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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this research was to develop and validate a conceptual design management 
model for international, collaborative remote site projects. In the last decade or so 
there has been an increasing number of remotely located and often environmentally 
sensitive sites becoming the focus for development work involving potential 
investors/entrepreneurs/stakeholders or government and non-government agencies. 
There were no previously documented empirical examples, nor theoretical models, for 
remote site design management. Projects on remote sites are frequently government 
funded, making the approval processes, and timelines for example, subject to political 
influence, which means that the projects are potentially more difficult to manage, at 
all levels of involvement. The conceptual model was developed in association with 
the development of a typology for remote sites, and an investigation of three 
previously completed eco-resort and Antarctic science projects located on 
environmentally sensitive world heritage sites. The model responded to and reflected 
the perceived need for a well-integrated management approach to remote site projects. 
The research aimed to also demonstrate the potential portability of the model, in terms 
of offering a basis for a relevant management framework for built environment 
projects, international scientific drilling projects and international humanitarian aid 
projects. Grounded theory and case-study methodology were adopted when 
developing the typology, the conceptual model and when validating the design 
management model, as it involved empirical enquiry that afforded investigation of the 
remote site design management phenomenon within a real-life contexts. Two main 
case studies were undertaken to test the model, one being an historical Antarctic 
Science Drilling Project and the other, a current UN Humanitarian Project in Sudan. 
The findings to date support the conceptual design management model as being 
relevant for not only non-profit and/or Humanitarian Aid projects in the Post-disaster 
Reconstruction context, but also for commercially based Antarctic Science projects. 
Subsequently, the model has also been applied to a Post-disaster Reconstruction 
project in Aceh managed by the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS).  
 
Keywords: case studies, design, management, framework, reconstruction, 
environment, remote sites, Humanitarian Aid, Antarctic. 
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FOREWORD 
The journey associated with the research and writing of this doctoral thesis, has been 
challenging, rewarding, and at times all–consuming. There have also been several 
chances to reflect on the research and why one embarked on a PhD in the first place. 
Interesting to also note how far my thinking and knowledge has progressed from those 
first days of enthusiastic, and at times naïve, endeavour to the realisations, shifts and 
expansions or refinements of those initial objectives and their subsequent and at times 
surprising outcomes. This is particularly evident when the end is finally drawing near, 
and one has that real sense of ownership of the research objectives and findings and 
yet be able to clearly identify what future associated research possibilities there are 
once the doctoral research is completed. 
The idea for researching into remote site projects from a management perspective, 
where there were collaborative international stakeholders involved, was essentially 
seeded initially from Antarctic, New Zealand and Australian world heritage project 
experiences and research, and a background in design and construction project 
management. The doctoral research process began with a reflective stage, reviewing 
published secondary data by others, and selected primary data from my masters 
degree a few years earlier (Kestle, 1995), that later informed the attributes and 
dimensional aspects of the development of a ‘remote site typology’. The journey then 
continued in earnest with a thorough and focussed literature review being conducted, 
(as written up in Chapters 2, 6 and 7 in particular) followed by the design of the 
research, including the proposed methodology, the development of a typology, a 
conceptual theoretical model, then the data collection, analysis and conclusions. Over 
time as the work progressed, the possibilities and realities of managing remote site 
(often world heritage) projects, with multiple stakeholders with various political 
agendas, differing management approaches and differing expectations regarding 
project outcomes emerged. Irrespective of how objective the researcher’s perspective 
aimed to be, acknowledgement is hereby made that personal experiences and the 
interpretations of the collected interview data have influenced the discussion of the 
results in part. However the intent, the content and the contributions to the research, of 
the interview transcripts have not been manipulated nor have they been diminished in 
their intent or value.   
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS                           
 
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................ii 
Publications that have resulted from this Doctoral Research ............................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................v 
FOREWORD...............................................................................................................vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................xi 
LIST OF TABLES .....................................................................................................xii 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS................................................................ xiii 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................1 
1.1 Rationale for the Research and Contribution to Knowledge ...................................1 
1.2 Focus and Position of the Research Project .............................................................2 
1.2.1 Remote Sites .....................................................................................................2 
1.2.2 Lean Design Management ................................................................................4 
1.2.3 Design Management .........................................................................................4 
1.3 Thesis Objectives .....................................................................................................5 
1.4  Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................................6 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE.....................................................................................7 
2.1 Introduction..............................................................................................................7 
2.2 Review of Lean Design Management......................................................................7 
2.2.1 Reviewing Current Practice ..............................................................................9 
2.2.2 Management....................................................................................................10 
2.2.3  Implications and Implementation of Lean thinking and Lean Production.....11 
2.3 Design Management Discipline and Processes......................................................12 
2.4 Current Issues around Design Management Practice ............................................13 
2.5 Project Management ..............................................................................................17 
2.6 Value Management ................................................................................................19 
2.7 Humanitarian Aid Management.............................................................................21 
2.8 Environmental Sustainability.................................................................................23 
2.9 Sustainable Development.......................................................................................25 
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY............................................................................29 
3.1 The Research Question ..........................................................................................29 
3.2 Choice of Methodology .........................................................................................29 
3.3 Testing and Further Development of the Conceptual Model.................................31 
3.3.1 Case Study Selection Process for Testing the Conceptual Design Management 
Model .......................................................................................................................32 
3.4 Sampling and Participant Selection .......................................................................33 
3.5 Human Ethics Process and Approvals ...................................................................33 
3.6 Data Collection ......................................................................................................34 
3.6.1 Interviews........................................................................................................35 
3.6.2 Interview Questions for Projects A and B ......................................................36 
3.7 Validity, Credibility and Dependability of the Collected Data..............................37 
3.7.1 Credibility .......................................................................................................37 
3.7.2 Dependability ..................................................................................................38 
3.8 Data Analysis .........................................................................................................38 
CHAPTER 4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TYPOLOGY......................................40 
4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................40 
4.2 Typologies..............................................................................................................40 
 viii
4.3 Development of Attributes and Dimensions for the Remote Site Projects Typology
......................................................................................................................................42 
4.3.1 Mapping the Properties and Attributes of a Selection of Previous Projects on 
Environmentally Sensitive Remote Sites.................................................................42 
a) Scientific Bases in the Ross Sea Region, Antarctica ...........................................43 
b) Kingfisher Bay Resort, Fraser Island (Australia) ................................................47 
c) Tongariro National Park (NZ) Huts and Ski Lodge sites on Department of 
Conservation Land. ..................................................................................................49 
4.4 Discussion in Reference to the Typological Attributes and Dimensions ..............57 
4.5 Conclusions............................................................................................................59 
CHAPTER  5.   DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
MANAGEMENT MODEL FOR REMOTE SITE PROJECTS ...........................64 
5.1 Introduction............................................................................................................64 
5.2 The need for a Conceptual Model for Remote Site Design Management .............64 
5.3 Theoretical Contributions to the Development of the Model ................................65 
5.4 Practice Contributions from the Exploratory Project Case Study Sites to the 
Development of the Model ..........................................................................................67 
5.5 Assumptions and Limitations of the Model...........................................................71 
5.6 Conclusions............................................................................................................71 
CHAPTER 6. THE CAPE ROBERTS DRILLING PROJECT ANTARCTICA – 
A RETROSPECTIVE HISTORICAL CASE STUDY...........................................73 
6.1 The Rationale for Conducting the Case Study.......................................................73 
6.1.1 Methodology ...................................................................................................73 
6.2 Contextualisation/Introduction ..............................................................................73 
6.3 The Management of the Project – the Original and Final Structures for the Pre-
Planning and Operational Stages. ................................................................................79 
6.3.1 The Management Structure – pre-1996 ..........................................................79 
6.3.2 Evolution of the Management Structure .........................................................81 
6.4 Management of the Environmental Considerations...............................................85 
6.5 The Key Project Management Recommendations by the CRP (1995-2001) 
Personnel......................................................................................................................87 
6.5.1 Summary of the lessons learned and recommendations for future projects ...87 
6.6 The Cape Roberts Drilling Project - the Realities of Managing............................91 
6.6.1 Interview Questions Part A – Associated with the Retrospective Case Study 
of the Cape Roberts Drilling Project........................................................................91 
6.6.2. Managing the Clients and Stakeholders.........................................................92 
6.6.3 Managing the Science .....................................................................................96 
6.6.4  Managing the Logistics..................................................................................99 
6.6.5 Managing the Design and Fabrication Process .............................................105 
6.6.6. The Managed Teams on ‘Being Managed’..................................................111 
6.6.7 Summary of the Keypoints from CRP Interview Questions Part A. ............113 
6.6.8.1 Data Collection ..........................................................................................119 
6.6.8.2 Analysis and Discussion of the Findings ...................................................120 
6.6.9 Concluding Statements .................................................................................122 
CHAPTER 7.  THE UN SUDANESE HUMANITARIAN AID (UNSHA) 
PROJECT WEST DARFUR – A CURRENT CASE STUDY.............................125 
7.1 The Rationale for Conducting the Case Study.....................................................125 
7.1.1 Introduction...................................................................................................125 
7.2 Contextualisation and Introduction......................................................................126 
7.3 The Current Management Context in Humanitarian Aid Agencies.....................128 
 ix
7.3.1 The Management Approach..........................................................................128 
7.3.2 The Organisational Context ..........................................................................129 
7.3.3 Disaster Phases..............................................................................................130 
7.3.4 Human Resources and how Staff are Employed on the Humanitarian Aid 
Projects...................................................................................................................131 
7.3.5 The Briefing and Training of Humanitarian Aid Staff at the Pre-planning 
Stages of an Aid Project.........................................................................................131 
7.4 The Review ..........................................................................................................132 
7.4.1 Mobilising humanitarian action ....................................................................132 
7.4.2 Supporting IDPs and Refugees in Darfur .....................................................134 
7.4.3 Managing the tensions between humanitarian aid activities and the political 
context....................................................................................................................135 
7.4.4 Situating Humanitarian Action in Relation to the Conflict...........................135 
7.4.5 Improving Coordination................................................................................136 
7.4.6 Crafting an Appropriate and Accountable International Presence................136 
7.5 The UN Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Project in West Darfur – the realities of 
managing the pre-planning and operational stages of the project..............................137 
7.5.1 Interview Questions Part A – the Overall UN Sudanese Humanitarian Aid 
Project in West Darfur ...........................................................................................137 
7.5.2 Managing the Clients and Stakeholders........................................................139 
7.5.3 Managing the Camps ....................................................................................140 
Management of the Camps’ Pre-planning Stages ..................................................140 
Management at the Operations Stage at the Camps...............................................141 
Management of Communications in and around the Camps .................................142 
Management of Human Resources associated with the Camps.............................142 
Suggestions for managing future projects in terms of management of the camps 142 
7.5.4 Managing the Logistics.................................................................................143 
7.5.5 Managing the Communications and Suggestions for Future Projects ..........146 
7.5.6 The ‘Managed on Being Managed’ - Suggestions for Managing Future 
Projects...................................................................................................................147 
7.5.7 Analysis of the Key Findings for Research Question Part A (i), ii) and iii) as 
related to the UN SHA Project in West Darfur......................................................147 
7.5.7.1 The Key Findings relative to Parts (i) and (ii) of the Question: ................147 
7.5.7.2 The Key Findings Relative to Part (iii) of the Question ............................153 
7.5.8 Concluding Thoughts on the Findings for Part A of the Interview Questions in 
this Chapter ............................................................................................................156 
7.6 The UN Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Project in West Darfur – the fit of the 
conceptual management model with the realities of managing the pre-planning and 
operational stages of the project ................................................................................157 
7.6.1 Interview Questions Part B ...........................................................................157 
7.6.2 Data Collection .............................................................................................157 
7.6.3 Analysis and Discussion of the ‘Key Factor’ Findings ................................158 
CHAPTER 8. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS....................................................164 
8.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................164 
8.2 The similarities and differences between the findings and analyses of the two main 
case-studies. ...............................................................................................................164 
8.2.1. The Similarities between the Findings.........................................................164 
8.2.2 The Differences between the Findings..........................................................166 
8.2.3 How the Findings Compared Overall ...........................................................167 
 x
8.3 Why the Model was Specifically Supported by Participants on the two main Case 
Study Projects ............................................................................................................167 
8.3.1. Antarctica - Cape Roberts Drilling Retrospective Case-study Findings 
Pertinent to the Support of the Model’s Four Key Factors for this Particular Project
................................................................................................................................168 
8.3.2 West Darfur Sudanese HA Case-Study Findings Pertinent to the Support of 
the Model’s Four Key Factors ...............................................................................169 
8.4 The Usefulness of the Model and the Changes over Time ..................................170 
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS..............................................................................172 
CHAPTER 10. FUTURE RESEARCH .................................................................174 
REFERENCES.........................................................................................................176 
Appendix A 
Appendix B 
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 Antarctica and the Southern Ocean (Waterhouse, 2001) 44 
Figure 2 New Zealand’s Scott Base, looking towards Mt Erebus (Waterhouse, 2001) 45 
Figure 3 USA’s McMurdo Base, looking towards Mt Erebus (Waterhouse, 2001) 46 
Figure 4 Kingfisher Bay Resort, Fraser Island (photograph courtesy of Kingfisher Bay Resort) 47 
Figure 5 Fraser Island locality map (courtesy of Kingfisher Bay resort) 48 
Figure 6 Map of Tongariro National Park and Conservancy locality plan 50 
Figure 7 Map of Tongariro National Park special zones showing wilderness and pristine areas 51 
Figure 8 Iwikau ski lodges, Mt Ruapehu, viewed from SH48 55 
Figure 9 Tukino lodges, east side of Mt Ruapehu (Kestle, 1995) 55 
Figure 10 Tukino Lodge, extreme winter conditions 55 
Figure 11 Mt Ruapehu ash eruption 1995, viewed from Mountain Access Rd 57 
Figure 12 Tukino lodges following Mt Ruapehu ash eruption 1995 57 
Figure 13 Exploratory design management conceptual model for remote sites (Kestle & London, 
2002) 71 
Figure 14 Cape Roberts camp and drill site (Cowie, 2002) 75 
Figure 15 Cape Roberts drilling sites and scientific bases locations within the Ross Sea Region 
(Cowie, 2002) 76 
Figure 16 Cape Roberts drill site operational and technical detail (Cowie, 2002) 78 
Figure 17 Cape Roberts drill rig and video monitoring hut in good and extreme weather 
conditions 79 
Figure 18 Management structure for the Cape Roberts Project published in the CRP 
Comprehensive Environment Evolution Report, January 1994 82 
Figure 19  Original CRP management structure (1993) 84 
Figure 20 Management structure as adopted in the CRP Operations Manual June 1996 84 
Figure 21 Map of Darfur region, Sudan (Source: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Darfur_map.png) 126 
Figure 22 Conditions in West Darfur camp for IDPs, 2004 127 
Figure 23 The Relief Response 130 
Figure 24 Field and Sectoral Organisation 130 
 xii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Kluge’s 4 stage approach to Typology Construction 41 
Table 2 Remote Site Comparisons (Kestle, London et al., 2002) 61 
Table 3 Key factors/plausible drivers in the development of the CDM model for remote sites 69 
Table 4 Key points from the Cape Roberts Drilling Project collected data in reference to the 4 
key Conceptual Design Management factors 120 
Table 5 Key points from the UNSHA West Darfur data in reference to the 4 key Conceptual 
Design Management factors 159 
 xiii
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AEC Architecture, Engineering and Construction 
AHC Australian Heritage Council 
ALNAP Active Learning Network or Account Ability and Performance  
ATCM Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 
ATS Antarctic Treaty System 
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere 
CEE Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation 
CEP Committee for Environmental Protection 
CERF Central Emergency Revolving Fund 
CIROS Cenzoic Investigations in the Western Ross Sea Region 
COMNAP Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs 
CRP Cape Roberts Project 
DASET Department of Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories 
DOC Department of Conservation (NZ)  
DFID Department for International Development 
EARP Environmental Assessment and Review Panel 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EPSRC Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council  
GB Great Britain 
GNS Geological Nuclear Sciences 
HA Humanitarian Aid 
HEC Human Ethics Committee (University of Canterbury) 
HRR Humanitarian Response Review 
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
ICOMOS International Council of Monuments and Sites 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons 
IEE Initial Environmental Evaluation 
IRW Islamic Relief Worldwide 
ISC International Steering Committee 
JEM Justice and Equality Movement 
JRS Jesuit Refugee Services 
 xiv
LINZ Land Information New Zealand 
MFE Ministry for the Environment 
MSF-H Medicins Sans Frontieres - Holland 
NDS National Strategies for Sustainable Development  
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations 
NSF National Science Foundation (United States) 
NZAP New Zealand Antarctic Programme 
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OHCHR Office of the High Commission for Human Rights 
OMG Operational Management Group 
PMI Project Management Institute 
QNPWS Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service 
Red-R Registered Engineers Disaster Relief 
RMA Resource Management Act 
SLA Sudan Liberation Army 
SMART Simple Multi-Attribute Rating Technique 
SSSI Sites of Special Scientific Interest 
TNP Tongariro National Park (NZ) 
TRP Tsunami Relief Program (in Aceh, Indonesia) 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNCSD United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development   
UNDSD United Nations Division of Sustainable Development 
UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
UNHQ United Nations Headquarters (Khartoum and Geneva) 
UNICEF United Nations Childrens Fund 
UNJLC United Nations Joint Logistics Centre 
UNSHA United Nations Sudanese Humanitarian Aid 
USAP United States Antarctic Programs  
 
 
 
 
 1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Rationale for the Research and Contribution to Knowledge 
Projects in remote locations such as the construction of dams, canals, oil rigs, and the 
rebuilding work associated with disaster relief have been undertaken for a number of 
years now, with disaster relief and reconstruction projects markedly increasing in the 
last five years or so, in Africa, Malaysia, Pakistan and China. These projects would 
appear to have several aspects in common such as multi-stakeholders, who sometimes 
form a management, operational and collaborative consortium(a) for the duration of 
the project; the work is often conducted under extreme weather/climatic conditions, 
and the processes associated with the environmental context and potential impacts, 
appear to involve significant and protracted protocols. Political agendas also appear to 
be evident on many if not all of these projects. Management of these remote site 
projects has been conducted by the scientific, oil exploration, engineering and 
humanitarian aid personnel and their related organisations, yet the management 
approaches have not been documented or published in the international research 
community from a theoretical perspective.  
An increasing number of remotely located and often environmentally sensitive sites 
are becoming the focus for new or post-disaster development work involving potential 
investors/entrepreneurs/stakeholders or government and non-government agencies. 
Projects on remote sites are frequently government funded, making the approval 
processes, and timelines for example, subject to political influence(s).This means that 
the projects are potentially more difficult to manage, at all levels of involvement. 
Projects located on remote sites often have extremely limited operational windows, 
due to extremes in local climatic conditions. As a result, remote site management has 
started to become more widespread, in recent years, as project participants are able to 
utilise advanced information technology and systems (Kestle & London, 2003).The 
clients, stakeholders, designers and construction industry representatives involved on 
these frequently sensitive remote sites have an increasing duty of care in a global 
sense, to these pristine environments and their associated ecosystems. The 
environmental movement in recent years has focused worldwide attention on the need 
for sustainable development of these remote sites, as against the pragmatics of the 
‘getting the job done, on time and to budget’ historical approach taken by construction 
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companies building in these areas distant from their home bases (Kestle & London, 
2003). The specifics associated with researching into design management and remote 
sites rendered no previously documented empirical examples, nor any theoretical 
models from published literature, and the research community had not considered nor 
created theories related to this specific topic, from an integrated design and 
management perspective. Theory-building and model-testing was therefore seen to be 
required in this field/discipline area of managing projects on remote, environmentally 
sensitive, and often hostile sites. The main objective of the doctoral research then 
became the development and validation of a conceptual theoretical model in the field 
of design management as specifically applied to internationally collaborative remote 
site projects.  
1.2 Focus and Position of the Research Project  
The thesis intends to inform the design management debate by contributing a 
conceptual design management framework/model for remote site projects, and an 
associated typology for remote sites. In addition, an analysis of multi-stakeholders 
viewpoints is presented on the usefulness of the management framework/model as a 
tool when managing and coordinating the pre-planning and operational stages of 
international scientific, humanitarian aid, and disaster reconstruction projects.  
The thesis draws on grounded theory, which is a systematic qualitative research 
methodology in the social sciences that emphasises the generation of theory from data 
in the process of conducting the research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), and also draws on 
case-study methodology. 
In order that the research topic, methodology, literature review and analysed data 
maybe more readily understood, early clarification of definitions and terminology was 
considered to be of paramount importance. The key terms associated with this 
research topic are therefore identified and clarified in the following subsections 1.2.1, 
1.2.2, and 1.2.3. 
1.2.1 Remote Sites  
These are typically located within environmentally sensitive regions primarily due to 
the region being previously undeveloped or under-developed. Sites can be categorised 
and considered to be ‘remote’ in relation to their,  
? environmental sensitivity 
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? the distance to the site from continuously available logistical support  
? the hostility of the environment in terms of the climate  
? the difficulty of physical access to the sites  
? the lack of available local materials and labour resources 
? be located in areas of hostile physical conditions.  
Further, remoteness when based on a continuum related to the physical distance of 
participants from the site, falls potentially into three different categories:  
1. Where the project participants such as the design, construction and facility 
management personnel are not at, or adjacent to, the project site, instead being 
located in another city or town. 
2. Where selected groups of the project participants are not initially located at or 
adjacent to the project site. For example, the design team and project/construction 
management teams have their offices in other countries or regions, and may move 
to the project site’s region, or install their agents within the region where the 
project site is located. 
3. Where the majority of the project participants are located adjacent to or actually at 
the project site, with the remainder (such as componentry suppliers or the 
conceptual design teams) being located remote from the project site. 
The majority of construction projects would typically fall within the third 
category.The most extreme situation in terms of a remoteness category, is category 1 
which would likely involve a range of differing project types within three 
predominant property markets, being: 
1. Commercial projects, and tourism including ecotourism. 
2. Government/NGO projects, scientific investigations, and space exploration. 
3. Civil infrastructure, such as oil /gas rigs, pipelines or dams. 
Remote sites pose unique challenges for the participants involved throughout the 
design, production and operational stages of a project. Most construction projects 
have a degree of remoteness and this having been acknowledged, means that projects 
can be viewed through a proxemics lens and the difficulties associated with 
remoteness, can be specifically explored. Increased global awareness of 
environmental issues and the emergent sustainability movement has created a focus 
for research and critical thinking in this area. However, there is still a lack of 
fundamental research in the area of the development and management of remote, 
environmentally sensitive and frequently hostile sites (Kestle & London, 2002). 
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1.2.2 Lean Design Management  
Lean design management in the construction industry has developed from the lean 
thinking and management approaches associated with the manufacturing industries, 
where there is a focus on efficient and effective production processes, minimising 
waste, and essentially producing exactly what the client wants. There are five key lean 
design management principles being Value, Value Stream, Pull, Flow and Perfection 
(Womack and Jones, 1996). ‘Value’ in this context refers to specifying value in terms 
of the product rather than by design. ‘Value Stream’ refers to when and how the 
‘value decisions’ are made. ‘Flow’ refers to ensuring that the resources are 
immediately available for when the product is to be produced. ‘Pull’ refers to 
customer demand, and ‘Perfection’ refers to the customised product being the focus 
of every aspect of lean design management. 
1.2.3 Design Management  
Design Management is regarded as an emerging field (Ballard & Koskela, 2002). The 
specifics associated with researching into remote sites rendered no previously 
documented theoretical models of remote site management. The discipline of design 
management is not focussed on design per se. Instead, design management within the 
disciplines of the built environment, is a complex process that is fundamentally 
concerned with the integration of specialist knowledge, value generation, and the 
critical timing of key design and management decisions. The design and construction 
processes have become more complicated and more fragmented over the last few 
years, and this has a series of differing, yet related, impacts on a number of factors.  
One of the significant factors is the difficulty surrounding the development of a 
shared understanding of the objectives of a project amongst the various stakeholders 
(Tombesi, 1997). Having a shared understanding that facilitates working toward the 
identification of what is valued in the project, impacts on how and when critical 
decisions are made on design and coordination issues. Poor integration of specialist 
user and producer stakeholder knowledge can result in an inappropriate synthesis of 
the needs analysis, leading to a lack of or a low level of value generation for the 
clients and stakeholders.  
Design management is considered, in some sectors, to be a complex social situation, 
and value to be a socially constructed phenomenon, which means that decision-
making can be inherently unpredictable (London, 2002). 
 5
Design managers have emerged as new and valued specialists on projects, who 
integrate and coordinate the design process, and in particular have the responsibility 
for the interface with other organisations involved on the project(s). Design managers 
are not normally the designers, though many are from design or management related 
backgrounds.  Instead they are process coordinators, who ensure that the process 
deadlines, reviews and consequentials are met. They ensure that there are sufficient 
integrative and coordinating mechanisms for the work to progress in a timely manner, 
keeping the focus on the tasks and objectives to achieve the value criteria set down 
and agreed at the initial stages of the project. 
The design and development process frequently involves a range of informed to ill-
informed decision-makers. This process and the resultant outcomes are driven by the 
initial and therefore critical decisions made at that time (London & Ostwald, 1996). 
Add the dimension of remote site projects and the complexity, and the critical nature 
of the initial decision-making stages increases and diversifies even further. Traditional 
project design and development issues expand to include those directly related to the 
location of the site, for example the lack of familiarity on the part of the personnel, 
with the social, physical, cultural and economic criteria.  
1.3 Thesis Objectives  
The objective has been set in terms of the overall research question, which is: 
“What are the key factors and drivers that constitute a plausible theoretical 
conceptual design management model for remote site projects?”  
The objective of this research is to develop and validate a conceptual design 
management model for remote site international collaborative projects, as there are no 
previously documented empirical examples, nor theoretical models that completely 
address remote site design management. The objective will be achieved by developing 
a typology specifically for remote sites using dimensions and attributes applied from 
previously published research, and the development of a conceptual design 
management model. The model will initially be developed by reviewing selected data 
from previously conducted research, and will then be tested in terms of two major 
case studies, which comprise a retrospective review (2003/4/5) of an historical case 
study of an Antarctic Drilling Project at Cape Roberts, and the other is a current UN 
Humanitarian Aid Project in West Darfur, Sudan (2004 onwards). 
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This research aims to not only develop and validate the theoretical design 
management model for remote sites, but may also demonstrate the potential 
portability of the model in terms of offering a basis for a relevant management 
framework for built environment projects, international scientific drilling projects and 
international humanitarian aid projects.  
1.4  Structure of the Thesis 
Chapters 1 to 3 comprise the Introduction, Literature Review and Analysis, 
Methodology and Research Rationale. The aim of these chapters is to set the context 
and rationale for the research, and describe the methodology being adopted. Each of 
the chapters includes links as relevant, to other chapters or sections of chapters. 
Chapter 4 documents the development of the Typology for Remote Sites 
Chapter 5 documents the development of the Conceptual Design Management Model 
for Remote Site Projects. 
Chapter 6 documents the Retrospective Historical Case Study research conducted on 
the Cape Roberts Drilling Project Antarctica in 2003-5. 
Chapter 7 documents the Case Study research work conducted on the UN Sudanese 
Humanitarian Aid Project -West Darfur in 2004/5. 
Chapter 8 is an overall discussion and comparative analysis of the findings, and how 
they may have impacted on the original conceptual design management model. The 
chapter also discusses the usefulness of the model on a range of very different remote 
site collaborative international projects.  
Chapter 9 documents the conclusions of the thesis.  
Chapter 10 discusses ideas for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The research was focussed on the design management discipline, and explored how it 
could potentially be interpreted, linked and implemented on remote site projects in 
environmentally sensitive areas internationally. To address the main objective of the 
research as outlined in Chapter 1, a review of published literature associated with the 
discipline of design management was undertaken to provide a framework for these 
remote sites. The review and analysis also explored perceived remote site design 
management links with the published literature on lean design management, 
humanitarian aid management, sustainable development, value management and 
environmental sustainability, in order to develop knowledge in these fields and 
establish gaps in the knowledge.  
2.2 Review of Lean Design Management  
The concepts and implementation of lean design principles and lean production were 
first introduced  in association with the car manufacturing industry, and have been 
subsequently interpreted and applied within the construction industry worldwide for 
the last two decades (Howell, 1999). There are five key lean design management 
principles being Value, Value Stream, Pull, Flow and Perfection (Womack and Jones, 
1996). These five principles were considered further by Garnett et al. (1998), who 
postulated that several different value strategies need to occur within single projects 
as the client may have one definition of value, whereas the end user or the 
stakeholders may have others. This is not dissimilar to previous design and value 
management literature. 
Howell and Ballard (1998) discussed the goals of lean thinking, and the early 
misconceptions and resistance amongst construction industry personnel regarding lean 
thinking being a useful management tool, regarding lean thinking as being simply a 
manufacturing technique. However, Howell and Ballard (1998), “believed that the 
goals of lean thinking does in fact describe the management of dynamic projects,” 
and went on to state that, “Lean is a value seeking process that maximises value and 
continually redefines perfection”, and that “the goals of lean thinking redefine 
performance against three dimensions of perfection,  
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• a uniquely custom product,  
• delivered instantly, and  
• nothing in stores”.  
This in their view essentially maximises value and minimises waste. This third 
dimension of perfection certainly has relevance for the Antarctic sites in particular, as 
discussed later. They further suggested that “Lean thinking forces attention on how 
value is generated rather than how any one activity is managed” (Howell & Ballard, 
1998), and that “lean production presents a very different model –where production is 
managed so that actions are aligned to produce unique value for the customer.”  This 
they said was basically achieved by ensuring that value to the customers, throughput, 
management, information and materials required to completion, were the primary 
objectives. Conversely, Howell and Ballard, (1998) postulated that project 
management was essentially a combination of activities, stating that “lean thinking 
views the entire project in production system terms, that is one large operation…..and 
implementing lean means adopting a ‘project-as-production-system’ approach 
…defining the objective in customer terms and decentralizing management.”   
The lean thinking and lean production tenets were identified by Womack and Jones 
(1996), as including ‘specifying value by product’ thereby essentially placing the 
specification of value ahead of design;  ‘identifying the value stream’, which 
influences when and how decisions are made; ‘making product flow’ at the ‘pull 
(demand) of the customer’, ‘whilst pursuing  perfection’ and ‘customised product’. 
Mapping of the value stream is probably better understood as a collection of ‘process 
flow charts’ that identify which actions determine when the next operation can start, 
according to Howell and Ballard (1998). This could be regarded as having similarities 
to critical path analysis for task management planning. The current practice is one of 
encouraging rapid completions in order to try and keep costs and completion times to 
a minimum, but in reality this basically results in cautious ‘fail safe’ approaches being 
taken by project participants, to protect themselves, against uncertainties on the 
project”. Under lean thinking, improvements are made by reducing uncertainty in 
work flow, hence eliminating the need for intermediate backlogs, and then 
redesigning the planning system at the operations level” (Howell & Ballard, 1998). 
As a result of lean thinking being about a ‘product-as-production system’ approach, 
rather than those that are currently contract or activity focused, it basically takes on 
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board the uncertainty and complexity of the project. By doing this, lean (thinking) 
aims to translate local level improvements into better results for the whole project, by 
reviewing every stage as a part of the whole, and identifying their impacts on the 
outcomes. According to Howell and Ballard (1998), there is a need to be more 
focussed and aware of production management, rather than productivity 
improvement. As reporting on productivity, particularly at the activity level, they 
suggest is “missing the point of system performance”.        
2.2.1 Reviewing Current Practice 
Much of the research on lean thinking and lean design falls into the tactical category 
rather than being strategic and theoretical, a view supported by Garnett et al. (1998).  
There were a few papers (Brochner, 1995; Melles, 1997 and Fisher, 1997) that were 
concerned with lean concepts that made reference to culture, people and translation 
perspectives. Koskela (1997) and Seymour (1999), suggested proposals for 
implementing lean construction at the organisational level rather than just at the 
operational level. In essence, “to achieve a lean enterprise”, Seymour suggested, the 
principles of value, value stream, flow, pull and perfection need to be considered at a 
strategic rather than just at the tactical level(s). This work was followed up two years 
later by Seymour and Rooke (2001) using an ethnomethodological approach in terms 
of their sitework activities, this time in a visibly orderly manner, by changing their 
mindset essentially.  
Howell and Ballard (1998) agreed with London’s research (1997), where it was 
suggested that changes of the mental model needed to be made. They further 
suggested that lean thinking, applied at the beginning or alternatively applied midway 
in well run projects, revealed the weaknesses of the current systems by mapping the 
project value stream. The manner in which the design process stage is handled has a 
significant, and often deleterious effect on all of the subsequent stages of construction 
project production, according to Huovila (1999), Ballard (1998), and Formoso (1998). 
These researchers put forward a range of propositions to minimise the problems for 
the production personnel, including integrating the design and construction processes, 
and changing mental attitudes. The separation of design and construction had long 
been identified as one of the key problems of construction, and that whilst design and 
build goes some way toward organisational integration, Huovila (1999), Ballard and 
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Koskela (1998), and Formoso (1998), still believe that there is significant room for 
improvement in terms of the design process. 
2.2.2 Management 
In lean design management literature value has been the sole focus of research 
investigations and found to be an important part of design management. However, 
other models have been explored by Formoso et al. (1998) that include conversion 
and flow in their investigations. Further to this work by Formoso et al.(1998), Ballard 
and Koskela (1998), Freire and Alarcon (2000), concluded that three distinct models -
conversion, flow and value generation - comprise the process of lean design, but 
added that the principles of lean design are generally unknown to the general public. 
An analysis of the application of some of the lean construction principles to design 
management from the point of view of design as conversion, flow and value 
generation was made in a paper by Tzortzopoulos and Formoso (1999). The findings 
from the two Brazilian case studies in their paper identified some gaps in the 
knowledge of the application of theory in design and in particular the value generation 
view of design concepts and principles.  
The lean design management literature primarily focuses on the production approach 
and processes, but a few of the researchers, for example (Garnett, 1999, Huovila & 
Koskela, 1998) adopted a more sociological approach to lean design. The lean design 
principle of ‘flow’ is relevant from a sociological and environmental viewpoint, as it 
tends to be focussed on a more holistic approach for theoretical and project 
development work. In addition, remote sites, which are frequently environmentally 
sensitive, may need a more holistic approach. 
An ethnographic case study was made of the partial implementation of the value 
stream approach on a construction project by Garnett (1999), and the model created 
was tested to develop a target baseline for improvement throughout the entire process. 
The results to date suggest that the UK construction industry is challenged by the 
cultural change, whilst several US companies have witnessed significant gains by 
employing lean thinking. Garnett (1999) believed that her research will contribute to 
new theory on lean thinking by taking a social constructivist methodological approach 
to the process work, “through ethnographic case-based research”.  
The question of how to use lean production philosophy to promote the necessary 
changes in the design process is significant. The essential lean construction principles 
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of integration and minimising design procedure conceptual changes, would increase 
buildability and lower the production costs of a project (Melhado, 1998). 
2.2.3  Implications and Implementation of Lean thinking and Lean 
Production 
The implications of lean thinking and production show that it is worth reflecting on 
how lean thinking coordinates action (Howell and Ballard, 1998). Specifying value by 
product to the customer shapes all actions around customer requirements and 
managing the work flow at the design phase of the projects. Focussing on the design 
phase is one of the challenges for the new discipline of lean construction. Historically 
in construction, specifying value has often come after design (Ballard, 2000) 
Lean thinking is based upon principles of  flow and value within the context of a 
production oriented world, whereas the more holistic approach to lean design 
management as explored by a few researchers over the last few years identifies 
additional significant design management factors. These researchers refer to the 
importance of, and the means to achieve sustainable development. They believe that 
whilst traditional design and construction focuses on cost, performance and quality 
objectives, sustainable design and construction by comparison, focuses on value 
generation, minimization of resource depletion, minimization of environmental 
degradation and the importance of information flow management. 
Information management can be considered from a sociological viewpoint, however it 
has a significant effect on production factors/processes, if planned or implemented 
ineffectively. The decisions made, and the successful implementation of those 
decisions by all personnel, depend on regular and clear communications, whether 
verbal, digital or in the form of hardcopy documentation.  
In summary, much of the lean design management research has been primarily 
concerned with sequential production and that a few authors are now in fact exploring 
a more sociological design management approach. 
In terms of project implementation, this stage relies on commencing once the design 
or product development stage is complete. Garnett et al. (1998), suggested that “using 
pre-planning, longstanding teams, would develop generic processes for designing 
developing and constructing the product on the basis of value stream maps”, leads to 
better overall integrity of the product/project, as it is operating as a series of teams 
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interfacing with key physical systems. The management of these interfaces is the 
responsibility of the ‘project integrator’ otherwise known as the design manager.   
2.3 Design Management Discipline and Processes 
Design management from within the disciplines of the built environment is a complex 
process concerned primarily with value generation, integration of specialist 
knowledge, and the timing of key decisions. In Chapter 1, design management was 
described as being fundamentally concerned with value generation, and that 
understanding what constitutes value is a difficult process. The design process has 
become more complex and more fragmented in recent years resulting in more actors 
who have design knowledge requiring integration (Tombesi, 1997). This impacts 
upon a number of factors, not the least being the difficulty of the development of a 
shared understanding of the objectives for a project among stakeholders. Identifying 
what is valued in the project impacts upon how critical decisions are made on design 
issues. This is an important point in the development of the design management field, 
as it is the integration of those who have knowledge that can contribute to the design, 
construction and management, which is critical to developing and achieving value on 
projects. It is suspected though, that the process is not simple and straightforward. 
Instead, design management is a complex social situation, as value can be a socially 
constructed phenomenon and decision-making to that end can be inherently 
unpredictable. Design decision making is often negotiated amongst groups and teams 
– it is an iterative process. The stakeholders of value can also change through the 
various stages of the design, construction and occupancy stages, and each group of 
actors may differ in perspective based upon their worldview. The power to negotiate 
and guide design decisions and assist with establishing building performance criteria 
changes at different times of the process. In many cases their voice is not heard at 
critical times (London, 1997, London, 2002). 
Poor integration of specialist user and producer stakeholder knowledge can have far 
reaching consequences, such as inappropriate synthesis of the needs analysis leading 
to low value generation for the client and users. In many cases identifying value is a 
socially constructed process between the stakeholders, who incidentally are not just 
design and construction teams–but are those actors who can contribute to improved 
design and construction building performance (London, 2002). 
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In recent years the need for the role of design manager has become more apparent, as 
being a specialist who integrates and coordinates the design process. Gray and 
Hughes (2001) discuss design management and identify two levels of responsibility 
for the design and its production, one being the associated authority for decision-
making, and the other being the responsibility for the interface with other 
organizations. They maintain that the task of the design manager is to ensure that the 
organisation of the design process is structured appropriately, to ensure that there are 
sufficient integrative and coordinating mechanisms for the work to progress 
meaningfully. They claim that a framework has to be established which keeps the 
focus on the tasks and objectives to achieve the value criteria set down in the initial 
stages. An alternate position was taken by Green (1994) when researching in the value 
management field. He adopted the approach of placing value generation at the centre 
of the design process rather than employing outside consultants to carry out a series of 
value engineering critiques throughout the various development stages. This is not 
unlike the study conducted by London (2002), whereby a design management model 
for the development of performance based briefing was tested and the group 
interaction between stakeholders was analysed. The premise was that there was no 
need for an external chief decision maker, however there was a need for a design 
manager to integrate and manage knowledge that is within the stakeholder groups. 
The nature of complex group dynamics affects design and building performance 
criteria. 
When there is a strict timeline for the completion of a project, for example, a 
restricted window of constructability and accessibility to the remote site due to 
climate or other reasons, the timing of the decision to proceed toward the concept 
design stage and financially commit to the project is absolutely critical to the 
subsequent design and construction stages and completion of the project on time.  
The resultant of delays in making key decisions can mean that the entire project 
becomes unviable on remote sites, particularly where accessibility is limited by 
seasonal weather conditions. 
2.4 Current Issues around Design Management Practice  
Ballard and Koskela (1998), suggested that there was very little literature on design 
management theory, and claimed that the way forward for design management was to 
have “a management philosophy and tools that fully integrate conversion, flow and 
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value perspectives”, and that “the management of engineering and design on 
architectural engineering construction, (AEC)  projects is problematic”. The most 
significant problems were seen as being poor briefing and communication, and a lack 
of technical knowledge and/or confidence in the preplanning stages of the design 
work (Coles, 1990). On the same topic, Sverlinger (1996) had found that the most 
“frequent deviations” as he called them were “deficient planning and/or resource 
allocation, deficient or missing input information and changes”, and Josephson 
(1996) conducted a construction defects study and found that from a cost perspective, 
in particular, “design-caused defects” were the largest category and specifically those 
resulting from a lack of coordination between disciplines. All of which supports the 
view that in depth and carefully coordinated pre-planning across the various 
disciplines involved on the project is essential to minimize design-caused defects. 
This also suggests a collective argument amongst design management researchers that 
there are currently shortcomings in the practice of design management. 
One view on the reason for this was made by Ballard and Koskela (1998 & 2002) 
which was that “that there is a lack of solid conceptual foundation”. As a means of 
addressing this, Ballard and Koskela (1998 & 2002) conducted a review of state-of-
the-art practice and research concepts and models. They also proposed a new 
conceptual framework of design management. Finally, they analysed the implications 
of this framework and called for systematic research collaboration in order to improve 
design management.  
The first review conducted and evaluated by Ballard and Koskela (1998 & 2002) 
involved the investigation of ‘Design Management as Project Management’, where 
they found that “the conventional view on design management had essentially been 
the same as in project management”.  
Empirically conducted research by organizations such as the Project Management 
Institute in 1996, in particular, and as promoted in best practice guidebooks by Gray 
et al. (1994) had suggested a lack of application of project management methods. 
However, Ballard and Koskela (1998 & 2002), in research findings that built on 
research done by Koskela in 1993, suggested that, 
“project management concepts and techniques have proven incapable of solving the 
difficult problems of design management. The main reason being that project 
management concepts are rooted in the conversion model” which assumes that “the 
work to be done can be divided into parts and managed as if those parts were 
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independent one from another”, and uses “management techniques such as ‘work 
breakdown structures’ and ‘earned value analysis’.” “This is fundamentally a 
contracting mentality, which facilitates the management of contracts, rather than the 
management of (design) production”. 
The second review conducted and evaluated by Ballard and Koskela (1998) 
investigated the concept and practice of ‘Concurrent Engineering’ which is concerned 
with the product development process within the area of product design and 
manufacturing (Ulrich & Eppinger, 1995). The fact that concurrent engineering aims 
to address the needs of multiple stakeholders in an integrated, almost simultaneous 
manner, whilst also considering multiple design criteria, was of particular value and 
interest when reviewing the literature, and trying to establish the need for a conceptual 
design management model for remote sites. The projects on remote sites usually 
involve multiple stakeholders, and multiple design criteria, so the question is whether 
there should be an integrated management approach, as design is usually an iterative 
and sequential rather than concurrent process. According to Ballard and Koskela’s 
work in 1998, “concurrent engineering concepts have just begun to enter the AEC 
(Architecture, Engineering and Construction) community, for example, the 
application of information technology. Another related trend is the use of cross-
functional teams in construction projects such as ‘partnering’ ,  however, partnering 
alone has proved insufficient for the management of production (Howell et al. 1996), 
and  at the time of their research in 1998, “no generally accepted model of concurrent 
engineering in AEC projects”  had been created or adopted in effect. 
The third review conducted and evaluated by Ballard and Koskela in 1998, involved 
‘Design Process Models’, and included a design phase process model by Roozenburg 
and Eekels (1995), that identified programming as a pre-design function, and a design 
constructability model by O’Connor (1993), that was developed in the process 
industry sector. Neither of these so-called AEC models was found to specifically 
address or present the process of generating and applying design criteria for the 
production of AEC facilities, whose cycle tends to be more about problem solving 
than the generation of aesthetics design associated directly with the design and 
production of buildings. In addition, Ballard and Koskela (1998) also concluded that 
“constructability is really only one of many relevant process criteria”.  
The fourth review into the current practice and problems associated with design 
management, by Ballard and Koskela (1998 & 2002) involved looking at ‘Design as 
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Value Management’. They found that “there is a tendency to disregard or underplay 
the extent to which value to the customer is created rather than simply revealed by 
questioning”, and they suggested that value is most likely generated as a result of  a 
learning process, that involves a detailed dialogue between the client and the service 
provider. Value engineering, is directly linked to and often simply referred to as value 
management, usually involves a peer review process conducted at the various project 
development stages by external consultants, to establish where the value is being 
generated, or potentially lost for the client.     
Of particular interest for the remote site design management research literature 
review, was the comment by Ballard and Koskela (1998 & 2002), that 
“conceptualizing value as a generation process and developing effective process tools 
is much needed by the AEC industry”. Green (1994) offered a slightly differing angle 
on the creation and review of value for the client by suggesting that “value generation 
be placed at the centre of the design process” which ensures a continuous proactive 
approach at all stages of the project development and beyond. 
The fifth and last review and evaluation, by Ballard and Koskela (1998) investigated  
problems associated with current design management practice involved ‘Information 
Technology’ and they found that support for design and management, had been 
significantly realized in practice and research, by the creation of Information Models 
for product and process, and yet a paucity of improved design process. Ballard and 
Koskela (1998) also noted that Fenves (1996) had called for “a science base of 
application of information technologies,…..where one component of this base would 
deal with the understanding of the processes of planning, design and management,…”    
and went on to say that “ we need to agree on an intellectual framework, in order to 
create a scientific understanding or abstraction of engineering practices in practice.” 
Ballard and Koskela (1998 & 2002) concluded that whilst these five ‘state of the art’ 
(of design management) reviews had revealed several interesting and apparently 
effective new features, that “ the approaches were fragmented and that they lacked a 
solid conceptual foundation”. They went on to suggest that the way forward was to 
simultaneously view design management, as applied to engineering in particular, as 
conversion, flow and value generation, rather than the more traditional view of  
engineering as a conversion. The ‘conversion view’ is basically about ‘getting the task 
done’ using practices such as ‘work breakdown structure’ and the ‘critical path 
method’, where ‘flow and generation’ and even the client are not considered in the 
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programming, or outcomes. Further, Ballard and Koskela (1998) noted that “in the 
conversion view, production management is the ‘local’ responsibility of those whom 
the various parts are assigned or contracted, and the project is essentially considered 
to be successful if everyone meets their contractual obligations. Again of specific 
interest for remote site design management was the comment by Ballard and Koskela 
(1998 & 2002) that “what is needed is a management philosophy and tools that 
integrate the conversion, flow, and value views.”  In addition, they called for a 
collaborative and integrated exploration of the design management domain, in order 
to improve the conceptual framework, including the testing of potential tools, the 
validation of hypotheses and theories.  
Building on Ballard and Koskela’s (1998) previous work, Koskela et al. (2001) then 
published design management research involving the empirical findings from their 
selected cases studies. The findings suggested that there were still deficiencies in 
design management, in terms of process transformation (previously referred to as 
conversion), from inputs to outputs, the flow of information and the process of 
generating value for customers/clients. They further argued that what was required to 
create effective design management methods were relevant conceptualisations 
informed by empirical data. Koskela et al. (2001) compared the findings with those of 
Lindkvist (1996), where construction professionals were identified the five most 
significant design and management issues in the early phases of projects were all 
related to client decision–making. The issues ranged from the decision-makers 
initiating the project too late on short duration projects, to not articulating their actual 
needs either at all, or being unclear, to leaving insufficient time for accurate and 
methodical planning to occur, to a lack of coordination, and follow-up between 
documented information. These findings also concur with those of Sverlinger (1996), 
previously referred in this chapter, particularly in reference to what he termed  
“frequent deviations”, that were made up of  “deficient planning and/or resource 
allocation, deficient or missing input information and changes.”   
The resultant being a lack of management and production performance on AEC 
projects, in particular. 
2.5 Project Management 
Project management theories and practice have been researched and documented for 
at least two decades and according to Winter et al., (2006) there is now evidence that 
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an increasing number of organisations, across differing sectors and industries are 
adopting project management standards and practices.  
“No longer just a sub-discipline of engineering, the management of projects is now 
the dominant model in many organisations for strategy implementation, business 
transformation and continuous improvement” (Winter et al., 2006). 
However, one of the most significant and ongoing concerns raised by Winter et al. 
(2006), was that “the current conceptual base of project management continued to 
attract criticism for its lack of relevance to practice”. The Project Management 
Institute’s (PMI) ‘Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge’ was 
criticised by Morris (2003), as “containing nothing detailed on project strategy, 
nothing on project definition, and little on value management” and essentially 
suggested that project management was viewed by many organisations as essentially 
an ‘execution’ discipline that was required to simply ‘deliver a project on time to 
budget and to scope’. He further suggested that “project management, like all 
management, is contextual, and it is managing projects in their changing modern 
contexts that is the real challenge”. Another criticism raised by Geraldi et al. (2008), 
when discussing the need for innovative approaches in project management, was “the 
(current) lack of consideration of social skills in projects and just as importantly, its 
lack of contextualisation”.  
Research conducted by a new research network called ‘ Rethinking project 
management – developing a new research agenda’  was funded by UK’s Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and undertaken from 2004-2006 by 
Winter et al. (2006). The main objective of the funded research was to create an inter-
disciplinary network of practitioners, researchers and academics to improve real 
world project management practice and establish a relevant future research agenda, 
from the analysis of the collected data. Findings established that the new research 
network needed to go beyond the previous intellectual and academic project 
management approaches, and be more closely aligned to the challenges encountered 
in project management practice in-the-field. Further, a framework comprising five 
future research directions was produced by Winter et al. (2006, p642). This 
framework called for “new models and theories which recognise and illuminate the 
complexity of projects and their management at all levels”, “concepts that focus on 
the interaction amongst people and the framing of projects within an array of social 
agendas, practices, stakeholder relations, politics and power,” and “concepts and 
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frameworks which focus on value creation as the prime focus of projects”. A further 
relevant observation for this remote site management research was the comment made 
in the research network findings that “theories about practice can also be used as 
theories for practice”. The network project also established from the data analysis 
that future research needed to specifically focus on creating theories and concepts 
which were closely aligned with ‘in the field’ realities, and which provided project 
practitioners with realistic and contemporary management frameworks.  
The data collected from the practitioners by the research network referred to the 
complexity of projects, created in the main by ‘the multiplicity of stakeholders and 
their differing agendas’, and ‘theories, practices and communications operating within 
the different interest groups’. They suggested that concepts and frameworks which 
would help them deal with the project complexity issues ‘in the midst of practice’ 
would be useful, and which recognised an interdisciplinary approach, social process, 
project conceptualisation, value creation and value management (Winter et al., 2006).  
2.6 Value Management  
There are three different yet related approaches and thinking associated with value 
management, that of ‘value engineering’, ‘value management’ and ‘SMART value 
management’.    
Green (1994), in his published work on SMART (simple multi-attribute rating 
technique) value management for building projects, discussed the ways in which 
value management and value engineering differ in terms of their approach to project 
management thinking in particular. He suggested that “value engineering is perhaps 
the epitome of what has become known as ‘hard systems thinking’ where the aim is to 
find efficient ways to achieve an objective that is firstly clearly defined, is assumed to 
be well structured, and stays constant over time. Interestingly too, the process of value 
engineering tends to be retrospective, and takes place toward the end of the design 
process. The ‘hard systems thinking’ approach is generally considered to be totally 
unrealistic in terms of real- world projects and their associated challenges, which are 
dynamic and forever evolving by nature. However, ‘hard systems thinking’ according 
to Green (1994) is a legitimate approach for ‘static problems’, where outside 
influences or variables do not/cannot affect a situation where conditions can be 
controlled for example. But according to Green (1994), “it has consistently failed 
when applied to real-world problems, which are messy, dynamic and ill-defined”.    
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As already discussed under the principles of design management, one of the very first 
aims is to try and establish shared and agreed objectives across a range of 
stakeholders. What was being argued by Green (1994) was exactly that point, and that 
was that the hard thinking systems do not work for building and design related 
projects. He went on to argue that “ the continued failure of hard systems thinking as 
applied to social problems, has led to the evolution of and alternative 
paradigm,…described as ‘soft systems thinking’. This approach involves embracing 
the full range of views held or objectives sought, by the various stakeholders and then 
in certain circumstances, recording and at times modelling the stakeholders’ 
perceptions, in order to learn how to work with the rest of a team to achieve a 
mutually agreeable set of objectives, referred to by Green (1994) as a “shared social 
reality” which came out of research work on ‘requisite decision models’ by Phillips 
(1984). This then is the basis of the value management approach versus that of value 
engineering, as it involves a team or teams of decision-makers and/or designers 
running workshops with agreed and structured processes that undertake to work 
through all of the issues, perceptions and consequences of the entire team on a 
particular project. Interestingly, this approach also describes the design review 
process undertaken by design managers in their role as coordinator of the design 
team(s). This then makes useful links with the published research literature and 
findings herein by Ballard and Koskela (1998), where they referred to their 
investigations into design management as value management, in subsection 4 of this 
chapter. Value management appears to demonstrate strong links with design 
management as it usually occurs in the early design stages of a project, and involves 
the major stakeholders in order to establish differing perceptions of what the issues 
are on a project, any project. A new approach to value management mooted by Green 
(1994) but originally developed by Edwards (1977), is based on  the  multi-attribute 
utility which theory, and is known as the ‘simple multi-attribute rating technique’ 
(SMART), is considered useful for problem structuring according to Edwards (1977), 
and for value management as it embraces ‘soft systems thinking’. Central to this 
technique is Phillips (1984) concept of the requisite decision model as mentioned 
earlier in this section of the literature chapter, and according to Edwards (1977), 
“SMART provides the basic framework for the decision model”, which is then 
constantly revised until such a time as it accurately represents the ‘shared social 
reality’ of the group, “ the model is then considered to  be ‘requisite’”, and forms the 
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basis for all the social aspects of the decision-making, and acting as a common 
reference point, to effectively guide the actions associated with the project. Green 
(1994) alluded to the implications of the various value management debates as to 
which approach may be more plausible for project managers. He suggested that whilst 
some researchers believe that successful project management relies on both soft and 
hard systems thinking, that in fact the SMART technique for value management, 
provides project managers with an opportunity to get involvement at the early stages 
of the design and play an important role, and exercise more control over the pre-
planning design stages of the project. This suggests that there are mutually inclusive 
outcomes emerging between the SMART value management approach, and that of 
remote site design management.    
2.7 Humanitarian Aid Management 
Literature relating to management processes includes documents such as the UNHCR 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) Handbook (1999) which tends to 
be very strong on objectives, but not so clear on how the objectives can actually be 
achieved. The UNHCR Handbook guidelines state for example that “there is no 
single blueprint for refugee emergency management: each refugee emergency is 
unique. However, experience shows that emergencies tend to evolve according to 
certain recognizable ad documented patterns.”  This suggests then that disasters tend 
to have discernable patterns, and one would perhaps expect there to be a specific 
management process that can be applied for each situation across the range of disaster 
pattern(s). This is not the case. The UNHCR Handbook basically sets out the desired 
outcomes, and then leaves it for the ‘reader’ to select the necessary management 
processes to achieve those outcomes, and further suggests that “there is no single 
obvious right answer.” 
The current management situation in humanitarian aid agencies appears to 
demonstrate significant gaps in the understanding of disaster management within the 
human aid community, with Fitz-Gerald et al. (2002), reporting that, “The 
humanitarian aid community is also a ‘slow follower’ in the adoption of management 
tools and techniques”, and that, 
this can be explained or defended on the basis that humanitarian aid is 
delivered in an environment where no two situations are the same. 
Consequently, there is no single model that can be applied, and the absence of 
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effective lessons-learned mechanisms that ensure positive and negative 
experiences are addressed throughout all levels of the organisation 
encourages reinvention with each deployment. 
Humanitarian aid organisations and the inter-relation between participants within the 
aid community tends to be very complex, as there are several stages to disaster 
response efforts, and differing emergency and recovery phase, operational or field 
relationship variations that can occur, according to Willitts-King and Harvey (2005), 
and Manfield (2001). The aid industry as reported in Fitz-Gerald and Neal (2002), 
discussed the debates regarding management issues within the humanitarian aid sector 
stating that,  
“the view of management is often either taken to mean traditional development 
project management, or is equated to experience and knowledge of the aid system”, 
and went on to suggest that “the aid system is very much a value chain requiring a 
different management approach, one that takes greater account of the activities of 
different players participating in a chain that should be viewed as a whole.” 
In addition, the legal and political status of those directly affected by the conflict, and 
therefore the potential recipients of the aid, is considered critical in the determination 
of what aid assistance can or cannot be given (Kestle et al. 2006). Research conducted 
by Potangaroa and Kahn (2003), looked at the project management issues, and the 
approaches taken, when constructing refugee camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 
2001-2002. In their work they referred to work by Bohn (2000) who wrote in the 
Harvard Business Review on the topic of emergency response management ‘fire 
fighting rules’, suggesting that “organisations develop many rules of thumb for ‘fire 
fighting’ rather than problem solving, and that when that organisation is under stress, 
adoption of these ‘fire fighting’ rules will not be constructive and will actually add 
further to the original problems”. According to Potangaroa and Kahn, a significant 
number of the problem-solving approaches that Bohn (2000) suggested were in 
conflict with the general management approach submitted by Fordham (2000). For 
example, the suggested participatory approach of consulting widely and being 
inclusive of all those affected by an issue was challenged by Bohn (2000) as being a 
‘drain’ on people’s problem solving time and particularly on those who were the best 
‘fire fighters’ in the organisation.  
The project management methodologies specifically adopted for the refugee 
camps, used simple system type approaches, in conjunction with a strong 
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objectives management approach. Each camp was typically a small town of 
20,000 people, in remote locations, with difficult timelines, different cultures 
and dire consequences should they (the camps) not be constructed in a timely 
manner. 
(Potangaroa & Khan, 2003).  
Two main management issues apparently arose in terms of the construction of these 
refugee camps in Pakistan, being a lack of on-site co-ordination that created delays, 
and a lack of appreciation for planning timelines and scheduled deadlines on site, due 
in the main to a paucity of professional personnel employed by the NGOs.  
Potangaroa and Khan (2003) went on to conclude that “the crucial aspect is on-site 
management and planning, with the emphasis being on- site rather than at some 
distant regional or sub-office” such as is the case where many of the agencies and 
NGOs have their offices (and therefore the control centre) located some distance away 
from the actual site(s). Interestingly, the findings of Potangaroa and Khan’s (2003) 
research, resonate with the remote site design management research, particularly 
where they say that two of the important ‘lessons to be learned’ from a management 
perspective are that timely decision-making is crucial, and that decision-making on-
site is a necessity, and that regular on-site meetings and progress updates are essential 
for effective communication. The research conducted by Haigh et al. (2006) on the 
levels of disaster preparedness, response and recovery after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
in 2004 for example, supported the findings of previous researchers when they 
identified  a lack of effective information and knowledge dissemination as one of the 
major reasons for unsatisfactory performance levels of current disaster management 
practices”. They continued by suggesting that “Future research must aim at 
increasing the effectiveness of disaster management by facilitating the sharing of 
appropriate knowledge and good practices”. 
2.8 Environmental Sustainability 
One of the underlying concepts of ‘sustainability’ is that our relationship with the 
built and natural environments is permanent, and that there is an interdependent 
relationship between our activities and their effects on the planet. This is particularly 
relevant as many of the remote sites are pristine and therefore environmentally 
sensitive. At the initial stages of a project, consideration of, and responses to the 
environmental sensitivity of remote sites may often be paramount to the overall 
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design development, construction or implementation stages for these often hostile 
sites, as the impacts created by any development activities can have long-term effects 
on the local and unique ecosystems. In recent years, governing bodies have accepted 
that upholding certain principles in relation to sustainable development is their 
responsibility. There have been varying attempts to operationalise such high ideals 
and philosophies. Environmental sustainability refers to biodiversity, sustainable 
environments, sustainable development and ecological design, and when the New 
Zealand Resource Management Act was implemented in 1991, it was the first time 
that environmental protection and sustainability had become a legal requirement in 
any Act of Parliament internationally. This Act promotes the sustainable management 
of the development and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a 
rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and 
cultural wellbeing and safety,  whilst “sustaining the potential of natural and physical 
resources (except minerals), to meet the needs of future generations; safeguarding the 
life–supporting capacity of air, water, soil and ecosystems; and avoiding, remedying, 
or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment” (RMA 1991). 
Interpretations of the intent and meaning of the RMA in terms of sustainability range 
across the spectrum of cultural, social, economic and developmental realities (Low, 
1999). The UN defines sustainable development as “the development with which the 
needs of the present generation are filled without jeopardising the possibilities for 
future generations to fulfil their needs” (Low, 1999), whereas the World Business 
Council on Sustainable Development effectively breaks the term into ‘sustainable’ 
meaning continued, and ‘development’ meaning growth, hence ‘business as usual’ 
almost without ecological constraint.  
Many articles, papers and governmental acts and policies make value judgements 
when referring to sustainability. “The goals of sustainability are ecological and 
social, and the two issues are not separate” (Rogers, 1995). Diverse biological and 
natural environments have intrinsic values in terms of their visual, educational, 
heritage and spiritual qualities. As an example, Antarctica is frequently referred to in 
terms of its intrinsic value (Article 3, Antarctic Treaty, 1959) and is described as a 
‘polar wilderness’ (Dingwall,1998). These environments are reliant on high levels of 
biodiversity and evidence of mature ecosystems which are rare within pristine sites, 
and the management of these environments has largely been associated with various 
legal instruments, such as international treaties and national acts, for example the 
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Antarctic Treaty (1959), and the NZ Environmental Protection Act (1994), which 
designates Antarctica as a natural reserve devoted to peace and science. Associated 
with such legal instruments are policies and protocols that give guidance, which are 
sometimes legally binding or simply advisory. Consequently, those that have been 
recognised as having attributes to be preserved for future generations have been 
awarded World Heritage listings, and are Tongariro National Park New Zealand and 
Fraser Island Australia.  
Regulatory frameworks such as the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Environmental 
Protocol (1991), the Resource Management Act (1991), the Nature Conservation Act 
(1994) and the Burra Charter (Heritage Council, Australia), ensure that any person 
wanting to visit, develop or alter the nature of particular remote sites, adhere to strict 
criteria that protect the physical or heritage values of the sites for present and future 
generations. Once environments are established as worthy of sustainable 
management, then the development of these unique environments is critical. Under 
the Antarctic Treaty (1959), and the associated Environmental Protocol (1991), 
environmental principles have been established for the conduct of all activities, and 
all activities are subjected to prior environmental assessment, giving priority to 
scientific research that contributes to the understanding of the global environment and 
prohibits, for example, mineral resource extraction and the introduction of non-
indigenous animals. Projects conducted in Antarctica (such as the Cape Roberts 
Drilling Project, refer Chapter 6), have to go through rigorous and constraining 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures. These EIA procedures cover all 
activities, including the inception, viability, methodology, implementation and overall 
monitoring stages. Each and every potential environmental impact has to be 
identified, addressed and monitored. 
2.9 Sustainable Development 
Literature related to the management of the Ross Sea Region of Antarctica in terms of 
sustainable development included documented regulatory organisational structures 
and obligatory multilateral agreements. These are all agreements that are created 
under the Antarctic Treaty system.  
“Activities in the Ross Sea Region are regulated through the national administrative 
and legal structures of the states active in the region, giving effect not only to their 
domestic legal obligations but also international obligations”, (Waterhouse, 2001). 
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The Antarctic Treaty System comprises the actual Treaty of 1959, Conventions for 
the Protection of Seals and Marine Living Resources, and also the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991), which covers the area south 
of 60ºS and “establishes the guiding principles for all activity in the Ross Sea 
region.” All of these agreements are ‘in force’ internationally, and  
“Although the Treaty  itself does not include provisions relating to the environment, it 
does provide the administrative structure to do so. Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meetings (ATCMs) have adopted in excess of 100 legally binding environmental 
recommendations (known now as resolutions or measures) aimed at furthering 
implementation of both Antarctic Treaty and its Environmental Protocol.” 
(Waterhouse, 2001).  
These ATCMs occur on an annual basis and consequently many more ‘measures’ and 
‘resolutions’ have been implemented since 2001, requiring that any participants 
involved on scientific or other Antarctic programmes to familiarise themselves with 
the latest legal and/or compliance administrative processes and requirements.  
In terms of the retrospective case study conducted on the Cape Roberts Project (refer 
Chapter 6 of this thesis), the Protocol was not even ratified until 1998, so the literature 
review has therefore been limited to an overview of the Ross Sea region’s sustainable 
development compliance requirements.         
Sustainable development as it applies to Humanitarian Aid programmes falls under 
the jurisdiction of the United Nations Division for Sustainable Development 
(UNDSD). The UNDSD acts as an authoritative resource on sustainable development 
for the various UN agencies within the UN system, by promoting and operating as the 
‘secretariat to the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)’, and as a 
facilitator for the reporting, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of 
sustainable development at national, regional and international levels, 
(www.un.org/esa/sustdev).   
“The context for the Division’s work is the implementation of Agenda 21, the 
Johannesburg plan of Implementation and the Barbados Programme of Action for 
Sustainable Development of small island Developing States”   
(Agenda 21, n.d). 
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Within Agenda 21, two chapters in particular are the cornerstone references for 
sustainable development in the UNDSD and the Humanitarian Aid sector(s), and 
these are Chapter 40 and Chapter 8. Chapter 40 of Agenda 21 focuses on ‘indicators 
of sustainable development’ in terms of what they are, how they can be achieved and 
how they will be monitored. These indicators are required to increase the UN 
agencies’ international focus, in particular, on sustainable development and assist 
decision-makers to adopt rigorous and plausible policies regarding sustainable 
development. The third revised set of CSD indicators was finalised in 2006 by a 
representative group of experts from developing and developed countries and 
international organisations. This revised edition comprises 96 indicators, which 
includes 50 subset indicators and all, their associated reference and methodology 
sheets, to assist in meeting the sustainable development objectives for the specific 
geographical and/or agency specific area(s) of operation. Particularly pertinent to the 
UN Sudanese and Aceh Humanitarian Aid projects is in Chapter 40.3 where it refers 
to ‘information for decision-making’ - and there being a general lack of capacity for 
gathering and assessing data to inform decision-making information in developing 
countries, whether that is environmental, demographic, social and developmental data 
(Agenda 21, n.d). Chapter 8 of Agenda 21 focuses on ‘national strategies for 
sustainable development’ (NDS) that build on the relevant sectoral economic, social 
and environmental policies and plans that are operating in the particular country. The 
formulation and enhancement of the national strategies for sustainable development 
began in earnest in 2002, and the commencement of their implementation began in 
2005. In addition, “integrating the principles of sustainable development into country 
policies and programmes, is one of the targets contained in the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration to reach the goal of environmental sustainability.” (Agenda 
21, n.d). The sections within Chapter 8 of Agenda 21 that are relevant to the 
Humanitarian Aid projects, focussed on in this research, are Chapter 8.1 and Chapter 
8.2 in particular. The areas of Chapter 8.1 that are specifically related to the 
Humanitarian Aid Project are the programme areas a) and b) which relate to the 
integration of the environment and development, at the policy level and also at the 
planning and management levels, and then the provision of an effective legal and 
regulatory framework, respectively. Chapter 8.13 states that ,“Laws and regulations 
suited to country-specific conditions are among the most important instruments for 
transforming environment and development policies into action,” and then in Chapter 
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8.14 that, “while there is continuous need for law improvement in all countries, many 
developing countries have been affected by shortcomings of laws and regulations.” 
(Agenda 21, n.d). This is especially true in regards the UN Humanitarian Aid project 
in West Darfur Sudan, where the conflict is political and the idea of sustainable 
development is a distant dream still.  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 The Research Question 
“What are the key factors and drivers that constitute a plausible theoretical 
conceptual design management model for remote site projects?”  
3.2 Choice of Methodology  
One of the first tasks involved reviewing and thinking through the possible choices of 
methodology given the nature of the research question. The decision to adopt a 
qualitative approach to the research was made because the researcher is developing a 
conceptual management model, and needs to gather and analyse ‘in the field, real-life 
context’ data from project personnel, in order to then test that data against the 
developed theoretical conceptual management model. This in turn suggested that 
personnel with remote site project experience, and involvement with the management 
of those collaborative international projects, potentially held the key to the rich in-
depth data sought to provide valid and reliable findings. The various qualitative 
research methods include Ethnography, Action Research, Unstructured Interviewing, 
Grounded Theory, Historical Research and Case-Studies. In addition, researchers can 
incorporate Surveys, Questionnaires, Structured Interviews and Document Analysis 
when gathering the qualitative data.   
The reviewed literature yielded no single theoretical model or framework that 
specifically or completely addressed remote site design management. The suggested 
reason for this is that the design management field, and specifically remote site design 
management is still an emerging phenomenon. Therefore exploratory empirical 
research methods, including historical research, case studies, document analysis, in-
depth interviewing, grounded theory, and case-study methodology were considered to 
be useful developmental and testing approaches.  
Ethnography was considered at the early stages of the research process because it 
uncovers social, cultural or normative patterns, it is concerned with generating theory, 
and “ethnography accepts that human behaviour occurs within a context” according 
to Burns (2000). However, ethnography was discarded as this method is primarily 
observational and requires that the researcher play an active part of the group being 
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observed and written about over a significant period of time, and is probably more 
suited to research in the educational or health disciplines.  
Historical Research was undertaken at the exploratory and later at the model testing 
stages of the research process, using a document analysis approach with reports 
written by the project personnel as a part of their official roles. Historical research is 
“used for synthesising or comparing old data with new data”  and “ is intended to 
help understand , explain or predict through the collection and objective evaluation of 
data relating to occurrences in order to explore research questions, that may help to 
explain present or anticipate future events” (Burns, 2000).  
Grounded Theory has been adopted given its relevance to the research approach 
during the initial development stages of the theoretical conceptual model and 
associated typology for remote site projects, and later when analysing the interview 
transcripts (refer Chapters 6 and 7). Grounded theory is a qualitative research method, 
originally developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). ‘Theoretical sensitivity’ was 
specifically described by Glaser (1978) as being an important feature of grounded 
theory for researchers aiming to develop theory, and  “as a process of developing a 
researcher’s conceptual insights by working in the actual area being researched to 
obtain experience and expertise, and the researcher is then able to recognise 
important data and formulate conceptually dense theory”. Strauss and Corbin (1990),  
further claimed that “it is a theory which is inductively derived from the phenomenon 
it represents”.  The theory is considered useful as a general methodology when 
developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed, and 
that “the result of a grounded theory study is the generation of a theory, consisting of 
a set of plausible relationships proposed among concepts” (Strauss and Corbin, 
1994). Further support for the choice of grounded theory for this particular research 
project was cited in Denscombe (2003, p.113), stating that “researchers usually adopt 
grounded theory when the topic of interest has been relatively ignored in the 
literature or has been given only superficial attention”. All of which fitted well with 
the objective at the exploratory research stage, of using a selection of primary and 
secondary data from earlier research and reflections on personal experience around 
scientific base projects in the Ross Sea Region of Antarctica, Tongariro National Park 
New Zealand projects, and the Kingfisher Bay Resort Project on Fraser Island, 
Australia. These data could then be tabulated as benchmarking attributes and 
dimensions, when developing the remote site typology (refer Chapter 4).  
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These particular sites were specifically selected because of their contrasting physical 
attributes, their significantly different developmental priorities set by the clients and 
stakeholders, and the researcher’s previous links with them. Reflection on the likely 
and real stakeholder and client expectations, and the issues and realities occurring on 
these particular project sites, helped frame some of the thinking when synthesising 
theoretical and practical contributions in the development of the conceptual design 
management model for remote sites. A further consideration when selecting suitable 
methodologies was that personal access to a range of remote site projects was limited, 
and therefore case-study methodology was considered to be an appropriate and valid 
research approach, in the development and testing of the theoretical conceptual design 
management model for remote site projects. 
Case Study Methodology has been adopted for this research as it involves empirical 
enquiry that investigates a phenomenon within a real-life context. The phenomenon in 
this instance is remote site design management, which includes the study of 
collaborative international projects that are remotely located, and which are frequently 
environmentally sensitive world heritage sites. According to Creswell (2002), “case 
studies may include multiple cases, called a collective case study”, and these are then 
described and compared to provide insights into an issue or occurrence. The 
comparative collective case (or multi-case) study approach can also provide insights 
into processes, practical realities of theoretical premises, and whether the researcher’s 
interpretations of issues, processes, data or theories are plausible (Burns, 2000).  
Case-study design and selection are considered to be two of the most critical aspects 
of case-study methodology (Yin, 2003), as is the choice of case study data collection 
according to Burns (2000), suggesting that several sources of evidence should be 
considered to “ improve the reliability and validity of the data and the findings, and 
make the case-study reporting more convincing”. Hence the decision to analyse 
records/reports directly associated with the case study projects, and conduct in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with project personnel. 
3.3 Testing and Further Development of the Conceptual Model  
Following the development of the typology and conceptual design management model 
for remote sites from the reviewed and analysed literature, document analysis, case 
study data and experiences on previous research projects, the literature review 
continued to focus in the areas of design management, sustainable development, and 
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environmental sustainability, but later included humanitarian aid project management. 
The next stage of the process followed the decision to test the conceptual model on 
two major projects with distinctly different stakeholders’ desired outcomes, and 
methods of management, one in Antarctica, the other in Sudan, to try and establish 
whether the theoretical model was rigorous and capable of representing the two 
diversely different real-life contexts of the remote site projects selected.  
The four main aspects of the research methodology involved : 
1. Establishing and deciding on the questions to be answered in order to answer the 
overall research question. 
2. How the data would be collected. 
3. Participant selection.  
4. Data analysis approach. 
3.3.1 Case Study Selection Process for Testing the Conceptual 
Design Management Model 
The multi-case study approach (Yin, 2003), allows valuable comparisons and 
contrasts to be made between project case-studies. For this research the choice of case 
studies was not restricted to Antarctic projects alone, as this was considered to be too 
limiting potentially, given that the remote site design management model needed to be 
robust and yet responsive to a range of remote site project situations. Therefore the 
cases selected to test the developed model were to be representative of both current 
and past projects, and from diversely different disciplines in order to enrich and 
validate the research process. The selection criteria for the two main case studies to be 
used when testing and further developing the conceptual management model, were 
based on the decision to collect and analyse data from relevant current and historically 
significant projects, that the researcher had had no prior involvement with. The cases 
selected to test the model were the Cape Roberts Drilling Project in Antarctica (which 
originally ran from1995 -2001), and the UN Humanitarian Aid Project in West 
Darfur, Sudan (2004 onwards). The Cape Roberts Drilling Project case-study 
involved reviewing the previously published data (Cowie, 2002), and the researcher 
deciding to conduct a retrospective historical case study approach in 2003/4/5, with 
selected participants who had previously been involved on the project. The UN 
Humanitarian Aid Project case-study in West Darfur, Sudan (2004), was selected as 
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an active and current project, and the intention is to interview a range of management 
and managed personnel.  
3.4 Sampling and Participant Selection 
The sampling approach taken for the two main case–studies aimed to involve a cross-
section of personnel that focussed on managers and ‘the managed’ to achieve a 
representative cross-section of the various roles on both of the case-studies. After 
approaching potential participants to be involved on this research, a Participant 
Information Sheet and Consent Form was prepared for each participant that agreed to 
be interviewed in terms of their official role/capacity on the particular case study 
project. There was a genuine willingness to be involved on the part of the 
organisations and the participants who were approached, many commenting on the 
value of having an ‘outsider’ (this researcher) conduct this particular research. 
Interviews were conducted with senior and middle management, and operational staff 
in terms of their official roles on the Cape Roberts Project (1995-2001), so as to give 
a rigorous and representative cross-section of the personnel who were originally 
involved on the project. On the UN Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Project in West 
Darfur interviews were conducted with a representative cross-section senior and 
middle management, and operational staff. 
3.5 Human Ethics Process and Approvals  
The Human Ethics Committee (HEC) of the University of Canterbury was established 
in 1992, to evaluate research conducted by staff, research associates and students at 
the university to establish the need and value of the research, to ensure the validity of 
the design, procedures and methodology to be adopted, whilst protecting human rights 
and the cultural values of participants in the research.The committee also evaluates 
the ownership and use of the findings of the research, confidentiality and effective 
monitoring procedures, and any legal issues that may arise. 
The HEC needs to receive an application for any research or teaching activity in 
which persons are subjected to experimental procedures or observation or questioning 
or otherwise used a source of information or data, unless excluded by the scope and 
exemptions in the Human Ethics Committee Principles and Guidelines. 
Within the Principles and Guidelines document Section 3 deals with exemptions, and 
in particular, 
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3(b) states:“Research projects or teaching assignments involving interviews with 
public figures or professional persons in the areas of their duties or competence , 
provided that the interview protocols and the eventual use of the gathered information 
complies with the Privacy Act”. 
The particular research design, methodology to be undertaken by the researcher for 
this doctoral  research was therefore originally understood and interpreted by the 
researcher and the senior research supervisor/head of department, to be exempt under 
section 3(b) of the Human Ethics Principles and Guidelines, given that: 
1. All of the participants to be interviewed on the Antarctic Drilling Project, and 
the UN Sudanese Humanitarian Aid projects would only be interviewed in 
terms of their official or professional roles on the projects.  
2. Interview protocols would be followed particularly in terms of ensuring that 
the participants voluntarily agreed and consented to being interviewed, and 
knew that they could withdraw from the interview at any time, and withdraw 
approval to use the collected data at any stage as well. 
3. The data collected would be factual and would comply with the Privacy Act in 
all respects and particularly in terms of maintaining the participants’ 
anonymity and confidentiality of the detailed data collected. 
However, in late 2007 the senior supervisor advised the researcher that the Human 
Ethics Committee now required that all research projects and assignments go through 
the Ethics evaluation process, even if considered exempt. Therefore an application 
was submitted to the Human Ethics Committee in late 2007, seeking their review and 
approval of the research proposal ‘Thesis: Remote Site Design Management – Project 
A and Project B’. A letter dated 4 February 2008 advising that the research proposal 
had been considered and approved by the Human Ethics Committee was received the 
following week by the researcher and the senior supervisor. (Refer Appendix B for 
the full application including the Interview Information sheets, and the Interview 
Questions asked of the participants for Projects A & B). 
3.6 Data Collection  
Once the conceptual model and typology were developed (Kestle & London, 2002), 
the testing stage of the research process began, and the decision to adopt face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews as the preferred data collection method for this stage of the 
research process resulted from reviewing the range of qualitative processes used to 
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collect data. Essentially the choices were surveys, questionnaires, interviews, case-
studies, fieldnotes/observations, or a combination of these. 
3.6.1 Interviews  
“The research interview has been defined as a ‘two- person’ conversation initiated by 
the interviewer for the specific purpose of obtaining research-relevant information” 
(Cohen & Manion, 1994).  
An advantage of interviewing participants is that it allows a greater depth of 
information to be gathered from participants’ experience, knowledge and perceptions, 
that are directly related to the research objectives, but a disadvantage is that 
interviewing can be prone to subjectivity and interviewer bias, according to Cohen 
and Manion (1994).There are several types of interview, being structured, non-
directive, focussed and semi-structured and unstructured.  
The structured interview is a closed situation in terms of the sequencing of 
procedures being slavishly adhered to, and the questions being set in advance with 
little or no opportunity for the interviewer to make spontaneous yet relevant 
modifications, or ask for elaborations on answers during the course of the 
interview(s). 
The non-directive interview is most frequently used in the health sector as there are 
no set questions and the respondent is free to speak freely and spontaneously. The 
focussed interview gives the interviewer some control in a non-directive situation as 
the researcher/interviewer will have conducted a preliminary analysis of the situation 
in which the participants have been, or are, involved and therefore has some fore-
knowledge of the situation. This allows the interviewer the opportunity to distinguish 
the objective facts of the subject from the subjective definitions of the situation. 
The unstructured interview is open-ended and is basically a conversation between 
the interviewer and the participant, to allow experiential information to be shared in 
an interviewing environment that is focussed and directional yet flexible (Cohen & 
Manion, 1994). 
The semi-structured interview sits between structured and completely unstructured 
interviewing techniques as it allows more flexibility than structured interviews in 
terms of the content and sequencing of the questions, even though the main questions 
regarding the key issues are pre-planned (Burns, 2000). The decision to use semi-
structured interviews for this research resulted from the decision to gather detail-rich 
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data from professionals and their experiences in-the-field to better inform the findings 
and subsequent analyses. The semi-structured interviews include common sets of 
questions for each participant that are open-ended so that the participant can expand 
and elaborate on their answers, as relevant to the questions being asked. Similarly, the 
researcher can follow up on participant responses to gain further insights and apply 
them to the research objectives. All of the in-depth interviews conducted with the 
participants will be voice recorded (with their prior approval), and then fully 
transcribed by the researcher.  
The potential problems associated with the use of interviews include ‘invalidity’, 
‘leading questions’, adopting ‘satisfactory recording methods for answers’, and 
reliable and complete ‘interpretation of unstructured interview data’. In terms of the 
two main case-studies selected (the Cape Roberts Antarctic Drilling Project in 
Antarctica and the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Project in West Darfur), to test and 
further develop the conceptual model as necessary, the data was collected using semi-
structured interviews with each of the participants, all of whom were, or are, involved 
on the two main case-study projects. The participants were formally invited to take 
part in the research project and interviewed strictly in terms of their official capacities 
and/or roles on the project(s). Information Sheets were provided to participants before 
the interviews take place, regarding the actual research being conducted. Participant 
Consent forms were prepared and provided to each participant, and needed to be 
signed off by each of the participants. A set of ethically approved, and research 
question relevant interview questions were asked of each of the participants (refer 
Chapter 6, 7 & Appendix B). The specific approach to the data collection for the Cape 
Roberts Drilling Project and the UN Humanitarian Aid Project in Sudan is written up 
in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively.  
3.6.2 Interview Questions for Projects A and B 
The Interview Questions for the two main case study projects are noted attached to the 
Ethics Application made to the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee 
(HEC) , (refer Appendices), and are also identified in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of the 
thesis. In the HEC application Project A referred to ‘The Cape Roberts Drilling 
Project in Antarctica’ and Project B referred to the ‘UNHCR (Humanitarian Aid) Red 
R project in Sudan (West Darfur). For case study Project A the interview questions 
for the Interview Schedule were drawn from the literature review, and the ‘Final 
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Report Document’ findings edited and published in 2002, in terms of the management 
framework at the pre-planning and operations stages. For case study Project B, the 
interview questions for the Interview Schedule were drawn from the literature review 
and the document ‘Lessons Learned’ (Minear, 2005), about Humanitarian Aid 
agencies generally and the UNSHA project in West Darfur in particular. 
The Interview schedules for projects A and B also included questions directly related 
to testing the exploratory conceptual design management model for remote site 
projects in terms of the participants’ experiences on Projects A and B specifically. 
3.7 Validity, Credibility and Dependability of the Collected 
Data  
“The most practical way of achieving greater validity is to minimise bias as much as 
possible” (Cohen & Manion, 1994).  The main sources of bias in collected and 
findings can result from the real value of the collected data being over or understated 
by the researcher, or from the attitude and/or behaviour of the interviewer, the 
characteristics of the participant and/or the way in which the questions are designed, 
worded and delivered to the participants. To reduce bias, Cohen and Manion (1994), 
suggest the use of clearly written questions that can be readily interpreted, and that the 
interviewer(s) are thoroughly trained in interview procedures, so as to minimise 
possible misinterpretations or the use of biased questioning techniques. Cohen and 
Manion (1994), also identified a further potential problem when conducting 
interviews, suggesting that with increased validity there was the potential for 
‘diminished reliability’. This occurred when the questions were more definitive, and 
inflexible, meaning that the participants’ answers were less forthcoming and the 
interview process risked becoming a sterile process if the balance was lost between 
trying to attain reliability and validity of the data.      
3.7.1 Credibility  
When conducting qualitative research credibility has to be established in terms of  
how the accuracy and truthfulness of the research findings can be defended.  
‘member checks’, according to Ary et al. (2006), is one method of establishing 
credibility, and this was adopted when gathering and writing up the data for this 
research  The transcripts were checked for accuracy and completeness by the 
participants in order to maximise credibility of the collected data. 
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3.7.2 Dependability  
Methods used to establish dependability, which is considered to be the qualitative 
research equivalent of reliability according to Ary et al. (2006), include ‘replication 
logic’. This method involves conducting the research in multiple locations with 
different settings and time periods. When the gathered findings from significantly 
differing contexts and disciplines are similar, Ary et al. (2006) suggests that this 
should add to the researcher‘s confidence that the findings are dependable.  
This was one of the main reasons why the diversely different case studies, and 
associated stakeholders in very different environmental and political settings were 
selected and undertaken, to test the conceptual model. 
A discussion on problems around validity when conducting interviews, suggested that 
there could be a risk of reduced validity where there is more control (and therefore 
reliability), of the elements of the actual interview (cited in Cohen & Manion, 1994,). 
p282). When conducting face-to-face interviews it is generally considered necessary 
to create a conversational environment to get the best responses from the participants, 
as they ‘feel at ease’, and that “the distinctly human element in the interview is 
necessary to its ‘validity’, and  the more the interviewer becomes rational, calculating 
and detached, …the more calculated the response is likely to be” (cited in Cohen & 
Manion,1994, p.282).     
3.8 Data Analysis  
The data and literature reviewed at the exploratory stage of the research were 
analysed in terms of fitness for purpose and relevance to the development of the 
typology and the conceptual model. The relevant attributes were then categorised and 
tabulated or included within the typology (refer Table 2 Chapter 4). In terms of the 
interview process associated with the two main case study projects A and B, once the 
interviews with all of the participants were completed, the next stage of the process 
was the transcription of the tapes. Taping the interviews rather than writing field notes 
ensured that every comment and response was captured in order, and within the actual 
context that they were made. Tapes and transcripts are a formal record, available to 
the researcher after the interview events to review, replay, and then analyse and 
critique in terms of revealing every feature and nuance of the individual and collective 
interviews. According to Silverman (2003), the preparation of transcripts should not 
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be assumed to be just a technical process that the researcher undertakes prior to the 
analysis of the transcripted material. Writing up the transcripts involved listening to 
the tapes on several occasions to be certain that every utterance and attitude of the 
participant was accurately and completely recorded in context.  “ the two main social 
science traditions which inform the analysis of transcripts of tapes are conversation 
analysis (CA) and discourse analysis (DA)” (Silverman, 2003). Discourse Analysis 
generally refers to the language used in the interview, and pertains to the terminology 
specific to, and in everyday use in the particular discipline. The use of Conversation 
Analysis is systematic rather than intuitive analysis which aims to maximise validity, 
credibility and dependability. Conversation Analysis requires that the following rules 
be followed according to Burns (2003), “Always try to identify sequences of related 
talk (answers) and look for particular outcomes in the talk (answers) whether that is a 
request for clarification or a further statement or question from the participant and 
work backwards to trace the trajectory through which a particular outcome was 
produced.”  In terms of what to avoid Burns (2003) recommends that the researcher 
does not try “to make sense of a single line of transcript or utterance in isolation from 
the surrounding talk”. In other words never take participants’ statements out of 
context. The transcripts were subjected to ‘member checks’ as already noted in 3.7.1 
to ensure completeness and accuracy, and therefore maximised credibility of the data 
and findings. The transcripted data was coded to ensure confidentiality of the 
participants’ responses, as per the HEC approved ethics application for the interview 
process on projects A and B, and as referred in Chapter 3.5. The primary transcribed 
and coded data and findings from the two main case studies (A and B) - Cape Roberts 
Drilling Project Antarctica, and the UN Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Project in West 
Darfur) was tabulated and analysed within each of the relevant case study Chapters 
(refer Chapters 6 and 7), and are discussed  and compared within Chapter 8. The 
discussion within Chapter 8 includes comparisons being drawn between the primary 
data and relevant published secondary data from the reviewed literature. The primary 
data was also reviewed in terms of enhancing, further developing and/or validating 
the conceptual design management model (refer Chapter 8). The next chapter though 
involves the development of the Typology for remote sites in order to clarify the 
interpretation and context of the research project.  
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CHAPTER 4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TYPOLOGY  
4.1 Introduction 
The concept of remote sites refers to a number of different, and complex, dimensions 
and properties, and can therefore be developed in a categorical and comparative 
typological manner. For example, there are varying degrees of remoteness 
experienced in nearly all construction projects so a clearer definition of the 
characteristics of remote sites would be beneficial. Therefore a typology was initiated 
for the concept of remotely located projects related to environmental sustainability 
and the management of the design process.  
4.2 Typologies 
A typology is a form of categorisation of theoretical and analytical data that is often 
used in qualitative social research to clarify concepts (Kluge, 2000). The introduction 
of empirical social sciences, and the concept of types and their construction have 
assisted in the explanation, comprehension and understanding of complex social 
realities according to Kluge (2000), but essentially each typology is the result of a 
grouping process which can then be further defined as “a combination of attributes”. 
A combination or grouping of attributes is generally supported by tables that can 
range from a simple tabulated format to a complex and multilinked model, which 
gives a visual overview of the theoretical landscape. Kluge’s empirical type of 
construct was adopted for the development of a typology for remote site projects, 
which is one that is grounded in observations from the real world and from literature 
concepts. Kluge (2000), refers to Becker (1968) and Kelle (1998) who believe that 
there is a need for both analysis and theoretical knowledge when conducting empirical 
investigations (Kluge, 2000). She concluded that, “It is only when empirical analyses 
are combined with theoretical knowledge that ‘empirically grounded types’ can be 
constructed.”  This builds on and is aligned with the adoption of grounded theory to 
develop and test particular aspects of the theoretical model (as referred in Chapter 3). 
Kluge’s approach (2000) to systematically construct a typological framework 
generally involves four different stages of analysis for the process of ‘type 
construction’, as identified in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Kluge’s 4 stage approach to Typology Construction 
The four different stages of Kluge 
(2000) Typological Approach  
Process involved  
1. Development of relevant 
analysing dimensions 
Type defined as combination of attributes (properties and 
dimensions) 
Identifying similarities and differences between the various 
cases selected  
Constructed groups and types are described in more detail, 
during analysis of collected data and theoretical knowledge. 
2. Grouping the cases and analysis 
of empirical regularities 
Cases are grouped in terms of their defined properties and 
dimensions 
Cases are analysed and compared with each other in terms of 
empirical regularities and dissimilarities 
Checking for Internal Homogeneity (elements in type have to 
be as similar as possible) 
Checking for External Homogeneity (differences between 
types are as strong as possible) 
Looking for variation of data in the resulting typology. 
3. Analysis of meaningful 
relationships and type 
construction  
Analysing the first two stages of the typology construction 
Establishing whether there are any meaningful relationships 
developing between the various cases  
Searching for contradicting or deviating cases 
Discovering further attributes potentially  
4. Characterisations of the 
constructed types 
Writing the detailed descriptions of the constructive types in 
terms of their combinations of attributes 
Writing the detailed descriptions of the constructive types in 
terms of their meaningful relationships 
Identifying the criteria for the characterisation of types (for 
example, ideal, extreme, prototypes, empirical et al.) 
 
 
 “These four stages represent sub-goals of the process of type construction, and the 
cases can be grouped by contrasting single cases, or by a computer-assisted grouping 
procedure like cluster analysis” (Kluge, 2000). The model of empirically grounded 
type construction is particularly useful as it is flexible and open. Every stage of the 
analysis can be achieved using different analysis methods and techniques yet the 
model still works with a variety of qualitative research questions, and differing 
qualities of data according to Kluge (2000). Further, “In spite of the different 
methods, the four stages of analysis (1-4 above) guarantee that the central sub-goals 
of the process of type construction are being realised” and “it is not only possible to 
compare different approaches with each other but also to achieve a combination of 
the different analysing techniques” as required (Kluge, 2000).  
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4.3 Development of Attributes and Dimensions for the Remote 
Site Projects Typology 
The empirically grounded typology model was adopted mainly because of the links 
with the use of grounded theory to develop the typology, and the conceptual model. 
The characteristics of the remote site typology were initially drawn from a selected 
literature review in the fields of typological constructs, and environmental 
sustainability, to understand how to develop and recognise the attributes and 
dimensions for these particular sites. The next stage involved an exploratory 
investigation mapping three previous case study projects in Antarctica, Australia and 
New Zealand to specifically establish their attributes and dimensions, to look for any 
meaningful relationships, patterns, similarities or differences, and then directly 
applied these in the development of the remote site typology (refer Table 2). These 
attributes needed to be explained, and to do this the fields of design management and 
environmental sustainability were drawn on, as remote sites are often environmentally 
sensitive, and the design process for these construction projects needs to be specific 
and closely managed across the various stakeholders. Sustainable development, 
maintenance of biodiversity, and an ecological approach to design concepts, were all 
potential attributes when constructing a typology for these sites and therefore global 
environmental philosophies and strategies were given further consideration (Kestle et 
al., 2002) in association with the development of the conceptual design management 
model for remote site projects.  
4.3.1 Mapping the Properties and Attributes of a Selection of 
Previous Projects on Environmentally Sensitive Remote Sites. 
The selected case study sites had a range of attributes that included:  
? pristine environment  
? governmental monitoring  
? government as client 
? evolving and mature ecosystems  
? commercial value 
? design stakeholders  
? scientifically investigative activities  
? global impact; historical conservation  
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? resource-rich 
? hostile climate   
? indigenous history.  
The case study projects were relevant for the development of the typology for remote 
site projects, because of their contrasting physical attributes and different 
developmental priorities. The sites were in environmentally pristine regions, yet 
offered and generated quite different dimensions. The first study was of Antarctic 
sites where research bases have been built to support international scientific 
investigations in the Ross Sea Region (refer Figure 1), whilst the second study was an 
Australian Eco- tourism resort on Fraser Island, located off the east coast of Australia. 
The third study involved reviewing the attributes and dimensions of Department of 
Conservation (DOC) sites within Tongariro National Park, New Zealand, where DOC 
huts and ski lodges are located. 
a) Scientific Bases in the Ross Sea Region, Antarctica                 
Prior to 1939 more than 20 nations were involved in research and exploration in 
Antarctica, seven of whom wanted to lay claim to parts of the continent for military or 
strategic reasons, related to its abundance of natural resources. The seven nations 
were Australia, Chile, UK, New Zealand, Argentina, Norway and France. Following 
the Second World War, USA and Russia became interested in Antarctica, calling in 
1948 for a form of international trusteeship as a governance tool for Antarctica. In 
1957 the International Geophysical Year created a worldwide research programme 
with a focus on polar regions, resulting in cooperative and collaborative science 
programmes being set up and conducted in Antarctica by twelve nations, including 
the original seven plus USA and Russia. In 1959 the Antarctic Treaty was signed by 
the twelve nations and ratified by their parliaments before being legally enforced in 
1961. Any member of the United Nations can become a party to the Treaty provided 
they carry out ‘substantial research activity’ in Antarctica, and can then apply to erect 
a scientific research base (Crossley, 1995). 
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Figure 1 Antarctica and the Southern Ocean (Waterhouse, 2001) 
Antarctica now has some 27 scientific bases and 46 countries who are signatories to 
the Antarctic Treaty (1959).  
The New Zealand Government has maintained a long-term commitment to, 
and strategic interest in, the Ross Sea Region since the first British 
exploration in 1839 by Sir James Clark Ross. Maintaining a credible presence 
and research interest in the region demonstrates a commitment to the 
stewardship of the continent, and to meeting New Zealand’s obligations under 
the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (LINZ, 2003). 
The scientific base stations of New Zealand (refer Figure 2), Italy and USA (refer 
Figure 3), and the historic hut sites in the Ross Sea Region fall under the stewardship 
of the New Zealand Government and are managed on their behalf by Antarctica New 
Zealand and the Antarctic Heritage Trust respectively, as any territorial claims have 
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been frozen under the Antarctic Treaty (1959). Consensus decisions by the 
Consultative Parties, who meet every year, are required for any changes to occur 
under the Treaty. Any activities and involvement, such as development work, has to 
occur within the framework of international agreements, such as international law, 
and comply with the requirements of the Antarctic Treaty system of governance, and 
the Environmental Protection Act (NZ) 1994, (Waterhouse, 2001). 
 
Figure 2 New Zealand’s Scott Base, looking towards Mt Erebus (Waterhouse, 2001) 
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Figure 3 USA’s McMurdo Base, looking towards Mt Erebus (Waterhouse, 2001) 
 
The following criteria form the basis of the client priorities when developing projects 
on these sites (Kestle, 1999): 
? environmental impact must be minimal;  
? scientific research is to be the prime activity on the 27 sites in Antarctica, with 
limited tourist activity being very strictly controlled; 
? the intrinsic value of these sites must not be compromised;  
? robust and reliable shelter is essential in terms of weather protection, as 
conditions can be life threatening;  
? logistical support is essential during the construction process and 
intermittently at the operational stage(s); 
? scale of building size and function is closely related and to be kept to a 
minimum in terms of area, weight (due to air transport to site), and budget;  
? restricted window of constructability exists (late September to early February 
in any one year), with only marginal building temperatures and 24 hour 
daylight, hence building developments have to be capable of prefabrication for 
speedier assembly when on site;   
? fire is the greatest threat and potential hazard; 
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? heating and cooling energy supplies should be minimised and retention 
maximised; 
? accessibility for materials and personnel deliveries must meet the tight 
deadlines;  
? budgets are always tight, as they are related to the fiscal policies of the 
government of the time and to the scale, nature and need for the building.  
b) Kingfisher Bay Resort, Fraser Island (Australia)  
The Kingfisher Bay Resort (refer Figure 4) is located on a large sand island known as 
Fraser Island that is free of any pathogens. It is located on the east coast of 
Queensland, north of Brisbane (refer Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 4 Kingfisher Bay Resort, Fraser Island (photograph courtesy of Kingfisher Bay Resort) 
 
This site was inscribed on the World Heritage list in 1992. There are clear regulatory 
regimes that govern and restrict the development of these sites. Both are governed by 
international law, with the Australian site being governed by the 1999 Australian 
Burra Charter (governed by the Heritage Council), which is a national framework 
endorsed by the International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) - the 
UNESCO advisory council on preservation of world heritage sites, of which there are 
107 member nations.  
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Any project development has to comply with the criteria set down by UNESCO and 
the Australian Heritage Council (AHC), and includes the Recreation Areas 
Management Act 1988, and the Australian Burra Charter, which are both governed by 
the AHC, (ICOMOS 1999). 
 
Figure 5 Fraser Island locality map (courtesy of Kingfisher Bay resort) 
The client was the Queensland Government, and in particular the Department of 
Environment and Heritage National Parks and Wildlife Service (QNPWS). The value 
of the site to this particular client was in being able to develop this environmentally 
pristine site for restricted public access and be a working eco-tourism educational 
project. QNPWS undertake the day-to-day management of this area. 
The following criteria were derived from conversations with the architects, to 
establish the client priorities in terms of value: 
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? an environmentally sensitive site development in terms of planting and built 
environment footprint 
? an indigenously cultural focus in the design as a selling point to potential 
visitors,  
? easy access for the construction processes and for the subsequent visitor 
population (now up to 300,000 per year) 
? logistical support considered essential at construction and operational stages 
? need to achieve 3-star comfort levels in terms of lifestyle, relaxation and 
entertainment, whilst at the same time being cognisant of the desire for 
environmentally sustainable principles at the design, construction and 
operational stages of the project  
? a budget that was related to potential returns on investment in the project 
? a customer and environs education focus.  
c) Tongariro National Park (NZ) Huts and Ski Lodge sites on 
Department of Conservation Land.  
The creation of national parks within New Zealand came from a desire amongst the 
new settlers to respond to the fact that large tracts of wilderness worldwide and 
specifically within New Zealand were disappearing (TNP Management Plan, 1990).  
Tongariro National Park (TNP) was essentially modelled on a United States of 
America concept dating back to the establishment of the world’s first national park in 
1872 when Yellowstone Park, Wyoming was created. National Parks were then 
created in Canada and Australia, followed by New Zealand. In New Zealand, National 
Parks are publicly owned tracts of land that are preserved in perpetuity for their 
intrinsic worth and for the benefit and enjoyment of the public (TNP Management 
Plan, 1990 & 2003). 
The creation of Tongariro National Park, was however significantly different from the 
three preceding parks in USA, Canada and Australia in that “the nucleus was a gift of 
an indigenous people” (TNP Management Plan, 1990 & 2003).  
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Figure 6 Map of Tongariro National Park and Conservancy locality plan 
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Figure 7 Map of Tongariro National Park special zones showing wilderness and pristine areas 
 
The Gift – Te Koha – was first mooted at the Rangipo-Murimotu land hearings in 
1881, where it was stated that, “They shall be a sacred place of the Crown, a gift 
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forever from me and my people.” Te Heuheu Tukino IV (Horonuku), paramount chief 
of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 1881” (TNP Management Plan, 1990 & 2003).  
Some six years later this promise was realised in fact, where, “On 23 September 
1887, a deed was drawn up in the court at Taupo in which, on behalf of his tribe, Te 
Heuheu Tukino IV paramount chief of Ngati Tuwharetoa  gifted the summits of 
Tongariro, Ngauruhoe and Ruapehu to the Crown, thus initiating a process which led 
to the creation of New Zealand’s first national park”, and “protected their tapu for 
all time”. The gifted area amounted to 2,640 hectares, which was considered too 
small to create a national park by the Crown. Further land purchases were made by 
the Crown in the 1890s. When the Tongariro National Park Act was passed in 1894, 
the park area was comprised of approximately 25,000 hectares, growing further still 
after the completion of the legislated boundaries in 1907. (TNP Management Plan, 
1990 & 2003). Tongariro National Park now comprised of approximately 79,600 
hectares made up of the volcanic mountains of Tongariro (1968m), Ruapehu (2797m), 
and Ngauruhoe (2290m), and now included Mt. Pihanga (1325m), and the southern 
slopes of Kakaramea (1300m), (refer Figure 6).   
Tongariro National Park is amongst the few sites which have World Heritage 
status for both their natural and cultural values .The natural landscape was 
acknowledged as a World Heritage Site in 1990, and its cultural values were 
recognised in 1993. Tongariro National Park was the first in the world to 
receive recognition under the revised cultural criteria describing cultural 
landscapes. This was advocated on behalf of all New Zealanders by Tumu Te 
Heuheu, at the UNESCO Conference in Berlin in 1993.  
(TNP Management Plan, 1990 & 2003) 
Tongariro National Park has the following attributes which are consistent with the 
UNESCO criteria for cultural heritage: 
? contains values of outstanding universal value from scientific and 
conservation perspectives (refer Figure 7) 
? is representative of the culture of Ngati Tuwharetoa and is vulnerable to 
impacts and irreversible change 
? is directly and tangibly associated with events, living traditions, ideas and 
beliefs of universal significance 
? contains superlative natural phenomena and exceptional natural beauty 
? represents significant ongoing geological processes and geomorphic features.  
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In addition, UNESCO viewed Tongariro National Park “as a stable site in a 
protective legislative framework capable of having its key attributes maintained in a 
pristine state in perpetuity” (TNP Management Plan, 1990 & 2003). 
Tongariro National Park is managed by the Tongariro/Taupo Conservancy of the 
Department of Conservation. Development and redevelopment of sites within the 
Tongariro National Park (New Zealand) have to meet strict guiding criteria contained 
within the following legislative and policy frameworks: 
? National Parks Act (1980) 
? National Park By-laws 
? Conservation Act (1987) 
? General Policy for National Parks (1983) 
? Tongariro National Park Management Plan (reviewed every 10 years by 
DOC - currently 2003-2012 version) 
? Resource Management Act (1991) 
? Tongariro/Taupo Conservation Management Strategy (2002). 
Visitor numbers exceed 700,000 per annum and are growing at approximately 2% per 
annum, (TNP Management Plan, 2003). This creates various and significant 
challenges in terms of managing the area to minimise environmental impact, whilst 
offering short-stay eco-tourism experiences. 
The majority of the designated sites for development within the “on-mountain” areas 
of the national park have already been built on, despite difficult physical access and 
seasonally extreme conditions at Iwikau village (Whakapapa skifield), the around-the-
mountain huts, and at Tukino and Turos skifields. Tukino at 1600m on the east side of 
Ruapehu for example, has just one remaining undeveloped ‘designated site’, but the 
access is difficult being via 4 or 6 wheel drive only on a roughly formed mountain 
road, that travels 17k in from SH1 on the Desert Road. Though further development, 
(and redevelopment) of the skifield areas is envisaged, this will be strictly monitored, 
with minimal infrastructure being created, other than that directly required under the 
National Parks Act (1980). The focus of attention is being moved away from the 
Iwikau village area in particular (refer Figure 8), to ‘off-mountain’ areas within the 
National Park in future, to minimise environmental impacts (Kestle, 1995). 
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The following criteria form the basis of client and DOC priorities when developing 
projects on these sites: 
? An environmentally sensitive site development in terms of planting and built 
environment footprint and overall environmental impacts (both physical and 
visual) 
? A robust and reliable shelter in terms of weather protection; conditions can be 
life threatening (for example, snow, gales, storms and ash eruptions), so safety 
is key 
? That the scale of the building, its overall bulk and location, and its functions 
need to be closely related, and be kept to a minimum footprint area, to meet 
DOC and other legislative requirements 
? Achieve 1-3 star comfort levels (hut to lodge), in terms of lifestyle, relaxation 
and entertainment requirements, whilst being cognisant of the desire for 
environmentally sustainable principles at the design, construction and 
operational stages of the projects 
? The need to work with a restricted window of constructability (late November 
to April in any one year), due to heavy snowfall, gales, torrential rain and 
freezing conditions at other times 
? The need for reliable access for materials and personnel deliveries, given the 
very difficult geographical mountain access, and a lack of locally available 
materials and labour, that is frequently specialist in nature.  
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Figure 8 Iwikau ski lodges, Mt Ruapehu, 
viewed from SH48 
Figure 9 Tukino lodges, east side of Mt 
Ruapehu (Kestle, 1995)
 
 
 
Figure 10 Tukino Lodge, extreme winter conditions 
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Figure 11 Mt Ruapehu ash eruption 1995, viewed from Mountain Access Rd 
 
Figure 12 Tukino lodges following Mt Ruapehu ash eruption 1995 
4.4 Discussion in Reference to the Typological Attributes and 
Dimensions 
The three case study projects referred to in 4.3.1 were investigated and analysed to 
look for empirical similarities, dissimilarities, and for any meaningful relationships 
that existed between the various properties and attributes as per the Kluge four stage 
typological construction approach. Typological attributes and dimensions specific to 
the three case study projects were then tabulated in a matrix under selected headings 
that essentially referred to the sites’ geographical, physical, regulatory, 
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environmental, functional and design planning aspects to enable the categorisation of 
a range of remote sites and their particularities. 
The headings selected, and as shown in Table 2, are: 
? Proximity to major urban areas 
? Regulatory framework 
? Physical environment 
? Functional, aesthetic and social aims 
? Environmental impact/sensitivity 
? Design, construction and logistical pre-planning needs.  
Table 2 graphically identifies the attributes of the selected remote sites in terms of 
their properties and dimensions. Issues in common between the sites are that they are 
all considered to be pristine sites. In addition, their development and operational 
(post-development) impacts have to meet strict guidelines which are closely 
monitored by the New Zealand and Australian governments and their agents.  
Developmental activities in terms of the Antarctic sites have to be conducted in terms 
of supporting scientific activities or providing visitor life support for the duration of 
their time on the continent. Shelter and safety are the prime priorities alongside 
environmental impact minimisation. Scientific activities are restricted to six months 
fieldwork per year and cannot be carried out at any time in the protected areas 
designated as Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). Value, in terms of these 
Antarctic sites, lies in the pristine nature of the continent, and the fact that Antarctica 
acts as a global barometer in terms of climate change, and demonstrates the effects of 
global human activities on the world’s atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems. New 
Zealand has ongoing commitment to the stewardship of the entirety of the Ross Sea 
Region (islands and territories below 60ºS and 150ºW), which includes the Italian, 
USA and New Zealand’s scientific bases. The government is constantly reviewing its 
scientific strategies for the region, in line with the Antarctic Treaty system and 
associated environmental protocols. The Government’s revised Statement of Strategic 
Interest released in 2002, which has been documented in the LINZ (2003) ‘Ross Sea 
Region Strategy 2003-2012’ document, is as follows: 
“New Zealand is committed to conservation of the intrinsic and wilderness 
values of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, for the benefit of the world 
community and for present and future generations of New Zealanders. This 
will be reflected in active and responsible stewardship, under the Antarctic 
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Treaty system, that promotes New Zealand’s interests in” a list of seven goals 
that essentially sit within the main goal of “Ensuring that all activity is 
undertaken in a manner consistent with Antarctica’s status as a natural 
reserve devoted to peace and science.” (LINZ, 2003)   
Development of the Fraser Island eco-tourism resort in Australia had to meet strict 
criteria in terms of environmental impact minimisation and site responsive aesthetics, 
whilst offering visitor education on indigenous and environmental conservation.The 
main challenge was to manage 300,000 visitors per annum visiting this unique 
location, whilst endeavouring to keep the site in pristine condition. 
All of the sites were remote in terms of their distance from a major urban area, with 
the Antarctic sites, for example, being completely isolated for up to six months of the 
year. Access is becoming slightly easier during the seasons of extreme weather due to 
advancing technology in terms of transportation and communications, but still 
remains a major hurdle for deliveries of supplies and personnel from April till 
October.  The properties and dimensions of these remote sites are deemed to be 
unique, in part evidenced by the world heritage listings, and the development and 
implementation of an international Treaty protecting the sites in Antarctica. Long 
term protection and monitoring of these remote sites is under threat however, as a 
result of the increasing demand for scientific investigation, and eco-tourism. 
Significant for this research though, is how this empirical typological construct 
informs and supports the development of the theoretical conceptual management 
model for remote sites, in terms of categorising their attributes, and understanding the 
priorities and processes required when planning for the design, construction and 
management of  projects on these sites. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The reasons and therefore the objectives for developing this typology for remote sites, 
was first to clarify the thinking around the term ‘remote sites’. The first stage 
determined the characteristics of remote sites, and tabulated, grouped and compared 
the attributes (properties and dimensions) of the three selected case study remote site 
projects, as a starting point. The three remote sites selected represented quite different 
climatic regions that were geographically distant from each other, and all were 
considered ‘pristine’, and inscribed as World Heritage listed sites. The outcomes of 
constructing the empirical typology demonstrated the significant range of attributes, 
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yet also similarities of the selected remote sites, when viewed under the six headings 
of the typology. The headings decided on as a result of the literature and case study 
investigations and analysis were: 
? proximity to major urban areas 
? regulatory framework(s) 
? physical environment 
? functional, aesthetic and social aims 
? environmental  impact/sensitivity 
? design, construction and logistics pre-planning needs (refer Table 2). 
The comparative discussion of the typological attribute findings suggested that there 
were in fact attributes in common between the three selected remote sites that were 
not evident when they were initially selected, and that long-term protection of these 
(and potentially other) remote sites is under threat from increasing demands for eco-
tourism destinations and scientific investigations. The results from the three selected 
case studies identified the key criteria that formed the basis of differing client and 
stakeholder priorities when developing projects on these remote sites, which in 
conjunction with the other noted findings, whilst constructing the typology, informed 
the development of the conceptual design management model for remote sites. 
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Table 2 Remote Site Comparisons (Kestle, London et al., 2002) 
Site Proximity to major 
urban areas 
Regulatory 
Framework 
Physical Environment Functional, aesthetic 
& social aims 
Environmental 
Impact/Sensitivity 
Design, Construction 
and Logistical pre-
planning needs  
Antarctic 
sites-Ross 
Sea Region  
 
4 bases 
Isolated.  
Distances  
to major areas:-  
Sth America:1000km 
Australia:2500km 
NZ (Chch): 3850km 
Africa: 4000km 
 
 
Antarctic Treaty 
(1959): 42 nations - 27 
are the core base sites, 
within the Treaty. There 
is also a Protocol on 
Environmental 
Protection (Madrid 
Protocol 1991) + 
associated 
Environmental 
Protection Act 1994 
(NZ)  
Treaty designed for 
peaceful and scientific 
endeavours (US space 
program) and to protect 
the resources from 
commercial gain and to 
keep it a continent free 
from military arms.  
Emerging regulations 
governing 
environmental sites 
Waterhouse, 2001) 
Hostile climate, 
extreme cold temps, 
Coldest and highest 
continent. World’s 
lowest temp of -89.6C 
at south pole. 
Extremely low relative 
humidity. Never rains. 
Desert conditions. 
24hr daylight from Nov 
–mid - Feb. No access 
during winter months 
due to extremely low 
temps, 24/7 darkness 
and high winds. 
Temp range -5C in 
December – February 
to -35C (to -57C) in 
June-August. Mean 
wind speed at Scott 
Base is 6m per sec 
(11knots) with gale 
force southerlies in 
winter months. 
Ancient landmass. 2% 
exposed rock. Ice sheet 
up to 4km thick covers 
majority of continent 
(87%) and (11%) ice 
shelf. 
Primarily scientific 
investigations. 
Emerging Eco and 
Historical Tourism  
Pristine with significant 
scientific profile. 
Research activities 
primarily quantitative. 
Aesthetics have been of 
secondary importance. 
Little thought to the 
human experience and 
the built environment 
except purely on a basic 
human needs basis 
related to physical 
survival.  
Threat of mineral 
resources exploitation 
averted till 2041. 
 
Largely pristine and 
highly eco-sensitive 
Mature ecosystem 
Heroic Age: approx 
1903-1917, explorers’ 
huts still there. 
Limited access to 6 
months of the year and 
highly restricted access 
to certain sites 
designated as 
scientifically significant 
internationally.  
Access to other 
locations is based upon 
the nature and 
approvals allocated to 
the various scientific 
programmes. 
Government concern re 
long term impacts 
(Wharton and Doran, 
1999) 
Detailed logistical pre-
planning of 
construction phases 
including all 
equipment, personnel, 
materials to meet the 
minimal 
constructability 
deadlines due to limited 
access and deliveries 
only available 
occasionally by plane 
or ship. 
Specialised design and 
construction technology 
required to address 
extreme temperature 
ranges, high winds, and 
the unique marine and 
desert environment.  
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Fraser 
Island, 
Australia 
Adjacent to Australian 
landmass. 
270km north of 
Brisbane 
World Heritage listed 
site (1992), due to 
unique sand ecosystem/ 
dune lakes geology 
(world’s largest sand 
island: complex dune 
systems) etc.  
Coupled with other 
natural and cultural 
significance reasons.  
eg fauna (rare frogs, 
bats and glider species, 
as well as marine life) 
and flora (‘wallum 
heaths’) and complex 
peat swamps are of 
particular evolutionary 
and ecological 
significance, and to  
indigenous culture. 
UNESCO 1972 
ICOMOS: 1999 
Australian Burra 
Charter – governed by 
Queensland and 
Australian Heritage 
Council. 
Subtropical, mild 
winters, hot and wet 
summers, high 
humidity, cyclonic zone 
etc 
Conditions are maritime 
subtropical with mean 
annual temperatures 
ranging from 14.1ºC 
minimum to 28.8ºC 
maximum.  
Rainfall is high, 
reaching 1,800mm on 
the highest dunes in the 
centre of Fraser Island 
(DASET, 1991; Sinclair 
and Morrison, 1990) 
 
EcoTourism  
Aesthetics is critical to 
the resort development 
as is the relationship 
between the built 
environment and the 
total human experience. 
Threat of sand mining, 
mineral resources 
exploitation and various 
introduced fauna/flora 
species. 
Pristine, evolving 
ecosystem and highly 
sensitive.  
Inhabited by Indigenous 
peoples: 1,200-2000 
years ago, and historical 
significance has to be 
respected and 
maintained. 
 
 
 
Levels of development 
only limited by 
restrictions on public 
access, new 
accommodation, and 
govt limits on 
environmental impact 
potential. 
Access limited to 
‘Permit’ access only, 
and only accessible by 
boat, from Hervey Bay, 
Queensland. 
Detailed logistical pre-
planning of the 
construction phases, 
including equipmt, 
personnel and 
materials. 
Tongariro 
National 
Park NZ-
huts and 
ski lodges 
Located on three 
volcanic mountains, 
two of which are still 
active. 
 
 
Resource Management 
Act (1991and 
amendments); 
NZ Building Act (1991 
and amendments). 
National Parks Act 
(1980 and 
amendments); 
Tongariro National 
High altitude hostile 
climate – 1500 up to 
2300m, with 
temperatures ranging 
from 25ºC to minus 
10ºC and winds from 5-
40 knots (9.3 -74km/hr) 
Volcanic ash and lahar 
outpourings 
Environmental 
protection of sites is the 
priority, given the 
levels of public 
accessibility. 
Primary activity is 
environmental and 
historical conservation. 
Limited levels of Eco 
Limited number of sites 
for huts and ski lodges 
available on 
Department of 
Conservation (DOC) 
land, to minimise 
impacts. 
Whakapapa and Turoa 
set aside by 
Limited access  (4-6 
months of the year). 
Limited number of sites 
for huts and ski lodges 
available on (DOC) 
land.  
Detailed logistical pre-
planning of 
construction phases 
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Park Management Plan 
(reviewed 5 yearly – 
latest is 2003); 
World Heritage Listing 
(1990 and 1993). 
intermittently. Tourism. 
Global value of site 
(World Heritage Listing 
as a National Park from 
1990/1993). 
government/DOC as the 
only commercially 
developed areas in 
Tongariro National 
Park. 
including equipment, 
personnel and materials 
essential to meet the 
tight snowless 
deadlines. 
Specialised design and 
construction  
technology to address 
the extreme temperature 
ranges, high winds (at 
times cyclonic), and 
precipitation. 
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CHAPTER  5.   DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPTUAL 
DESIGN MANAGEMENT MODEL FOR REMOTE SITE 
PROJECTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The research objective is to develop a conceptual design management model that 
answers the following research question: 
 “What are the key factors and drivers that constitute a plausible theoretical 
conceptual design management model for remote site projects?” 
The initial planning for the model was developed in association with the development 
of a typology for remote site projects (refer Chapter 4).The exploratory stage drew on 
the key concepts and principles of design management and lean design management 
literature, and partially investigated three project case studies on remote sites in 
Australia, New Zealand and the Ross Sea Region of Antarctica, as discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 4, and also referred to in this chapter in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. In 
addition the development process also involved reviewing current design management 
practice and supportive theories. 
5.2 The need for a Conceptual Model for Remote Site Design 
Management  
There was a collective argument amongst design management researchers, in the 
reviewed and analysed literature (refer Chapter 2), that there are currently 
shortcomings in the practice of design management. One view on the reason for this 
was made by Ballard and Koskela (1998) which was “that there is a lack of solid 
conceptual foundation”. As a means of addressing this, Ballard and Koskela (1998) 
conducted a review of state-of-the-art practice and research concepts and models, 
proposed a new conceptual framework of design management, and analysed the 
implications of this framework. They then improve called for systematic research 
collaboration, in order to design management, which supports this research, and in 
particular the development of a theoretical conceptual design management model (for 
remote sites) as a means of responding to this call for research collaboration to 
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improve the discipline of design management and provide a solid conceptual 
foundation for remote site design management. There were other findings in the 
analysed literature that supported the reasons for case study methodology in terms of 
developing the theoretical model, including the use of empirical data, and the way in 
which it could be useful as a process tool. The literature findings also supported many 
of the key aspects of the model development in terms of creating value for the 
client(s) and stakeholders.  
5.3 Theoretical Contributions to the Development of the Model 
One of the significant outcomes of the review and analysis of lean design 
management and design management literature was the important contribution of 
process integration and value generation to the development of a conceptual design 
management model for remote sites. Design management is fundamentally concerned 
with value generation however understanding what constitutes value is a difficult 
process. It is suspected that the process is not simple and straightforward, instead, 
design management is a complex social situation as value can be a socially 
constructed phenomenon and decision making to that end can be inherently 
unpredictable (Kestle & London, 2002).  
Shared understanding towards identifying what is valued in the project impacts upon 
how critical decisions are made on design issues. This is an important point in the 
development of the design management field as it is the integration of those who have 
knowledge that can contribute to the design, construction and management, which is 
critical to developing and achieving value on projects for the client and stakeholders. 
Poor integration of specialist user and producer stakeholder knowledge can have far 
reaching consequences, such as inappropriate synthesis of the needs analysis leading 
to low value generation for the client and the end users. Design decision making is 
often negotiated amongst groups and teams – it is an iterative process. The 
stakeholders of value can also change through the various stages of the design, 
construction and occupancy stages and each group of actors may differ in perspective 
based upon their worldview. The power to negotiate and guide design decisions and 
assist with establishing building performance criteria changes at different times of the 
process and in many cases their voice is not heard at critical times (London,1997, 
London, 2002). 
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The more holistic approach to lean design management as explored by researchers 
such as Green (1994), and Garnett (1999), Huovila and Koskela (1998), and London 
et al. (2002), over the last few years identifies additional significant design 
management factors. These researchers refer to the importance of, and the means to 
achieve, sustainable development. They believed that whilst traditional design and 
construction focuses on cost, performance and quality objectives, sustainable design 
and construction by comparison, focuses on value generation, minimization of 
resource depletion, minimization of environmental degradation and the importance of 
timely information flow management. Information management can be considered 
from a sociological viewpoint, however it has a significant effect on production 
factors/processes, if planned or implemented ineffectively. 
Design management is primarily concerned with value generation for the client, 
integration of specialist knowledge, and the timing of key decisions. This is achieved 
by means of  an integrated team approach to the way in which the project is designed, 
constructed, implemented and managed, and in the case of remote site projects 
involves an interface between two quite different process perspectives.    
The first perspective primarily involves and addresses the design phases. For example, 
the conceptual design phase is often marked by an iterative and creative process, 
which tends to be a sociologically oriented world where designers respond to a range 
of functional, aesthetic, environmental and even spiritual concerns. The second 
perspective primarily involves and addresses the strategic decisions that need to be 
made during the briefing and conceptual design stages, and how these may impact 
upon construction logistics and the sustainable development of the project site. 
Detailed design for the construction phase tends to be a production oriented world. In 
developing a conceptual design management model for remote sites, the approach 
aimed to suggest that there was a need for these two perspectives to interface, in order 
to theoretically address the way in which these remote site projects were managed in a 
practical sense. In order to try to create theoretical synergies between the ‘production 
oriented world view’ and the ‘sociologically oriented world view’ it was important to 
first identify and understand the underpinning principles and implementation 
problems of design management from current and relevant literature. 
There was a significant body of literature that addressed the application of lean 
thinking to improving the interface between detailed design and construction 
production. There was little literature that offered a holistic view of how design 
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management for remote sites could be addressed, yet the lean design management 
field of research potentially had much to contribute to the design management of these 
remote site projects. The review of the literature indicated that much of the lean 
thinking has been primarily concerned with sequential production. However, lean 
thinking is based upon principles of flow and value, which was seen as being 
conducive to the complex process involved in design management for remote sites. 
The field of design management and the more focussed thinking associated with lean 
design management informed the development of a theoretical management model for 
design management for remote sites (Kestle & London, 2002). The topic of remote 
sites brought with it a range of other fields that could contribute to our understanding; 
for example international construction, online management and procurement and 
sustainable development. The field of international construction has in recent years 
emerged as a growth area, precipitated by the growth of multinationals and lowering 
of trade barriers which have increased globalisation of construction (Mawhwinney, 
2001). The design and development process is frequently a team effort involving a 
number of informed and ill-informed decision makers, and is a complex natural 
system dependent upon initial decisions. Complex design management scenarios 
suggest that as areas of professional responsibility become fluid, the manner in which 
decisions are made by design teams becomes critical for understanding the resultant 
building performance (London & Ostwald, 1996). The added dimension of remote site 
construction increases the complexity and criticality of early decision making. The 
project team is required to address the traditional design problems, but also those that 
occur as a result of the location of the site and the team’s lack of familiarity with the 
often uniquely social, physical, economic and sometimes spiritual criteria.  
5.4 Practice Contributions from the Exploratory Project Case 
Study Sites to the Development of the Model 
The added dimension of remote site construction increases the complexity and 
criticality of early decision making. The project team is required to address the 
traditional design problems, but also those that occur as a result of the location of the 
site and the team’s lack of familiarity with the often uniquely social, physical, 
economic and sometimes spiritual criteria. Further, when there is a strict timeline for 
the completion of a project, for example, a restricted window of constructability and 
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accessibility to the remote site due to climate or other reasons, the timing of the 
decision to proceed toward the concept design stage and financially commit to the 
project is absolutely critical to the subsequent design and construction stages and 
completion of the project on time. The resultant of delays in making key decisions can 
mean that the entire project becomes unviable on remote sites, particularly where 
accessibility is limited by seasonal weather conditions, and where scientific projects 
for example, are funded for a specific twelve month period only.   
The traditional lean design management principles of value stream, process 
integration, workflow and waste minimisation were seen to be potentially useful and 
applicable to remote and often hostile project sites in Antarctica, for example. These 
project sites are closely aligned to lean and functional production processes, as the 
main priorities for the client are shelter, a strict budget, tight timelines and a process 
driven construction programme. The development of these sites then potentially fits 
with the ‘traditional lean thinking design management model’, in terms of the 
sequential process and flow approach. However, under the Antarctic Treaty (1959) 
and the related Protocol for Environmental Protection (1991), all development 
projects on Antarctic sites also have to fully comply with the Environmental Protocol 
associated with the Antarctic Treaty (1959), particularly in terms of minimising 
environmental impacts. This means in effect that the traditional lean design 
management approach does not fully address all of the factors associated with remote 
site design management. 
The decisions made, and the successful implementation of those decisions, by all 
personnel, depend on regular and clear communications, whether verbal, digital or in 
the form of hardcopy documentation. Clear and effective communications, whilst 
important on any project, become critical on remote sites, according to personnel 
involved on these particular projects (Cowie, 2002). Communications are discussed 
here in reference to remote site projects, where miscommunications may be absolutely 
critical to the viability and completion of the whole project, given the limited physical 
accessibility in many cases. Poor information management has the potential to create 
confused site and/or office personnel, resulting in mistakes requiring rework on an 
already tight timeline, costly overruns, lack of task completion on and/or off-site, and 
value degeneration from the client’s and stakeholders’ perspectives.  
Given the characteristics (attributes and dimensions) of remote sites (refer Chapter 4, 
Table 2, and Chapter 5, Table 3), the principles and concepts of value generation, 
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knowledge integration, timely decision-making and process integration became the 
key factors and potential drivers of the exploratory design management model for 
remote site projects. 
  
Table 3 Key factors/plausible drivers in the development of the CDM model for remote sites 
Key Factors/Drivers Key Features 
Value generation Value (often intrinsic and /or economic) that specific 
client and stakeholders place on each project and site. 
The ‘value’ expected is realized in the completed 
project. 
Primarily concerned (in this context) with  
1. environmental protection of the site where public 
site access is restricted 
2. the site’s global world heritage and/or esteem 
value. 
Environmentally sensitive design approach applied to 
the site, at design, construction and implementation 
stages. 
Integration of specialist 
knowledge (knowledge 
capital) 
Specialist knowledge experience of remote (and often 
hostile) sites essential.  
Valuable asset in terms of design choice decision 
making at pre-planning stage on remote site projects. 
Often tacit not explicit knowledge. 
Process involves in depth pre-design briefing and pre-
planning of construction (or aid phases), of all the 
specialist personnel. 
Timely decision-making Timing of financial and design decisions in 
particular, are critical to successful management of 
design, construction and implementation of remote 
site projects. 
Decisions frequently made within the context of: : 
1. non-negotiable windows of physical access to the 
site(s) 
2. buildability 
3. fixed budgetary constraints 
4. political agendas/directives 
5. the need for environmentally sensitive 
development of these remotely located, pristine 
and often hostile sites. 
Process integration  Involves construction planning methodology, 
logistics, information management, and the influence 
that the design stages have on the overall process 
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management of the total project. 
Logistical planning and implementation complex and 
critical for remote sites or hours to pre-plan a 
mobilization.  
Access to Antarctic sites restricted to four months a 
year, and life threatening situations are the norm, 
means that logistical resources and their deployment 
need to be pre-planned up to a year ahead. 
On Humanitarian Aid projects there is frequently 
only a matter of days to pre-plan.  
Antarctic projects are predominantly prefabricated 
into their component parts (if building projects) in 
response to the tight timeline and adverse weather.  
Timing , costs and weight restrictions (for shipping or 
air freight)add to the logistical complexities  
 
A design management model was needed that responded to and reflected the need for 
well integrated specialist design, construction and operational actors, when 
synthesizing the various theoretical and contextual contributions, as demonstrated in 
Figure 13. Alternative methods of procurement may also be, and often are, required 
when dealing with collaborative international stakeholders in the majority of remote 
site projects. This model, as already noted, was set up in terms of reviewing current 
practice in design management and establishing if any gaps existed in current practice 
and supportive theory. Design management was also reviewed in terms of production 
principles, sociological factors, revisiting the characteristics/attributes and dimensions 
of remote sites from Chapter 4, and then developing a conceptual model that 
identified the key factors or plausible drivers of design management for remote sites. 
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Production oriented worldview :
’
- value stream
- process integration
- workflow
- waste minimisation
Lean design’ 
Sociological oriented worldview
- value generation
 - timely decision making
 ‘design methodology’ & 
‘creative/iterative design process’
- knowledge integration 
REMOTE SITES
- proximity to urban areas
- regulatory framework
- physical environment
- functional/aesthetic and social aims
- environmental impact/sensitivity
VALUE GENERATION
- client’s value criteria
- stakeholders’ value criteria
KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION
- specialist site knowledge
- IT for remote site coordination
PROCESS INTEGRATION
- logistics & site accessibility
- construction planning/methodology
- alternative procurement  strategies
- creativity and production interface
DECISION MAKING
- timely & critical 
- performance criteria
- environmental sustainability
- economic constraints
 
SYNTHESISTHEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
CONTEXT
 
Figure 13 Exploratory design management conceptual model for remote sites (Kestle & London, 2002) 
5.5 Assumptions and Limitations of the Model 
1. That the projects involve international stakeholders working in a collaborative 
manner  
2. That the sites fit with the ‘remote’ descriptor in terms of the attributes and 
dimensions of remote sites as described within the typology 
3. That the projects are conducted on environmentally sensitive (and often world 
heritage) sites that are not easily, or readily accessible  
4. That the projects are politically influenced in terms of funding and approvals  
5. That the model is addressing the pre-planning and operational stages of the 
projects. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter built on the gaps in design management practice that were identified in 
Chapter 2. The management of design and construction on remote sites, why the 
theoretical conceptual model is needed and would be valuable as a management 
process tool, are also discussed. The literature review and analysis indicated that 
much of the lean design management research had been primarily concerned with 
sequential production, and that a few authors were exploring a more sociological 
design management approach. The production oriented view assisted the sociological 
view to develop the conceptual design management model for remote sites. 
Exploratory case study projects, with references to other remote sites noted in Chapter 
 72
4, Table 2, highlighted the factors or drivers that needed to be considered in the 
development of a conceptual design management model for remote sites, which were 
value generation, knowledge integration, process integration and timely decision-
making. These were arrived at by contextualising the typological descriptors for 
remote sites, identifying the contributions made by the sociological and production 
oriented worldview, and in turn became the synthesis described by the four 
factors/drivers for the theoretical model. The three sites investigated at the early stage 
of the research, ie Ross Sea Region scientific bases in Antarctica; Kingfisher Bay 
Resort, Australia; and Tongariro National Park huts and ski lodge sites, fit the 
sociologically oriented holistic design management model in varying degrees, and 
draw from the production oriented worldview of design management. The next stage 
was to test this newly created conceptual theoretical design management model on 
further remote site projects (refer Chapters 6 and 7). 
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CHAPTER 6. THE CAPE ROBERTS DRILLING 
PROJECT ANTARCTICA – A RETROSPECTIVE 
HISTORICAL CASE STUDY 
6.1 The Rationale for Conducting the Case Study  
The selection of this case study at Cape Roberts was made on its potential to represent 
the phenomenon of remote site design management. The Cape Roberts Drilling 
Project in Antarctica, was deemed to be a remote site project, as there was a lack of 
continuously available logistical support; the site was difficult to access in terms of 
geographical location, being approximately eight hours flying time from New 
Zealand, and several hours of overland travel time from Scott Base in the Ross Sea 
Region of Antarctica; the site is subjected to a seasonally hostile local climate, and 
there is a complete lack of local materials and local labour. All resources, whether 
materials or labour had to be either shipped or air freighted into Antarctica’s Ross Sea 
Region and then transported overland with Hagglunds and sledges to the drilling site. 
6.1.1 Methodology  
The Antarctic Drilling Project at Cape Roberts (1995-2001) was examined and 
reviewed retrospectively, from data collected by the researcher using semi- structured 
interviews conducted with nine of the key personnel on the project. The data were 
then analysed within the context of the previously developed conceptual design 
management model for remote sites. The interviews explored the project in its entirety 
with the nine selected key personnel. The aim was to see how well the data matched, 
or added to the design management model in terms of the four key factors- value 
generation; knowledge integration; process integration and timely decision making. 
The analysis supported the conceptual design management model for remote sites.  
6.2 Contextualisation/Introduction  
The Cape Roberts Drilling project (1995-2001) (refer Figure 14), was initiated by 
New Zealand as an extension to the CIROS drilling programme in Western McMurdo 
Sound that can from 1974 -1986. This followed the discovery of strata buried deeply 
beneath the Ross Sea, and yet rising to the sea floor off of Cape Roberts (refer Figure 
 74
15), by New Zealand, the United States, and Italian seismic surveys. The camp and 
drill site(s) were located approximately 140km from the McMurdo and Scott Bases 
(over the ice). The drilling project, conducted from 1995-2001, was an international 
collaborative effort involving seven countries, being Italy, Germany, Australia, UK, 
United States, New Zealand and the Netherlands, each contributing to the scientific, 
management and/or operational aspects of the project. The final budget was in the 
order of NZ$12million. This collaborative approach created a complex regime of 
project personnel and tasks that needed to be sensitively integrated, coordinated, and 
managed.  
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Figure 14 Cape Roberts camp and drill site (Cowie, 2002) 
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Figure 15 Cape Roberts drilling sites and scientific bases locations within the Ross Sea Region 
(Cowie, 2002) 
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The overall aim of the Cape Roberts Project was to recover sedimentary core from the 
3 fast ice holes that were drilled to 500 m beneath the sea floor (refer Figure 15 and 
Figure 16), 13-16km off Cape Roberts (Barrett, 1993 & 2006), to improve the 
understanding of the climatic and tectonic history of the region. The core would 
provide information on  the period 17-34 million years ago, however, they would have 
preferred to study the 0-40 million year period. The aim was to also study ice sheet 
behaviour, under differing global climatic conditions. The aims were further defined 
in 1994, by the International Steering Committee as being:  
To investigate the early history of the East Antarctic ice sheet and the West Antarctic 
Rift System by drilling off Cape Roberts (77.0ºS, 163.7ºE) and then to completely drill 
a 1500m thick sedimentary succession into the western margin of the Victoria Land 
Basin.(Barrett, 1993) 
The project addressed two main issues –  
1. The possibility that sea level changes prior to 40 million years ago, were caused by 
the growth and collapse of ice sheets on the Antarctic continent 
2. The history of the West Antarctic Rift system. 
The first, offering improved understanding of ice sheet behaviour, the second – an 
understanding of the origin and relationships between rift mountains and basins. 
(Barrett, 1993) 
The framework of the project was originally set out in the Antarctic Stratigraphic 
Drilling- Cape Roberts Project- Workshop Report, which was published as Report 
M23 by the Royal Society of New Zealand in 1992. The project was to have been 
carried out in three phases: The Project Planning and Camp set up phase in1995; the 
Drilling phase(s) from 1996-1997 inclusive and the Decommissioning phase in 1998. 
However, this timeframe became extended, for each of the phases due in part to rig 
issues and the challenges of extreme wind, temperature and snow-storm conditions 
(Figure 17). The final decommissioning did not eventually occur until 2001. 
The success of the project has been measured in various ways. For example, the high 
quality of the 1.7km of rock core and the subsequent scientific outcomes, once the 
core had been analysed, and the way in which the project was managed by New 
Zealand. 
“The cores are a nearshore marine sedimentary record, 1500m thick, well-dated from 
volcanic ash, biostratography, Sr-isotopes and magnetostratigraphy” (Barrett, 2006). 
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The scientific outcomes have been well documented, some of which have been 
published (for example, Naish et al. 2001). The detailed results from the drill holes 
were published in 10 issues of the Terra Antarctica Journal between 1998 -2001 
(Cowie, 2002), and most recently in a special issue of Palaeogeography, 
Palaoecology, Palaeoclimatology (Barrett, Florindo & Cooper, 2006). 
  
 
Figure 16 Cape Roberts drill site operational and technical detail (Cowie, 2002) 
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Figure 17 Cape Roberts drill rig and video monitoring hut in good and extreme weather conditions 
6.3 The Management of the Project – the Original and Final 
Structures for the Pre-Planning and Operational Stages. 
6.3.1 The Management Structure – pre-1996 
In terms of the originally proposed management structure (Byrd Polar Research, 
1993), the overall supervision of the Project was to be the responsibility of the 
International Steering Committee (ISC). The Logistical support for the Project was to 
be the responsibility of the Operations/Logistics Management Group (OMG). 
The primary role of the ISC was to be responsible for all the scientific aspects of the 
project, from planning the project science, to implementation of those plans and then 
ensuring that the results were reported and documented. The decisions made by the 
ISC were to be consensual. The ISC was to be comprised of representatives of the 
Parties Contributors, who were to also serve as National Science Coordinators. The 
ISC could also co-opt scientific representatives from other countries on an individual 
or national capacity. The OMG was to be comprised of the National Logistic 
Coordinators, of the Parties Contributors, and be chaired by a representative of the 
New Zealand Antarctic Programme. The OMG was to review the logistics support 
requirements on an annual basis, and meet with the ISC to review completed 
activities, and the plans for future activities.  
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The New Zealand Antarctic Programme (NZAP) was to be responsible for: 
1. Coordinating logistics support, and the drilling operation, including safety aspects; 
2. Coordinating, and accounting to Parties Contributors for financial and other 
resources provided by the Parties Contributors; and  
3. Developing Operational Plans for the three phases of the Project based on the 
requirements of the OMG (Byrd Polar Research, 1993). 
The NZAP (which became Antarctica New Zealand in July 1996), was to appoint a 
Project Manager to manage the operations and logistics associated with the Project. 
This person was to also act as a point of contact for the national logistic coordinators 
of Parties Contributors and the Project Science Coordinator.  
The original Logistics Budget for the Project was US$4million over a 5 year period. 
This figure was to be reviewed annually by the OMG, after the completion of each 
season’s work. Each Party Contributor was to be entitled to a level of scientific 
involvement that was in proportion to their logistics support contribution (Byrd Polar 
Research, 1993). The actual budget, though, was a combination of cash contributions 
and contributions of resources-in-kind for example, helicopter and sea transportation 
support (Cowie, 2002). 
The ISC was to use the Cape Roberts Workshop Report of 1992, as the basis for the 
Project Science Plan. This plan would then identify the key tasks needed to meet the 
Project Objectives, and also allocate responsibilities for the drilling and post-drilling 
programme. Each Party Contributor would then select their own scientists, and 
approve the Project research proposals.  
The procedures for core processing, description and sampling were to be based on the 
previous CIROS Project, and the Ocean Drilling Programme for Leg 119 (Prydz Bay). 
There were also reporting and publication procedures to be followed on a progressive 
basis, by the scientific personnel, to and through the ISC (Byrd Polar Research, 1993). 
A ‘Record of Understanding of Parties Contributors to the Cape Roberts Project’ was 
drawn up, to serve as an intention of long-term cooperation between the Parties’ 
Contributors for a five year period. This was dated from when they agreed to the 
Record of Understanding. The timeframe could be increased to six years, if the ice 
conditions prevented drilling in one of the planned seasons (Byrd Polar Research, 
1993). 
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6.3.2 Evolution of the Management Structure  
The Cape Roberts Project (CRP), comprised two quite distinct, yet parallel parts - one 
being science the other logistics, both sharing the same overall objectives but having 
differing timeframes and critical criterion that needed to be met. In addition, there 
were two main phases, planning and drilling (operational).  
One of the main challenges with the first and notional management structure (refer 
Figure 18) as published in the CRP Comprehensive Environment Evaluation (CEE) 
Report (January 1994), was the suggestion that the ISC be responsible for two areas 
where it had no direct control, that is the ISC had no budget for logistics and 
operations, as that came from the national programmes. Nor did the ISC have direct 
control, or authority, over the nominated Project Manager from NZAP. “The ISC was 
central to the Project and its success, but it could not go it alone” (Cowie, 2002). The 
ISC needed therefore to work with a parallel organisation, the Operational 
Management Group (OMG) in terms of funding the logistics aspects of the Project. 
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Figure 18 Management structure for the Cape Roberts Project published in the CRP 
Comprehensive Environment Evolution Report, January 1994 
 
Another challenge with the CEE (1994) version of the project’s management structure 
was that the planning and operational phases were centred on the ISC and the Science 
Project Coordinator. In the Planning Phase, this meant that the Project Manager 
(NZAP) and the Science Project Leader were only able to formally communicate via 
the ISC. There was no formal functional link or requirement as such, for the Project 
Manager, the Science Project leader or the Science Principal Investigators (PI’s) to 
work together. (Cowie, 2002). In practice, a less formal and common sense approach 
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tended to prevail, and the limitations of the structure’s implementation were largely 
ignored. However, this approach could only succeed for as long as there were no 
serious problems, or irreconcilable differences, between the parties. 
In the Operational Phase, the challenges of the CEE (1994) management structure 
were, potentially, even greater, as the management plan involved splitting the 
scientists into two separate groupings. One group would be located at Scott Base and 
McMurdo Station, a relatively pleasant and safe working environment, but one which 
was remote from the drilling ice-face. The second group would be located 140km 
away, in a relatively hostile and isolated environment, at Cape Roberts. These 
scientists would be working immediately alongside the drillers and the support staff. 
They would have first-hand knowledge of conditions at the actual site, and the 
potential real-time expectations at any one time. There was, therefore, potential for the 
operational and scientific goals to be in conflict. Further, the NZAP was to be 
operationally responsible for logistic support and drilling operations, and needed, 
therefore to appoint one of their employees as a CRP Project Manager (initially 
termed the CRP Logistics Manager).  
However, at Cape Roberts, the Science Project Coordinator, who was not an 
employee of NZAP, was expected to take on this responsibility, which in effect was 
responsibility for the total field operation.  
The structure of the operational management plan needed to be amended, to remove 
the inconsistencies relating to operational decision-making, line management, and 
reporting, at such a critical stage of the overall Project. The proposed variations were 
adopted unanimously, by all of the interested parties, in June 1996. The agreed CRP 
Operations Plan (refer Figure 20)was basically a refined version of the original 
Washington Workshop structure (1993) (refer Figure 19).  
There was an emphasis on an operational management team with recognition of the 
two distinct parts of the Project (science and logistics/operational) and therefore 
recognition of the need for joint or bifurcated leadership. Those leaders would be the 
Science Project Leader (later renamed the Chief Scientist) and the Project Manager. 
Each would report to the ISC and NZAP (Antarctica NZ), respectively. However, 
both would be responsible for coordinating their respective activities through, and 
with, the Drilling Manager and the Science Support Manager.   
Each member of the management team had their roles and responsibilities clearly 
defined in the Operations Plan. (Cowie, 2002) 
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Figure 19  Original CRP management structure (1993) 
 
  
 
Figure 20 Management structure as adopted in the CRP Operations Manual June 1996 
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6.4 Management of the Environmental Considerations  
Discussions regarding the environmental aspects of the project first began informally, 
in 1991, within the NZ Antarctic community, and later in consultation with the Office 
of Polar Programmes, National Science Foundation, Washington DC.  
Dr Harry Keys (Department of Conservation) presented a paper to the May 1992 CRP 
Planning Workshop outlining environmental concerns and recommendations 
associated with drilling in Antarctica, under the new Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty 
(1991). Dr Keys recommended consultation with the international Antarctic 
community, and that a Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation (CEE) be 
undertaken.  
Resultant from these recommendations, the NZ Antarctic Environmental Assessment 
and Review Panel (EARP), recommended the CEE process be followed, rather than 
the Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE), given the potential scale of the 
environmental impact(s).  
The final draft of the CEE was published in January 1994, and tabled at the ATCM  
XVIII/INFO 21. The CEE laid down the conditions that would apply, in principle, at 
the set-up and operational stages of the CRP. The detailed documentation was to be 
prepared by the CRP Project Manager, and be an interpretation of the CEE conditions.  
The key conditions involved: 
a) Identifying specific environmental risks and the need for these to be eliminated or 
mitigated by means of operational procedures and educational training. 
b) Formulating a CEE compliance checklist for the key stages of the Project, to 
include site inspections, to gauge the level of actual compliance. 
c) Setting up a monitoring programme to identify any potential and/or real long-term 
changes. 
d) Setting up reporting systems to track compliance levels and gather generic 
information.  
e) Creating mechanisms that allowed amendments to be made to the original CEE 
document (Cowie, 2002). 
Following the 1992 CRP Workshop, the Environmental Risk Assessment approach 
was mainly concerned with mitigating the concerns raised at the workshop. The 
concerns were associated with the unstable sea-ice, the remoteness of the drill sites 
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and the perception that the scientific drilling may in fact have been explorative 
drilling. 
All the drillers employed on CRP demonstrated a very positive attitude toward 
the environmental objectives of the Project. Had they not, they would not have 
been employed. The adverse impacts were identified as ‘disturbance’, 
‘destruction or contamination of’, and ‘cumulative impacts’ on Cape Roberts 
itself, and contamination of the marine environment. 
(Cowie, 2002) 
The potential environmental impacts would emanate from, for example, fuel or toxic 
spills; equipment falling through the sea ice; noise pollution, a blow-out on the drill 
rig at the sea-floor, and vehicle and/or foot traffic.  
Antarctica New Zealand (originally the NZAP) already had a set of operational and 
environmental procedures that required compliance by all approved national 
programme activities in Antarctica. These documents included the Environmental 
Code of Conduct, the Operations Manual and the Waste Management Manual. These 
documents were then modified, in terms of documenting the environmental operating 
procedures that would specifically apply to the CRP (Cowie, 2002). 
The environmental compliance of the CRP to the CEE in Antarctica was the 
responsibility of the CRP Project Manager. However, this responsibility was 
delegated to the Science Support Manager (Antarctica NZ’s Environmental Manager), 
during the operational stages at the drill site.  
The Science Support Manager, in consultation with the CRP Project Manager 
prepared, and then conducted, the CEE Compliance Checklist; On-site Inspections; 
Monitoring and Environmental Reporting, respectively. 
Reports were then written up independently, by the CRP Project Manager, and the 
Environmental Manager. These individual reports were then collated, by Antarctica 
New Zealand, and sent to EARP, and also to the Committee for Environmental 
Protection (CEP), to be tabled at the ATCM (Cowie, 2002). 
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6.5 The Key Project Management Recommendations by the 
CRP (1995-2001) Personnel 
After the decommissioning of the Cape Roberts Drilling Project (CRP) was completed 
in 2001, the ‘Final Report’ was compiled and edited by Cowie (2002) and published 
by Antarctica New Zealand. The report drew on written contributions by the project 
science coordinator (and chief scientist), the science support manager and the overall 
project manager. Reviewing this report provided the researcher with clarity on the 
details of the project and which personnel to potentially select and approach as 
interview participants for the doctoral research. In addition the following summary of 
recommendations from the CRP personnel served as a basis for designing the 
subsequent interview questions, and provided the opportunity for direct comparisons 
with the collected data(2003/4) and findings, refer section 6.6.  
6.5.1 Summary of the lessons learned and recommendations for 
future projects 
1. Project Management – Structure 
a) Agree a ‘responsive/flexible project management structure’ in the earliest 
stages of the project. 
b) Trial the proposed management structure before the anticipated full 
implementation stage(s), wherever possible, to establish the potential trigger 
points and operational phase defects.    
c) Involve all the key players and groups in the project, as early as possible 
d) Employ and involve the proposed project manager/management team, at the 
planning or initiating phase preferably. 
e) Agree realistic job descriptors, and be consistent in the use of these 
role/position titles.  
f) Establish clearly defined dispute resolution process, at inception of the project. 
g) The Management style(s) need to be responsive, and adapt to the various 
stages of the project. 
     2. Project Management – employment tactics/strategies 
a)   Recruit experienced Antarctic personnel wherever possible, and preferably 
locally domiciled in and around Christchurch. 
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b)   Establish conditions of employment within the contracts that specifically 
acknowledge and recompense, the demands associated with working on Antarctic 
projects, such as the Cape Roberts Drilling (and now the projected Andrill Drilling 
Project). Within the limitations of the project’s budget, institute innovative and 
flexible employment packages, particularly when the projects are seasonal 
c)  Offer incentives to ‘valued staff’ to return and be re-engaged the following 
season. 
d)  Institute a system of ‘guaranteed payment/income’ in the event of an 
unexpected and early project termination. 
e)  Provide a well run camp that affords reasonable, and reliable levels of 
communication with home, and office bases.  
f)  Make realistic and measurable provisions within the project’s budget, for safety 
equipment and training, to encourage workplace safety and to minimise risk, on 
these potentially high–risk projects. 
      (Cowie, 2002). 
3. Financial Management  
a) Collaborative international projects increase the complexity of the financial 
and budgetary set-up phases of a project. Important for the contributing parties 
to understand and agree a basic set of financial guidelines/rules before the 
contributions are made and/or the expenditure commences. For example, agree 
the currency or currencies that will be used for the project, which may run for 
several years, across several currency fluctuations, potentially 
b) Preliminary budgets need to include significant contingency sums, if they are 
to be used when preparing funding proposals. For example, for the CRP a 50% 
contingency sum would have been necessary 
c) Preliminary budgets need to be accurately matched to preliminary detailed 
logistics, and operational planning, and so on through the various design, 
planning and operational stages of the project 
d) Realistic and significant levels of cash flow is critical,  particularly at the set-
up phases of the project 
e) Realistic lead-times and milestones need to be established in terms of the 
planning stages, which in turn need to be recognised as requiring significant 
time and cash inputs 
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f) Accurate and timely tracking of budget expenditure, which is easily 
accessible, is essential for good financial management. CRP for example, 
highlighted the need for differentiation between capital and maintenance costs 
and more rather than less budget codes to achieve high quality information  
g) When considering managing a project on behalf of other interested 
parties/stakeholders, negotiate the terms under which that service will be 
provided, well before the commencement of any stage of the project 
4. Operations 
a) Detailed planning, design, fabrication, and deployment of equipment took 
almost two years to complete for CRP and this, set against a very tight series 
of timelines. More realistic timelines, or resourcing, or both, need to occur in 
future projects. 
b) There is a significant difference between preliminary and detailed planning. 
Preliminary planning is concerned with feasibility studies, setting the 
objectives and associated milestones, applying for and securing funding, 
applying for CEE approvals, and establishing preliminary resourcing/logistical 
needs and links. A dedicated budget needs to be included for this 
fundamentally important phase of the project, to ensure that quality 
information is gathered, resulting in well informed decision-making. 
c) Adjudging the need for, and timing of the recruitment of a Project Manager for 
a specific project, requires experience. For example, when does an idea 
actually become ‘a project’. This decision is of paramount importance to the 
long-term success of a project, as the earlier the appointment of the project 
Manager is made in the project, the better. 
d) “The importance of effective coordination, communication and control in all 
phases of project management, cannot be overemphasised” (Cowie, 2002) 
e) Ship off-loading of heavy equipment on to sea ice, is considered to be a high-
risk operation. Prior contingency plans need to be drawn up and in place. The 
further the ships are from the land at the time of off-loading, the greater the 
risk, particularly in the transition zone or tide crack areas. 
f) Project managers could be held liable for accidents to individuals, or the 
environment, where insufficient testing or trialling of equipment can be 
proven. Trialling equipment would minimise safety issues and ensure 
environmental compliance measures were met. 
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g) The use of fitted-out shipping containers, for camp accommodation, utilities, 
laboratories, and storage buildings, whilst cheap, are heavy and are not as 
flexible in-use as for example, purpose-made demountable structures. 
h) The forecasted estimations of the number of helicopter hours support required 
for the CRP (2 seasons) was set approximately 20% too high. This meant that 
these ‘resource-in-kind’ contributors were potentially overcompensated by the 
credits attributed to them, relative to the project’s cash contributors. 
i) The Communications Network at CRP was considered to be totally 
inappropriate. The only means of communication with the original CRP-1 and 
CRP-2 drill sites was by open-broadcast channel VHF radio. This type of 
communications network is really only suited to low level operational usage, 
such as skifields, and is subject to strict codes of conduct and language.  When 
potentially confidential and critical drilling, scientific and operational 
discussions and decisions are being made, a more discreet, yet diverse range of 
communication systems are required. Time and reliability of information is 
also of-the-essence.  
On future projects, the expectation would be that high quality, diverse and fast 
communications ranging from emails, fax, data transmission, telephone calls 
et al, and individual computer access, will be accommodated by the (pre-
trialled) communications network.  
j) Provisions for inter drilling operation phase maintenance, and associated 
budgets need to be made on future projects. 
k) Projects similar in scope and size to the Cape Roberts Drilling Project should 
have a process and live archiving system that documents and/or records all 
collected data, all decisions and recommendations made. This central and live 
archive should be accessible to all project personnel 24/7 and be continually 
updated on an hourly/daily/weekly/monthly basis, as appropriate. 
5. Environmental Management 
a) For future projects, attention needs to be given to: Issues associated with the 
CEE process in terms of allowing sufficient lead times, and amendments time; 
the need for a separate and significant budget for the CEE process from the 
application preparation to the compliance and monitoring stages; the need for 
ownership and buy-in to the process by the stakeholders and the project 
personnel; on-site environmental management and associated ground-rules for 
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compliance inspections establishment and the perceived need to achieve  
balance between compliance and cost. 
b) Also on future projects, the issue of Project staff and Environmental 
Compliance needs attention. The implementation and achievement of a CEE is 
only possible with the willingness and buy-in of the project personnel to 
embrace and involve themselves in good environmental practice. 
As a footnote, the CRP drillers in particular were somewhat and unexpectedly 
environmentally conscientious, both in terms of their attitudes and their on-site 
practice. 
 
6.6 The Cape Roberts Drilling Project - the Realities of 
Managing 
The nine selected participants represented a cross section of the personnel involved on 
the Cape Roberts Drilling Projects. All of the participants were approached prior to 
the interviewing process, to establish their willingness to participate in this research. 
All agreed to be interviewed using taped verbal responses to the interview questions 
contained in parts A and B. 
Part A involved a question related to the participants’ official responsibilities that 
were associated with their roles on the Cape Roberts Drilling Project. Part A also 
involved a question regarding the main issues that arose during the project, from their 
perspectives, and the impacts that the issues may have had on the project and their 
individual roles. 
Part B involved a question regarding the four key factors of the conceptual design 
management model for remote site projects. The question was aimed at establishing 
how well the theoretical model, and the four key factors therein, represented the 
realities of the Antarctic Drilling Project at Cape Roberts, from the nine participants’ 
perspectives. 
6.6.1 Interview Questions Part A – Associated with the 
Retrospective Case Study of the Cape Roberts Drilling Project. 
In reference to the Cape Roberts Drilling Project in Antarctica,  
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(i) what were the official responsibilities associated with the key roles played 
by the nine selected participants, and how did these change during the course 
of the project;  
(ii) what were the main issues that arose during the project, and to what extent 
did they impact on the individual and distinct role, and/or the project. 
This two part question, aimed to also review the ‘lessons learned’ and the 
‘recommendations’ made in the 2002 (Cowie) report, with the participants, in respect 
of the Cape Roberts Drilling Project for future projects, and particularly in terms of: 
? The management framework and approaches 
? Funding 
? Pre-planning 
? Detailed planning stage(s) 
? Communications 
? The operations stage 
? Human Resources 
6.6.2. Managing the Clients and Stakeholders  
The terms Client and Stakeholder were interpreted differently, according to which 
respondent/participant was being interviewed. 
The Client, as perceived by the selected interview participants from the Cape Roberts 
Drilling Project, was considered to be “whoever was paying for/or driving the 
project”, and this ranged from being considered to be Antarctica New Zealand 
(funded to support science), to the Scientists (funded to conduct the science) or the 
ISC (International Science Committee) who essentially wanted the ‘core’ to conduct 
the science on. 
The Stakeholders, as perceived by the selected interview participants from the Cape 
Roberts Drilling Project, were considered to be “ the various organisations with a 
direct interest in the scientific ‘outcomes’ from the project”, and who these were also 
ranged from being considered to be the 7 collaborative nations’ governments, (USA, 
Italy, Germany, UK, the Netherlands, Australia and NZ); the NZ economy and 
society; the Minister for the Environment; the Minister for Research, Science and 
Technology; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Victoria University of Wellington; the 
OMG (Operations Management Group) and all the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
partners. 
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The Management Framework and Approaches 
According to the interview participants selected for this research, there were ‘sector’ 
managers but it was unclear as to who was, or should be, in overall charge of the 
project, at the operations stage in particular. There was a sense that no one person or 
group was in overall charge of the entire project, and this resulted in a series of 
challenges around communications and ongoing project expectations throughout the 
duration of the project.  
The project management of the project was primarily the responsibility of Antarctica 
New Zealand, and the OMG (Operations Management Group). The OMG partially 
funded the logistics of the project, as a result of representing the Antarctic Agencies 
from each of the collaborative countries, who were providing that funding. 
The responses from the selected participants were totally consistent in that they 
believed the management of the project did not reside solely with one person, nor with 
just one group. The participants were of the general opinion that they would have 
preferred a less fragmented management approach, as was the case at the initial stages 
of the project. The participants acknowledged though, that after the first year or so of 
operations, Antarctica New Zealand (and their appointed project manager of logistics 
and operations), together with the chief scientist, were seen by all of the project 
personnel as being the parallel/collaborative project management duo.  
The Funding  
In the initial stages the CEO of Antarctica New Zealand headed up the Cape Roberts 
Drilling Project, and Antarctica New Zealand was driving the costings of the project 
and feeding this information back to the collaborative countries. These costings were 
directly related to how much funding the Project would need, for what and when. In 
particular the Project needed cash, not just resource time and/or resources-in-kind. 
The resources-in-kind also had to have costs attributed to them in order to be 
equitable for the countries that provided that type of contribution. The NSF (National 
Science Foundation), wanted every American dollar contributed to be set against a 
tangible asset that could then be returned to the Americans at the completion of the 
project. The sourcing and provision of logistics funding and science funding were two 
separate activities and entities, yet the representatives from each grouping were 
required to work together to achieve the required and common prime outcomes.  
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The science funding was the responsibility of each individual country and their 
scientific teams. This was a challenging prospect from a project management 
perspective, as the scientific leadership identified certain objectives and priorities 
within a particular timeframe, as did the logistics and operational 
leadership/management, in attempting to support the scientific goals and timeframes. 
Given there were two separate funding streams, and differing timeframes for those 
funding streams to come-on-line and be utilised, a few of the project management 
challenges become immediately obvious.  
However, the infrastructure usually evident in organisations to set up and support the 
handling and processing of, for example, financial matters such as loans, 
contributions, purchasing etc did not exist at the initial project stages.  
Nobody had thought about how you actually receive monies from overseas, let 
alone set up an accounting procedure to handle those kinds of things” 
(Participant E). “At that stage we were just a branch of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, so we had to negotiate with the accountants in 
Wellington regarding how to bring this money in (to the country)…..how do 
you accommodate large sums of foreign money?” (Participant E).  
The project partners were also experiencing difficulties on how to transfer money to 
the Antarctica NZ programme,  
There’s a story that the first cheque from the British as part of their 
contribution arrived in a brown paper envelope, was delivered to the Antarctic 
Centre, and was made out to cash, not to the Cape Roberts Project or the NZ 
Antarctic Programme. It went back to the post office then to the Americans 
and finally 3 weeks after it arrived in New Zealand, it came to me. 
(Participant E). 
The Pre-Planning Stages 
There is a suggestion from the interview data collected that the project “grew like 
Topsy” and that the initial scoping exercise conducted by the client(s), the various 
stakeholders, and operational personnel, did not accurately describe the project that 
Cape Roberts later became in reality. This was due, in the main, to the fact that prior 
experience on a project of this complexity, scope and size within an international 
environment, was non-existent amongst the New Zealanders, in particular.  
 95
The Operations Stage 
Communications between the scientific and logistics representatives on the project 
varied both in terms of the individual expectations, the nature of the communications 
and the timing and /or regularity, which resulted at times in miscommunications. The 
main cause of communicational issues was the geographical locations of the 
personnel.  One group of scientists were located in the Crary Laboratory at McMurdo, 
whereas another group of scientists were working alongside the drillers and associated 
site personnel 140km away at Cape Roberts.  
The expectations of the Science Steering Committee regarding the daily outputs and 
report updates, were apparently out of sync with the realities of what was possible at 
the drill hole sites in terms of the timing and availability of core material for scientific 
logging and investigation. Urgent on-site decision-making regarding the drilling 
process, at times precluded the preferred process of full consultative scientific 
involvement, prior to any drilling changes being made.  
Suggestions for Managing Clients and Stakeholders on Future Projects  
Chairing the OMG –  
Interviewed participants questioned whether the OMG should be chaired by 
Antarctica NZ, when they were also the project manager, or whether it should be 
chaired by someone else. The fact that the Americans are the project managers, this 
time, in terms of the current Andrill project, was also noted by the participants. 
On the Cape Roberts Drilling Project, the advantage of Antarctica NZ chairing the 
OMG was that those personnel were “right up with the play on all counts”, and 
therefore they knew what they wanted, and needed, from the OMG meetings. One of 
the disadvantages was that the six other collaborative project members did not have 
the same level of ownership in terms of the project as that of the chairing project 
member. The suggestion then was that there should be a rotating chair amongst the 
Project Country members, on an annual basis. Further, there needs to be a separate 
Project Manager, who attends, and contributes to, all of the meetings from the early 
stages of the project, but the Project Manager should not chair the OMG. The 
advantage of (the Project Manager et al) not chairing (and therefore controlling) the 
meetings, is the opportunity for direct involvement in the discussions and therefore 
the outcomes.  
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Another disadvantage, or potential issue, with Antarctica NZ being both the Project 
Manager for the Cape Roberts Project, and the OMG chair, was the need to be seen to 
be adopting an equitable and transparent funding approach when reviewing or 
discussing the cash and in-kind contributions from the collaborative project partners.  
6.6.3 Managing the Science 
The Management Framework and Approaches 
The overall management and supervision of the Science aspects of the project, from 
planning the project science, to implementation of those plans and then ensuring that 
the results were reported and documented, were the responsibility of the International 
Steering Committee (ISC).  
The decisions made by the ISC were to be consensual. The ISC was to be comprised 
of representatives of the Parties Contributors, who were to also serve as National 
Science Coordinators. The ISC could also co-opt scientific representatives from other 
countries on an individual or national capacity. 
The ISC was responsible for creating the Project Science Plan which identified the 
key tasks needed, to meet the Project Objectives, and also allocated responsibilities 
for the drilling and post-drilling programme. Each Party Contributor then selected 
their own scientists, and approved the Project research proposals.  
A Project Science Coordinator, who later became known as the Chief Scientist, was 
formally appointed by the ISC. 
The formalisation and recognition of the role of the Project Science Coordinator was 
stated in the founding document of the project, otherwise known as the ‘Record of 
Understanding’, drawn up  to serve as an intention of long-term cooperation between 
the Parties Contributors for a five year period. This was dated from when they agreed 
to the Record of Understanding. The timeframe could have been increased to six 
years, if the ice conditions prevented drilling in one of the planned seasons (Byrd 
Polar Research, 1993). 
Each party Contributor was entitled to a level of scientific involvement in the project, 
in general proportion to their contribution to the logistics support of the project. 
However, the costs associated with the scientific work and attendance at meetings 
connected with the project were to be met by the relevant Party Contributors. Each 
country compiled their lists of preferred scientific personnel,  
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And then basically it was horse-trading, but there was still a sense of 
commitment to the project. For example, there was strong interest from Italy 
and the US, and a couple of initial clashes, in the area of paleomagnatism, but 
a collaborative agreement was worked out between the scientists themselves 
that really benefitted the overall project (Participant A).  
The Funding 
The science funding was the responsibility of each individual country and their 
scientific teams. There were two separate funding streams, being scientific and 
logistics/operations, and there were differing timeframes for those funding streams to 
come on-line and be utilised. 
The scientific funding was won on application and then allocated to teams of 
scientists, or in a few cases to individual scientists, to be completed within a set 
timeframe. Failing to conduct the science and deliver the scientific outcomes within 
the agreed timeframe (usually one or two years duration) to the funding 
organisation(s), meant that the funding would be lost. The scientist would therefore 
now be unemployed, unable to conduct the science, and was possibly professionally 
chastised, as well. 
The Pre-planning and the Detailed Planning Stages 
In the pre-planning stage, specific science personnel involvement, and the associated 
proposals and processes, were dealt with by the national science coordinator for each 
participating country.   
We had already identified the areas of science we were particularly interested 
in receiving proposals from, and of course, this was a negotiated process. We 
had people who were specialised in palaeontology, tectonics, geophysics and 
sedimentology, who had considerable Antarctic experience, and who were 
established figures in their communities and countries they came from. 
( Participant A).  
Scientific areas were frequently oversubscribed with at times up to 5 people wanting 
to do petrology, from 3 different countries. 
Another group in sedimentology, which was necessarily large because we had 
to describe core 24/7. It was probably oversubscribed, but it was interesting, 
because there were two fundamentally different philosophies in sedimentology, 
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and we had representatives from each. By the end of the first season one 
group was not talking to the other, by the second season there was a better 
understanding and some negotiation happening” (Participant A).  
The Operations Stage 
Relative to the first drilling season were these quotes from a number of the 
participants,  
We had planning delays, in the sense that I said, we just cannot do it in the 
time available, we haven’t got the money, and we just haven’t got the lead 
times to fabricate, manufacture and purchase things. I did not appreciate the 
grief that that caused the scientific fraternity. (Participant E). 
 Most countries run on a 2 or 3 year (funding) cycle. A scientist applies for funding 
and, if successful, the expectation is that the science and the funding will occur within 
the set timeframe.  
“When a project is delayed by a year for example, the scientists get out of sync, they 
are either unemployed or they have to apply to have the funding rolled over for a 
year” (Participant E). 
Challenges, sometimes referred to as problems or failures by the selected interview 
participants, that had occurred on the previous drilling projects of CIROS1 and 
CIROS 2, occurred again in the first drilling year of the Cape Roberts Drilling Project: 
“There were problems that we should have foreseen, and didn’t. Quite significant 
failures in terms of mud supply, and the failure of the sea-riser, for example. There 
was a very fine line between success and failure” (Participant A). 
Another view, regarding the scientific management at the operational stage of the 
project, referred to the politics and power issues that arose in the third year of the 
project, and the impacts it had on the otherwise cohesive team of scientists: 
In the third year we had this senior overseas scientist, who was a specialist in 
our particular discipline, suddenly arrive, telling us how it was going to be, 
and expected because of his seniority, that we would listen to him. He 
fundamentally disagreed with the interpretations we had made, …and it was a 
majority view held by the rest of the team on a fundamental and publishable 
issue (Participant A).  
Given his seniority and late appointment (in the project timeline), to write up the 
findings, he was in a powerful position. The resultant impacts on the team were that of 
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frustration, and also determination to prove their case to this particular person. They 
succeeded. 
There were successes too, though, in terms of the management and outputs of the 
science, and in particular that of the scientists.  
What we succeeded at sufficiently, I won’t say we did it well, was creating a 
community of scientists, that were actually pretty tolerant of being told what 
their role was, and this was an environment where the scientists had control of 
their own money, so they could choose to walk if the going got too tough!!  
The successes, well these are represented in the 10 volumes, stacked about 
that high, which is the product, the reporting of the project” (Participant A). 
So, the short story is that Cape Roberts really, I think, succeeded amazingly 
well in documenting its science (Participant A). 
“I think it works really well to have an integrated science team on the ice, getting as 
much done as possible at that initial stage, before you lose the momentum” 
(Participant F). 
The Scientific Reports prepared by the 30 or so scientists on the Cape Roberts 
Drilling Project were peer reviewed and published in Terra Antarctica - a biennial 
earth science journal. Several scientific journal papers have subsequently been 
published from this project, and continue to be prepared and published in high profile 
journals such as ‘Nature’ and ‘Geology’ (Participant A). 
6.6.4  Managing the Logistics  
The Management Framework and Approaches 
The management framework/structure evolved over time from that initially proposed 
in 1993, as did the safety allocations required by the project management 
organisation. 
“The reporting lines for the project manager was another interesting management 
issue within Antarctica New Zealand, complicated by the fact that we had some 
organisational restructuring, and there were people leaving, particularly in the 
operations management role” (Participant H). 
The expectation would have been for the Cape Roberts Manager to report to the 
Operations Manager, as this was an operations’ task, but with the Operations Manager 
(personnel) changing, this was not the case. Instead a member of the OMG, who had 
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considerable and pertinent previous knowledge worked directly with the Project 
Manager. The Project Manager of the Cape Roberts Drilling Project, was initially 
employed by Antarctica NZ as the Logistics Manager, responsible for the total 
logistics operations side of the project, except for the drilling operations. These were 
to be conducted under a separate contract with GNS (Geological Nuclear Sciences), a 
Crown Research Institute. However, 1994 was a period of widespread government 
restructuring and GNS decided to relinquish the drilling arm of the organisation. This 
situation led to the Logistics Manager taking on the responsibility for the entire 
logistics operation, including the drilling operations.  
The Pre-planning and the Detailed Planning Stages 
According to the selected participants, acknowledgement or rather, perhaps, the 
realisation of the complexity and scope of the Cape Roberts Project as a significant 
and stand-alone project, was never realistically addressed or evident in the associated 
time allocations for planning, or in the account budget. 
“There was no account, no Cape Roberts account” (Participant E).  
In addition, data collected suggests that the project team may not really have 
understood the essential difference between pre-planning, and detailed planning, 
seeing them as potentially one and the same thing, involving estimates and few 
specifics.  
Pre-planning I’d argue, can often be done within already existing resources in 
your office, or your organisational structure. But there comes a point where 
you’ve got to consciously move from preliminary planning and guesstimating, 
to some seriously detailed planning which is going to take people’s time and 
expertise. It’s going to start costing (Participant E).   
The Funding 
Initially, it was Antarctica New Zealand that was driving the costings of the project, 
and feeding this information back to the collaborative countries. These costings were 
directly related to how much funding the Project would need, for what and when it 
was required to come on stream. The Project needed cash, not just resource time 
and/or resources-in-kind. The resources-in-kind though, had to have costs attributed to 
them in order to be equitable relative to the countries that provided that type of 
contribution (New Zealand and Italy, for example).  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the sourcing and provision of logistics funding, 
and science funding, were two separate activities and entities. The logistics, and 
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operational leadership/management, key focus was to support the scientific goals, and 
their timeframes. The logistics funding came from cash, and resources-in-kind 
contributions from the collaborating countries. This was problematic due in the main 
to the conditions put on the contributions by some countries, the variable currency 
exchange rates, and the timing and nature of the contributions not always matching 
the actual equipment required and/or the transport/task timelines. 
The NSF wanted evidence of tangible assets in return for their monetary 
contributions, that could then become American property at the completion of the 
project. This initial requirement, if adhered to, would have meant that other countries’ 
contributions would have had to be used to pay for consumables, such as labour and 
fuel, with no right of, or ability for, a ‘return’ at the end of the project. 
Resources-in-kind, rather than cash contributions were made by at least two of the 
collaborating countries, being New Zealand and Italy. These resources ranged, for 
example, from providing logistical support for the various project teams to providing 
equipment. One of the challenges associated with equipment being supplied by 
contributing countries was the need to establish whether the resources (for example, 
equipment), would match the set performance criteria for the Cape Roberts Project.  
One of the other challenges was establishing and agreeing the ‘value’ of the 
resources-in-kind in dollar terms, in order to make comparisons with the inputs from 
cash contributions. The participants identified one example of inappropriate and over-
valued resources-in-kind which involved an offer to provide tents for the Cape 
Roberts ‘site camp’. However, the tents were only single-skinned and would have 
been totally unsuited for the staff working 12 hour shifts, 7 days a week, in up to 
minus 30oC conditions, and the actual value (in dollar terms) of the equipment was 
overstated by approximately five hundred percent. The tents were never used.  
The Operations Stage 
The project experienced a faltering start. After the first few weeks into the first year of 
drilling, the project was halted, 
When a big  storm came through carving off a huge section of sea –ice that we 
were perched on!! ….and the sea ice “looked suspect …we could have lost 
everything including, possibly, lives”. We felt that the ice was so 
dangerous…and to have a 55 tonne drill perched out there? !! , so we gave it 
away (Participant E). 
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 The Project Manager and NZ team were criticised for this decision by one of the 
collaborative countries on the project, believing that “the kiwis were being cowardly” 
The reality was that the ice continues to grow through September and October, and 
the minimum operating standards for using a D6 bulldozer, was that the ice had to be 
at least 1.2m thick by around mid-September, in order to be at an operable depth by 
November onwards. In addition, there were planning delays associated with lead 
times to fabricate, manufacture and purchase resources. There was also a lack of 
funds. (Participants E, D and A) 
Other factors that could have caused serious consequences were the assumptions 
regarding the force of current and tidal flow around the site. In fact when the currents 
were actually measured on site, they, together with the tidal flows, were found to be 
flowing much faster than expected.  
“The drill rig was bending like a bow…and we were fearful of a break” (Participants 
E and D) 
These events caused a total rethink of the drilling approach, particularly in terms of 
the sea-riser. The consequence was a $1million dollar upgrade of the sea-riser to cope 
with the current, before drilling recommenced the following year. 
On-going sea-ice analysis based on satellite imagery was conducted every year prior 
to drilling operations, as the sea-ice had to be of a particular and sustainable thickness 
for the drilling operation to commence and continue for the whole season. In the first 
season the forecasted situation was that there would not be sufficient sea-ice for the 
season and the drilling was deferred. The fact that sea-ice information was an ever 
changing snap-shot scenario that could alter significantly over a short period of time, 
or between adjacent sites, was not always fully understood or appreciated by scientists 
new to Antarctic drilling programmes.  “ (Antarctic) drilling is a continuous 
problem…you are constantly problem-solving” (Participant D).  
Further, and reflecting on the topic of the Cape Roberts drilling operation pre-
planning, Participant D stated that, 
We started off drilling at Cape Roberts believing that we knew more than we 
actually did from previous drill holes (on the CIROS project), we were really 
drilling in a new area, far away from the previous holes, and we should have 
expected more variability, so  we did not quite plan for it the way that we 
could have. The whole strategy of drilling changed as we drilled one hole and 
found we hadn’t gone deep enough, we then knew that the next two holes 
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needed to be deeper and that the drilling system did not have quite the level of  
flexibility to allow us to drill deeper. The change in strategy was very 
successful…slightly different to what the scientists expected, but we got the 
results  (Participant D). 
 
Communications 
Communications between the scientific and logistics representatives on the project 
varied both in terms of the individual expectations, the nature of the communications 
and the timing and/or regularity. This resulted at times in miscommunications. From a 
project management perspective, one of the major priorities is safety, and this was not 
always understood or acknowledged by sectors of the project personnel.  
Oversights, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the various Antarctic 
programme personnel on the project, meant that there were, at times, very tense 
periods, often fuelled by the realities of time and financial constraints and differing 
priorities and expectations.  
Every project is going to be different, but I cannot overemphasise, and 
particularly in the early stages, of trying to understand the cultures that come 
together in projects, particularly the more remote you are. Once you go 
operational, you are living in each other’s pockets so to speak. It has 
everything to do with the way you set up the structure down there…even down  
to how you set up the accommodation, sleeping and eating arrangements, all 
those sorts of things become quite important (Participant E). 
The way in which communications are conducted on and between Antarctic projects 
has changed over the last few years. Antarctica is now a part of world-wide 
communication globalisation that includes computers, internet, email and cell phones 
(Participant D). Expectations of project and stakeholder personnel have changed and 
increased as a result. 
The Science Steering Committee expected twice daily updates from the drilling site 
regarding progress and outputs from the ‘drilling hole’. There was a very high 
expectation, not only from the scientists but from all personnel for regular, reliable 
and up to date contact with other project personnel and family et al.  
The scientists at the Crary Laboratory (at McMurdo Base) didn’t think that they were 
getting enough information, and this added a significant amount to the workload” 
(Participant D). 
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Human Resources 
In terms of the operational stages of the Cape Roberts Project, there was a drilling 
operation with the associated scientific and technological drilling expertise required, 
and then there was an Antarctic operation, which involved all of the support staff, 
before, during and after the operational stages of the project. 
The logistics staff employed by Antarctica New Zealand on the project were 
essentially the drillers and the support staff. The support staff ran the camp, 
maintained the vehicles and equipment, and this included an electrician, engineer, 
plant operator et al. All had field experience in Antarctica, which was an essential 
requirement of their employment, as was a “passion to be there”. 
The drillers came from all over the world and from a range of drilling disciplines, to 
work on the Cape Roberts Project. Many had differing experiences and expectations 
to those that were associated with or required on Antarctic programmes, for example 
the supply of, and responsibility for equipment, and the “ways of working”.  
On the Cape Roberts Project, some of the senior drillers, needed an 
explanation as to why they had to take responsibility for something that 
normally in PNG or Australia, they would not have had to, as the client 
(running a mine, say),would usually have looked after that aspect” 
(Participant D). 
Whilst there was a work culture of  “just working until the job got done”, overworked 
staff became an issue, according to the interviewed participants. This was due in the 
main, they suggested, to a budget blow-out, which was basically linked to there being 
an initial unclear picture of the scope and complexity of the project.The resulting tight 
budget precluded the employment of extra staff, thereby exacerbating the situation 
further (Participants E, J and C), and did not measurably alter the fact that all of the 
staff had to be managed in a manner that would result in an harmonious team effort 
for the common goal–ice core for the scientists. 
Participant D then reiterated an earlier view that,“The big advantage we had on Cape 
Roberts, was once again, the operation side only had to answer to a small group of 
people…”  
According to a number of the participants, there was a big difference between the 
approach that New Zealand took to logistics staffing in comparison to that taken by 
other countries. The participants suggested that the New Zealand programme prided 
itself on having people that had good all-round skills, albeit a nucleus of multi-skilled 
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people that were employed on previous Antarctic projects and therefore added to a 
level of continuity between projects. 
6.6.5 Managing the Design and Fabrication Process 
This stage of the project encompassed specific engineering design and fabrication of 
specialist equipment, to support the drilling and scientific personnel, in particular. The 
design and fabrication work included manufactured or pre-fabricated shipping 
container accommodation units that had to be manoeuvred to and between sites; 
transportation sledges; drilling rig(s), and a number of associated 
engineering/scientific componentry that varied in scale from minor to significant. 
The engineering design personnel comprised a small group of specialist structural, 
mechanical and electrical engineers and draughtspersons. 
The key design factor associated with every component was weight, and this 
significantly affected many, if not all, decisions regarding approximately forty items 
of equipment/componentry for the project, over the various drilling seasons. 
Certain items could not be airlifted to the site, as the maximum lift for a helicopter 
was 500kg per item. The drilling rig and associated casings and draw rods et al, 
weighed in excess of 40 tonnes and had to be sledged, on a sledge train to the site, and 
then attached to the sea riser via specially designed floats, so as not to be lost through 
the sea-ice.  
The engineering support for the project then, 
 Was to provide the equipment with which the other parties could do the 
various things that they have been commissioned to do. Our role was to 
provide whatever mechanical equipment that the drillers’ believed might make 
the drilling operation safe, or safer and provide warm accommodation, that 
was easily moved, and that was safe (Participant B). 
The Management Framework and Approaches 
The role of a designer requires an ability to think creatively and three dimensionally; 
respond to, at times incomplete design briefs from the client, work with people who 
tend to see the world in black and white and meet tight timelines, at minimal costs, 
but not compromise on the required quality standards. The management structure that 
works best for most designers is one where there is a level of mutual trust, and 
understanding between the client, the project manager and the designer. This then 
 106
frees the designer to do what they are best at, conceptualising an idea right through to 
the reality of the finished item(s). The manager needs to be aware and understand how 
the design process works, and that there needs to be time made available for reflection 
on the part of the designer, in addition to the time spent actually creating the concept. 
On the Cape Roberts Drilling Project, the major equipment requirements were clearly 
defined and the designer was able to work unhindered, preparing the best design 
solutions for the componentry or equipment brief, until the completed designs were 
delivered, within the timeframe and at a very competitive price, according to the 
participants. The same respectful and realistic management approach applied, when 
additional equipment and componentry was necessary as the project progressed. Such 
an arrangement tends to be unique and needs to be acknowledged as such. 
The Funding 
Issues around the timing of available funding for manufacturing equipment were 
referred to by several of the participants. The relationship between scientific outputs 
and the need for funding up front was more readily understood and supported by the 
stakeholders, than the need for funding up front for the design, fabrication and 
purchase of equipment to conduct and support the scientific research.  
Funding is the thing that can kill flexibility. When they start asking you, well 
why do you need two, when one will do? Sometimes you can answer that sort 
of thing, if you lose one down the hole, drilling will not start again until there 
is a new one. Sometimes it is more complex. Basically we needed options, as 
we might for example, be drilling into soft or hard rocks. Those are relatively 
simple justifications. They become a lot less simple when someone sees that as 
a cost of say $100,000 for having a piece of drilling or electrical equipment, 
‘just in case’ (Participant D). 
Another aspect of funding is the expected life of the equipment being purchased, or 
designed and fabricated. The questions asked include whether the equipment should 
be designed to last one year or ten years. 
For Cape Roberts, quite a lot of the equipment was hired, even the drill power 
pack was hired. We had to build specific equipment, but the Cape Roberts 
Project had a limited lifetime, so many things were done efficiently and 
cheaply in terms of that lifetime. It’s a continuing battle to try and justify 
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spending another 10% on something so that it will last ten years rather than 
just three (Participant D). 
This participant then went on to explain the differences in expectations between oil 
and minerals industries investors, and the realities of government organisations 
funding drilling to support global science in a marine environment.  
“To drill in a marine environment, we have got specific requirements and we are 
using certain parts of the oil industry knowhow, technology, and equipment” 
(Participant D). Investment in the oil and mineral industries is very high, and the 
returns are huge, for these high risk operations. 
“It’s an industry where they expect to put big money in, but potentially their return is 
going to be very high. This does not sit well with science and with government 
organisations, and government funding, as they do not normally fund high risk 
ventures” (Participant D). 
According to the various participants, the national operators in Antarctica realize that 
working in a remote area generates additional costs, but the international collaborators 
familiar with the oil industry needed to be the convinced on a continual basis, item by 
item and event by event, regarding the seemingly high ongoing costs of particular 
equipment.  
One of the key realities that impacted on this situation was the time between 
conducting the budgeting exercise to actually purchasing particular equipment. In 
some cases this may have been a year, and in that time the relativity of the US and 
New Zealand dollar exchange rates can and did alter the purchase price of the ‘oil 
industry’ equipment by up to 100-150% (Participant D). In a few instances second 
hand equipment was purchased, or equipment was hired, to reduce costs.  
“The whole project was funding restricted, so for anything that we designed,  we were 
always trying to provide a result that was simple and sufficient to do the job, but not a 
Rolls Royce solution ” (Participant B). 
Participants A and D identified a further funding related issue involving risk, and risk 
mitigation associated with equipment and sea ice operations specific to the operational 
stage of the Cape Roberts Project. This related to the fact that a piece of equipment 
could be airlifted to Antarctica in a matter of days from Australia, the USA or New 
Zealand, but this did not mean that the equipment would arrive at Cape Roberts when 
required. The trip from Scott or McMurdo Base to Cape Roberts could take up to a 
week or longer at times, due primarily to weather conditions. Losing ‘the drilling 
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hole’ during this downtime was always high risk, and a second chance would not 
always be possible in that current season. 
In many cases, especially if you are making risky decisions and trying to 
identify where the big risks are, and where the funding has to be directed to 
ensure that you reduce those risks, it is actually very difficult sometimes, and 
part of that is driven by funding. For example, if you are coming from different 
positions, where some people are saying – we need this piece of equipment, we 
cannot afford, not to have it, whilst other people are saying that we cannot 
afford to have it because we do not have the money (Participant D). 
From the New Zealand’s national designers’ and fabricators’ perspectives however, 
the invoicing phases were straightforward by comparison, as they were handled in a 
progressive manner, based on the budgeted estimates and were at all times within 
budget, completely transparent, and defensible in terms of their documentation 
(Participant D). 
The Pre-Planning and Detailed Planning Stages 
This can be described as the pre-design and pre-operational stages, when relevant 
investigative work was conducted, including the planning and forecasting that was 
required in terms of for example, whether there would be helicopter transport 
available, when required, for the various components or equipment to be delivered to 
site. On the Cape Roberts Drilling Project this pre-planning process took 
approximately a year to complete, “often requiring some very hard decisions, 
definitely the right ones, there is no two ways about that” (Participant B).  
The pre-planning stage for the accommodation units, involved doing a cost 
comparison between using pre-fabricated ‘Bondor-type’/‘Portacom’ buildings that 
were to be constructed using insulated wall panels, and second hand insulated 
shipping containers of comparable size. The cost per unit for pre-fabricated buildings 
(1992 prices) was $10,000, whereas the insulated shipping containers could be 
purchased for around $2,000 per unit, but they needed a coat of paint. 
The cost advantages were immediately obvious, given that there was a requirement 
for 30-40 containerised buildings for the Cape Roberts Camp. These units needed to 
be transported on purpose designed sledges. Initially the proposal was for the sledges 
to be fabricated using bolted connections and this would have cost approximately 
twelve thousand ($12,000) per unit sledge. However, by welding the sledges together 
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the price per unit sledge dropped to around $5,000 per unit. (Participant B). This 
outcome fits with the notion that innovative solutions are frequently the norm 
concerning New Zealand designers across many if not all disciplines. 
The pre-planning stages for the drilling operations, involved a range of people whose 
main task was to ensure that the scientific, drilling and operational aspects of the 
project would provide the best possible core and information to the scientists. This 
meant working very closely with the scientists to clearly define and prioritise their 
expectations and needs, and with the drilling personnel to establish how and whether 
these expectations could be achieved, what equipment would be required, set against a 
pre-determined timeframe. As mentioned earlier in this section under funding, oil 
industry equipment was purchased or hired given there were some similarities in the 
drilling tasks. 
The design of the camp set-up of the operational drilling stage was planned and 
agreed in conjunction with the scientific pre-planning design stages as both involved 
being set up on sea-ice. References to, and use of, the significant amount of research 
conducted by new Zealand’s Antarctic scientists and technologists regarding sea-ice 
behaviour, salinity measurements, temperature gradients, and current flows (direction 
and speed), in the proposed core drilling areas were essential. Data regarding current 
speed, in particular, was (and continues to be) considered very important, when 
planning and designing the drilling operations. They would prove pivotal to the 
success and/or failure of the entire drilling operation and the subsequent supply or 
non-supply of core, over the three main drilling operations, associated with the Cape 
Roberts Drilling Project. 
In fact when the currents were actually measured on site, they, together with the tidal 
flows, were found to be flowing much faster than expected.  
“The drill rig was bending like a bow…and we were fearful of a break” (Participants 
E and D) 
As already mentioned in an earlier section of this chapter, these events caused a total 
rethink of the drilling approach, particularly in terms of the sea-riser. The 
consequence was a $1million dollar upgrade of the sea-riser to cope with the currents, 
before drilling re-commenced the following year. 
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Operations Stage 
There were two distinct yet inextricably linked parts to the design and fabrication 
aspects of this project, from a management perspective. Firstly, there was the Drilling 
Operation running on site at Cape Roberts on the sea-ice. Secondly, there was the 
engineering support team of designers, including structural, mechanical and electrical 
engineers, who were initially engaged at the pre-design stage right through to the 
completion of the operations stage. 
Once the power generation, water supply and waste disposal systems had been 
established at the Cape Roberts Drilling Camp site the design work involved mainly 
structural or structural-mechanical items, on an ‘as-needs’ basis. 
I received enquiries, at maybe monthly intervals. When they were on the ice 
the telephone, fax or email would say, “Do you think you can come up with an 
object to do this or that”. So we would then go back through the design, 
approvals and procurement processes all over again. It happened like this for 
approximately 40 objects/ items for the project (Participant B).  
The primary role at the drill site was to ensure that quality core was being produced 
for the scientists in a timely fashion.  
There were a limited number of personnel involved at the site (scientific and drilling), 
or at the design office, all of whom were multi-skilled people, and this contributed to 
knowledgeable, effective and efficient decision-making as problems arose, according 
to Participants B and D. The suggestion being that if there are too many people 
involved in the decision-making process who do not have an overview of the project, 
then the resultant may not be fit-for-purpose, nor responsive to the problem. 
Communications 
These were considered by a selection of the designers to be “as good a system as you 
would get anywhere” in terms of telephone, fax and email facilities from New 
Zealand to Scott Base at that time. Documentation transfer was by fax. PDF was not 
yet available at that time,  
“if we could not reduce it to A4 and fax it, it had to go by mail. One deficiency, and it 
was a real deficiency, was that they did not have access to digital cameras, initially” 
(Participant B).  
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Photos taken by project personnel have apparently disappeared without trace, so there 
are only about twenty digital photos on record that relate to the structural design 
aspects of the project. 
Similarly, the documentation was prepared using manual sketching and draughting 
methods. AutoCAD was not widely used in the early 1990s, and digital information 
storage had not been generally introduced nor adopted by design organisations. There 
were however excellent paper trails, and paper records.  
Human Resources 
Human resources on the design and fabrication stages of the Cape Roberts consisted 
of a handful of very specialised personnel, who have had many years experience with 
previous Antarctic projects. This raised questions for the researcher regarding the 
need for ‘successional planning’. In discussion with the various participants involved 
on this project in 2003 and 2004, apparently this topic had been thought about, in 
some cases discussed, but nothing had yet been formally planned nor implemented, in 
any of the key disciplines or roles.  
6.6.6. The Managed Teams on ‘Being Managed’. 
The Management Framework and Approaches 
The expectation would have been for the Cape Roberts Manager to report to the 
Operations Manager, as this was an operations task, but with the Operations Manager 
changing, this was not the case. Instead a member of the OMG, who had considerable 
and pertinent previous knowledge worked directly with the Project Manager.  
Over time this situation evolved, as was discussed in Chapter 6.3. 
Participants C and G were employed as support staff by Antarctica New Zealand for 
the duration of the Cape Roberts Project, on a year by year basis, and both referred to 
the ‘differing rules’ for the personnel at Scott Base compared with those at the site, 
and how this created communications and HR issues, amongst the teams in the first 
year of operation in particular. 
The contractual arrangements meant that staff were on call 24/7, commencing work at 
5.30am and finishing at 8.30 at night on a typical day, and that was for the whole 
drilling season of October to December.They were often working in minus 30-40 ºC 
temperatures during the set-up phase, prior to the drilling season commencing. 
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The main issue for the site support staff was the level of remuneration being offered. 
To put the matter in context, prior to the start of the Cape Roberts Project there had 
always been more people in search of work on Antarctic projects as support staff, than 
were ever required. This meant that supply exceeded demand and remuneration levels 
could be set quite conservatively. When the Cape Roberts Project came on line there 
was in fact a shortage of suitable applicants, and there was a need for support staff 
with previous Antarctic experience. Using the Scott Base Staff remuneration levels 
was considered inappropriate, by the interviewed participants, 
We nearly did not go that first year, because it wasn’t worth it, we were going 
to make more money here in NZ than they were offering. They were not taking 
into account the location, or the previous Antarctic experience. They couldn’t 
do without us, but they had no idea what the private world was paying, I 
mean, in the drilling world the money was, and is phenomenal .They were 
expecting us to do the same work as we would do on a drill site platform but 
get paid the same as support staff at Scott Base (Participants C and G). 
The situation regarding more realistic levels of remuneration was resolved 
satisfactorily before the second year of operation commenced, and “by the end of the 
project things were a lot better, we even had a day off here and there” (Participant C). 
There was considerable support voiced by the participants for the Project 
Management personnel, as managers, when reviewing the Cape Roberts Project 
period as a whole. The support staff, or any staff working on a project such as Cape 
Roberts, not only had to have the right experience, they had to be able to work well 
with other people in a difficult environment according to several of the participants,  
“You do not have to be the smartest ‘professional’ in the world, you just have to fit in 
well” (Participant G).  
Another issue that came up in the first year of drilling that was later resolved 
satisfactorily, was the lack of awareness and compensation for the staff who gave up 
their jobs to work on the Cape Roberts Project, and then when the project was 
terminated for the year because of the huge storm, these people had no immediate 
/continuance of work or income. This was particularly true for those staff from Papua 
New Guinea and Australia. 
The scientists too, struck problems as their funding is usually only for one year. When 
the project was postponed/stalled in the first year of operations, this impacted on the 
scientists’ ability to do the science within the funded timeframe. Resourcing was 
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considered an on-going problem, both financially and labour wise. The nature of the 
people employed, meant that the job got done no matter how many hours they had to 
work, as they obviously were professionals who took pride in their work and had a 
strong work ethic. 
Reporting lines were clear but the line managers were not always available due to the 
heavy workload everyone on the Cape Roberts Project team was under. This had two 
main outcomes, one was that decisions were often made on the site on an as needs 
basis, as time was of-the-essence, without waiting for every necessary approval prior 
to an action. This also meant that the line manager(s) were not always up with the 
play regarding the decisions being made on site on a daily basis. Trust and delegation 
is necessary in these instances, together with a no-blame working environment. 
6.6.7 Summary of the Keypoints from CRP Interview Questions 
Part A. 
The Management Framework and Approaches realities and issues according to the 
participants on CRP were that : 
? The management of the project did not reside solely with one person, nor with 
just one group, no one person was in charge, and this was unavoidable and had 
benefits and disbenefits  
? Fragmented management in the initial stages was disruptive, but after the first 
year of operations, this was largely resolved when Antarctica NZ (and their 
Project Manager), and the Chief Scientist, were seen by all project personnel 
as being the collaborative/parallel project management duo. 
? The ISC was responsible for creating the Project Science Plan (the tasks) and 
allocated responsibilities for the drilling and post-drilling programme. Each 
consultative party contributor then selected their own scientists. The numbers 
selected were generally in proportion to their contribution to the project’s 
logistics support. 
? The reporting lines for the project manager within Antarctica New Zealand, 
complicated by the fact that there was some organisational restructuring 
occurring, and there were people leaving, particularly in the operations 
management role. 
? 1994 was a period of widespread government restructuring and GNS decided 
to relinquish the drilling arm of the organisation. This situation led to the 
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Logistics Manager taking on the responsibility for the entire logistics 
operation, including the drilling operations.  
? There was a uniquely rare level of trust afforded by management to the 
equipment designer, on this project. This meant that the designers were able to 
work unhindered, preparing the best design solutions for the componentry or 
equipment brief, until the completed designs were delivered, within the 
timeframe. 
? The main issue at the early stage of the project for the site support staff was 
the level of remuneration. There had always been more people in search of 
work on Antarctic projects as support staff, than were ever required, and pay 
rates were low. When the Cape Roberts Project came online there was in fact a 
shortage of suitable applicants, and the remuneration levels had to be 
increased to attract (the right) staff. 
 
The Funding realities and issues according to the participants on CRP were that: 
? The sourcing and provision of logistics funding, and science funding, were 
two separate activities and entities, with differing objectives and timeframes, 
yet the representatives from each grouping were required to work together to 
achieve the required and common prime outcomes. 
? The infrastructure usually evident in organisations to set up and support the 
handling, and processing of for example, financial matters such as loans, 
contributions, purchasing et al did not exist at the initial project stages, hence 
transferring money to the Antarctic programme for the project was difficult. 
? The NSF (National Science Foundation), wanted every American dollar 
contributed, to be set against a tangible asset that could then be returned to the 
Americans at the completion of the project, and this was considered 
impractical and unwarranted.  
? There were challenges associated with equipment being supplied by 
contributing countries, and there was the need to establish whether the 
resources (for example, equipment), would match the set performance criteria 
for the Cape Roberts Project. 
? There were other challenges of establishing and agreeing the ‘value’ of the 
resources-in-kind in dollar terms, in order to make comparisons with the cash 
contributions. The participants identified one specific example of an 
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‘inappropriate-for-purpose’, and over-valued ‘resource-in- kind’ and that was 
the tents for the Cape Roberts Camp. 
? There was a need for funding up front for the design, fabrication and purchase 
of equipment (and spares of equipment) to conduct and support the scientific 
research, was not readily understood nor supported by the stakeholders. 
? Key realities impacted on this situation for example, there was the time 
between conducting the budgeting exercise to actually purchasing particular 
equipment. In some cases this may have been a year, and in that time the 
relativity of the US and New Zealand dollar exchange rates altered the 
purchase price of the ‘oil industry’ equipment by up to 100-150%. In a few 
instances, equipment was hired, to reduce costs. 
? Funding related issues involving risk and risk mitigation associated with 
equipment and sea-ice operations, were related to the fact that a required piece 
of equipment could be airlifted to Antarctica in a matter of days from 
Australia, the USA or New Zealand, but the trip from Scott Base or McMurdo 
Base to Cape Roberts, could take up to a week or longer at times, due 
primarily to weather conditions. 
? Losing ‘the drilling hole’ during any downtime was always high risk, and a 
second chance would not always be possible in the current season. 
 
The Pre-Planning and Detailed Planning Stages realities and issues according to 
the participants on CRP were that: 
? The project at the initial scoping exercise did not accurately describe the 
project that Cape Roberts became. Prior experience on and of a project of this 
complexity, scope and size was non-existent amongst New Zealanders. 
? Scientific areas were often over-subscribed because there was no overall 
scientific resource planner, and each ‘party’ country selected their own 
scientists irrespective of how many petrologists, or sedimentologists for 
example, were there from other countries. 
? Data collected, suggested that the project team may not really have understood 
the essential difference between pre-planning, and detailed planning, seeing 
them as potentially one and the same thing, involving estimates and very few 
specifics.  
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? The complexity and scope of the Cape Roberts Project as a significant and 
stand-alone project was never realistically addressed nor evident in the 
associated time allocations for planning. 
 
The Operations Stage realities and issues according to participants on CRP were 
that: 
? The expectations of the Science Steering Committee regarding the daily 
outputs and report updates, were apparently out of sync with the realities of 
what was possible at the drill hole sites in terms of the timing, and availability 
of core material for scientific logging and investigation. 
? The main cause of communication issues were the geographical locations of 
the personnel, (scientists and drillers located at the drill site and other 
scientists at the Crary Laboratory at McMurdo Base).   
? There were quite significant foreseeable failures on the project, in terms of 
mud supply, and the failure of the sea-riser, which caused delays and hence 
funding problems for the scientists in particular, who had to ‘perform the 
science’ in a set timeframe or they lost their funding. 
? There were politics and power issues in the project, involving senior scientists 
from the collaborative party contributors, who arrived unexpectedly and 
assumed power (and rights) over the scientific interpretations and outcomes. 
(This behaviour seriously affected morale, particularly as this was an 
internationally important project, set in hostile climatic conditions, against 
tight timelines). 
? The currents together with the tidal flows, when measured on site, were found 
to be flowing much faster than expected. This required a total rethink of the 
drilling approach, and a $1million dollar upgrade of the sea-riser was 
commissioned to cope with the currents, before drilling re-commenced the 
following year. This caused a major ripple right across all of the project 
personnel roles. 
? There were a limited number of personnel involved at the site (scientific and 
drilling), or at the design office, all of whom were multi-skilled people, and 
this contributed to knowledgeable, effective and efficient decision-making as 
problems arose. 
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Communications realities and issues according to the participants on CRP were that: 
? Communications between the scientific and logistics representatives on the 
project varied both in terms of the individual expectations, the nature of the 
communications and the timing and/or regularity. This resulted at times in 
miscommunications. 
? Oversights, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the various 
Antarctic programme personnel on the project meant that there were, at times, 
very tense periods, often fuelled by the realities of time and financial 
constraints, and differing priorities and expectations.  
? Antarctica is now a part of world-wide communication globalisation, that 
includes computers, internet, email and cell phones, and expectations of 
project and stakeholder personnel regarding communications’ modus operandi 
have changed, and increased as a result. 
 
Human Resources realities and issues according to the participants on CRP were 
that: 
? There was a work culture of “just working until the job got done”, but 
overworked staff became an issue, according to the interviewed participants. 
This was due in the main, they suggested, to a budget blow-out, which was 
basically linked to there being an unclear picture of the scope and complexity 
of the project, initially. The resulting tight budget precluded the employment 
of extra staff, thereby exacerbating the situation further. 
? The drillers came from all over the world and from a range of drilling 
disciplines, to work on the Cape Roberts Project. Many had differing 
experiences and expectations to those that were associated with or required on 
Antarctic programmes, for example the supply of, and responsibility for 
equipment, and the ‘ways of working’.  
? There was a big difference between the approach that New Zealand took to 
logistics staffing in comparison to that taken by other countries. The New 
Zealand programme prided itself on having people that had good all-round 
skills, a nucleus of multi-skilled people that had been employed on previous 
Antarctic projects, and therefore added to a level of continuity between 
projects. 
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Recommendations from the participants for future projects in terms of 
particular ‘personnel roles’ 
? That there should be a rotating chair amongst the Project Country members, on 
an annual basis. Further, there needs to be a separate Project Manager, who 
attends, and contributes to, all of the meetings from the early stages of the 
project, but the Project Manager should not chair the OMG. 
? That the pre-planning and detailed planning stages should be accorded 
sufficient time and a separate budget, that is, it is treated as a minor project, so 
that when the project reaches the operational stage, most of the potential issues 
and therefore the problem-solving has already been done. This would create a 
more integrated and seamless form of management of the science and the 
logistics in particular. 
? That successional planning, which is directly linked to knowledge capital and 
knowledge management, was considered a good idea by all participants. 
However, no detailed planning or implementation was evident, in any of the 
disciplines, at the time of the interviews.  
 
6.6.8 The Interview Questions Part B - The Fit of the Cape Roberts 
Drilling Project, with the Conceptual Design Management Model for 
Remote Site Projects  
The ‘fit’ of the project with the theoretical design management model, was addressed 
firstly, in terms of how well the four key factors of the conceptual design management 
model for remote site projects, and secondly how the data collected from the selected 
participants, (as written up in sections 6.6.1.to 6.6.7), represented the realities of 
designing and project managing projects such as the Cape Roberts Drilling Project in 
Antarctica. As already described in section 6.1 and 6.2, the selection of this case study 
at Cape Roberts was made on its ability to represent the phenomenon of remote site 
design and project management. As noted earlier, the examination of a report on the 
Cape Roberts Drilling Project contributed to by the Project Science Coordinator (and 
Chief Scientist), the Science Support Manager and the overall Project Manager and 
subsequently edited by Cowie (2002), assisted the researcher’s overall understanding 
of the project, and assisted in the subsequent  selection of  preferred interviewees for a 
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series of retrospective semi-structured interviews. The interviews explored the project 
in its entirety with a cross-sectional representation of nine selected key personnel.  
The Cape Roberts Drilling Project being an international collaborative involved  
seven countries, being Italy, Germany, Australia, UK, United States, New Zealand 
and the Netherlands. Each country contributed to the scientific, management and/or 
operational aspects of the project. This collaborative approach created a complex 
regime of project personnel and tasks that needed to be sensitively integrated, 
coordinated and managed. 
The overall aim of the Cape Roberts Project, as already noted, was to investigate the 
early history of the East Antarctic ice sheet and the West Antarctic Rift System by 
recovering sedimentary core from 500m beneath the sea floor off Cape Roberts,  
and then drill a 1500m thick sedimentary succession into the western margin of the 
Victoria Land Basin for the period 34 -17 million years ago (Barrett, 1993). 
The complexity of the Cape Roberts Drilling project and the associated management 
of this internationally collaborative project, were strongly evident to the steering 
committee and subsequent management personnel, from the commencement of their 
engagement on the project, according to at least five of the participants. This stemmed 
in part from the fact that there were seven countries involved, with their associated 
stakeholders and scientific expectations.  In addition there was a non-negotiable 
timeline to achieve the desired scientific outputs.  
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures required for every activity in 
Antarctica were also in place for the USA, New Zealand, German and Italian 
Antarctic Programmes. As such, this put significant and rigorous constraints on 
Antarctic projects such as the Cape Roberts Drilling Project, from its inception, 
viability, methodology, implementation and overall monitoring of every potential 
environmental impact on Antarctica. 
6.6.8.1 Data Collection  
Interviews were conducted over a period of ten months, with nine senior and middle 
management, and operational staff, in terms of their official roles on the Cape Roberts 
Project (1995-2001), to give a rigorous and representative cross-section of the 
personnel who had been involved on the project. A refereed and published paper by 
Kestle and Storey, (2005), had the aim of writing up a selection of the collected data 
in order to test the key factors and plausible drivers of a conceptual design 
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management model for remote site projects against the realities of managingCape 
Robert Drilling Project in Antarctica.  
The Research Question of  “How well do the four key factors of the conceptual 
design model for remote sites represent  the realities of designing and managing 
projects such as  the Cape Roberts Drilling Project ? ”, was focussed specifically on 
the data collected from the nine interviewees, relative to the four key factors as 
established in the conceptual management model for remote site projects, which were: 
1. Value Generation;  
2. Knowledge Integration;  
3. Process Integration;  
4. Timely Decision-Making, 
The aim was to establish how well the gathered data supported, challenged or added 
to the four key factors of the conceptual design management model, for remote site 
projects. The remaining data collected related to the participants’ particular roles on 
the project and the impacts on their roles of the main issues during the course of the 
project, and is written up in sections 6.1 to 6.6, and 6.6.7.  
6.6.8.2 Analysis and Discussion of the Findings 
The ‘four key factor’ results were extensive and generally consistent across all of the 
nine selected participants. The following key points in Table 4 were drawn from that 
collected data: 
Table 4 Key points from the Cape Roberts Drilling Project collected data in reference to the 4 key 
Conceptual Design Management factors 
The Four Key factors  Key Findings  
Value Generation as perceived or 
needing to be realised on the Cape 
Roberts Drilling Project was: 
 
In respect to the technical and scientific aspects, and 
specifically the scientific outcomes from examining the cores. 
The value added through the scientific outcomes of the project, 
and the contributions on the international stage eg climate 
change, Kyoto protocol. 
The 1.7km of core provided at a very reasonable cost. This 
outcome was considered ‘great value for money’ by the 6 
nations involved with NZ and in the fact that USA also saw NZ 
technology as ‘great value for money’. 
In the need for low environmental impacts on the part of the 
project, and its personnel. 
Knowledge Integration as 
perceived or needing to be realised 
on the Cape Roberts Drilling Project 
was: 
 
Intellectual property issues preventing knowledge integration 
happening – seen as an inhibiting factor. 
Successional planning being the need for understudies for the 
people with key intellectual capital. 
‘Risk’on these projects is significant in terms of the personnel 
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 selected for the project(s). If you get the wrong people, it can 
break up the project.  
Problems that arise with ‘patch protection’, where people may 
not want to share their valuable expertise with potential 
successors for fear of becoming dispensable. 
The situation where a pool of specialist remote site personnel is 
created within organizations to design and manage these 
particular project sites. The potential weakness though, is where 
this knowledge capital is not documented explicitly, and a 
successional framework of specialist personnel is not fully 
established within organizations.  
Knowledge management using centralised data bases and 
consequent data management makes the creation of a website 
essential on future projects. 
Process Integration as perceived or 
needing to be realised on the Cape 
Roberts project and future Antarctic 
projects: 
 
The consequences of no process integration are dissatisfied 
staff, burn-out, budget blow-outs and an incomplete project.  
This is all about operational logistics and information 
management, and it is critical that this occurs in a timely and 
realistic manner. 
The secret is pre-planning and being aware of the other team 
members’ needs, and the consequences of all the actions 
proposed.  
Timely Decision-Making issues on 
the Cape Roberts and future 
Antarctic projects were that: 
 
The key decision-makers have to be identified and recognised 
as having the appropriate authority to act and respond. 
The fact that fast, accurate and safe decisions were made in 
potentially dangerous situations, was the result of having a very 
good management structure that was responsive and 
responsible. 
The participants noted that “everything revolves around the 
environment on Antarctic project sites. The weather controls 
everything in terms of what, when, and if you can do anything. 
You have no real control; it’s often called the Antarctic Factor”. 
A lack of timely and critical decision-making may result in the 
loss of a whole year, (or more) of core production, as ships can 
only access Antarctica, in the Ross Sea Region once a year, 
between the late September and February. 
  
One of the interesting outcomes, from the collected data on the ‘key factors of the 
model’ was the range of views held by the interviewees regarding who they believed 
were the stakeholders, and the client(s) on the Cape Roberts Project. Views were 
diverse, with the majority believing the scientists were their client, whilst others held 
the view that Antarctica NZ or the university, and hence the government were their 
clients.  
There was consensus however, regarding what the value generation criteria were for 
the Cape Roberts Drilling Project. The primary purpose in their view was to drill and 
recover high quality, specific sedimentary cores to create globally significant 
(climatic) scientific outcomes.  
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Another finding was the suggestion that knowledge integration can be inhibited, to 
some extent, on these scientific projects, by the issue of intellectual property which 
may, and possibly does, work against the sharing of intellectual or knowledge capital 
nationally, and internationally. There was also evidence of a lack of succession 
planning across all disciplines and areas of expertise. 
Reviewing the collected data regarding process integration, there was strong support 
for clear, effective, regular communications, and the centralized storage and 
management of data, on future projects.  
Communications were considered critical on remote sites. Miscommunications 
occurring at times between the various stakeholders on and off site, caused perhaps by 
different interpretations of the issues, or decisions being made remotely from the site 
itself, and from each other.  
Time delays in terms of decision-making, whether in terms of the design or financial 
commitment cause a flow-on affect across all disciplines and tasks. In the case of 
remote sites this can mean a delay of up to twelve months, until the site becomes 
accessible again.  
In terms of the aims of the research question, the interviewees unequivocally 
supported the four key factors of the conceptual design management model, as being 
valid for Antarctic remote sites, and accurately representing their experiences on the 
Cape Roberts Drilling project (Kestle & Storey, 2005).  
6.6.9 Concluding Statements 
A summary of the key findings suggests that there is significant support for the design 
management model for remote site projects, and in particular the four key factors. 
Additional aspects, that may require future consideration, were discovered whilst 
conducting the case-study interviews. For example, issues around Human Resources 
such as, “only applicants with previous remote site project experience need apply”, 
and the suggestion that remuneration needs to reflect the specialization of the tasks, 
the remote location and acknowledge that personnel must be covered for ‘down time’ 
if the project stalls. 
The data supports the notion that strategic decisions made during the briefing, 
conceptual design stages, and pre-planning stages  in particular, can significantly 
impact upon the design, fabrication, construction, logistics, and the value generated in 
order to meet the expectations of the clients and stakeholders, and the final outcomes. 
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The international significance of the collaborative scientific research, innovative 
technical expertise and ‘knowledge capital’ associated with the Cape Roberts Project 
has helped place New Zealand in a position of strength in terms of influencing the 
Antarctic Treaty partners, and future collaborative international scientific endeavours.  
The management of the project from the perspectives of the Science, Logistics, 
Design and Fabrication and on ‘being managed’ succeeded mainly because of a 
willingness on the part of strategic personnel to get the job done, and done well.  
The project teetered at first, due in the main to a lack of experience with a drilling 
project of this scale and complexity, a lack of real and/or timely funding, and an over 
optimistic tasked timeline and resourcing plan. 
The management issues that occurred during the course of the project were 
Operational, Technical, Political or Financial in nature (a view totally supported by 
one of the participants in particular). All, however, were solved in the fullness of time. 
The fact that this was a collaborative venture meant that as with many collaborative 
working arrangements, there is always a tendency to make sure that the individual 
partner’s needs and demands are met, as well as those associated with the agreed 
‘collective good’. This is where the situation can, and did become political, on 
occasion. Working to tight timeframes on a project, providing internationally 
significant scientific data, set in a hostile climatic zone, with fragmented groups of 
project personnel, with differing expectations both financially and in terms of the 
value of the outcomes to them professionally, resulted in a complex, exciting, at times 
frustrating, and rewarding project. 
In terms of recommendations for the future from the data collected, there was support 
for the design management model for remote site projects. In particular, decision-
making authority needs to be vested in the right people to get effective and timely 
outcomes for the overall project, the various stages of the project, as well as the 
discreet parts of the overall project. Managing by committee has always been 
problematic on projects, and this was particularly true on the Cape Roberts Project 
initially, but the management structure at the operational stage ‘on-the-ice’ evolved 
into one that was workable, as the project progressed. The differences of approach to 
the ‘tasks-in-hand’ by scientists and operations personnel were not easily integrated 
and required mediation and innovative approaches. 
In the future, reporting and management structures need to be resolved, published and 
implemented well before the commencement of the operational phase(s) of the 
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project. For example, unified agreement on how financial reporting will be conducted 
needs to be set up at the early stages of the project and be totally transparent.  
The Project Manager needs to be ‘on the team’ from day one of the pre-planning and 
strategic management meetings and processes, not drawn in when the project is about 
to go ‘live’ or into the operations stage at the site. 
Language and cultural differences can cause unexpected and unintended friction and 
issues between collaborating partners on any project, and these were evident on the 
Cape Roberts Project from the published reports and data collected in discussion with 
the participants. Differing work and organizational structures both at planning and 
operational stages need to be acknowledged, and incorporated into an agreed 
document and action plan, well before the operational stages commence. There may 
never be full agreement, for reasons outside of the personnel actually involved on 
these international projects, but a level of professional consensus should however be 
the main goal to minimize risks, and maximize quality outputs. The politicization of 
international projects such as the Antarctic Drilling Project at Cape Roberts, adds to 
the management challenge across all aspects and stages of the project, whether it 
impacts on the stakeholders, the client, the finances, the logistics, the science, the 
designers, the drillers, the support staff, or the final outcomes. 
The participants’ data, once analysed, specifically supported the overall conceptual 
design management model, and particularly the four key factors, as being valid for 
Antarctic remote sites generally, and as accurately representing their experiences on 
the Cape Roberts Drilling Project. This therefore provided significant support to the 
validation of the conceptual design management model for remote sites, and to the 
associated typology for remote sites. Further, the decision to conduct a retrospective 
review of an historical case-study to see how well the realities of managing this 
particular Antarctic Project matched or added to the theoretical design management 
model has been vindicated. 
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CHAPTER 7.  THE UN SUDANESE HUMANITARIAN 
AID (UNSHA) PROJECT WEST DARFUR – A CURRENT 
CASE STUDY 
7.1 The Rationale for Conducting the Case Study 
Once the conceptual design management model for remote site projects had been 
developed and tested on the Antarctic Drilling project, the question asked next was 
whether such a management model work in other operational situations such as in the 
often desperate situations associated with humanitarian aid. Certainly, the present 
model was not originally developed with the Humanitarian Aid sector in mind, 
however the opportunity arose and was taken up, to test and potentially further 
validate the model (though that was not completely apparent at the outset). The results 
of the test appeared to further validate the model. This then opened up the notion of 
portability of the model. The area of West Darfur in Sudan is ‘remote’ according to 
the typology for remote sites, with the best access being a three day flight from 
Khartoum, given the lack of any formed roads.  
7.1.1 Introduction 
A similar methodology as used earlier by Kestle and Storey (2005), was adopted for 
the UNSHA study (refer Chapter 6). Seventeen senior and middle management who 
were operational staff with NGOs (Non-Government Organisations), and UN (United 
Nations) Agencies in West Darfur were interviewed over the two months of June and 
July 2004. No special criteria were applied, other than that they were representative of 
active Humanitarian Aid Agencies in the area, and available and willing to be 
interviewed. Initially it was thought that the differences of management styles, the 
projects themselves, with their differing objectives, geographical locations and 
differing groupings of stakeholders, would make such an application of the theoretical 
design management model unworkable. Surprisingly, the model was found to match 
and organise the management experiences of those interviewed, and this is 
highlighted throughout this chapter.  
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7.2 Contextualisation and Introduction  
Darfur is a large area of approximately 256,000 square kilometres, consisting of 3 
states that occupy the western area of Sudan (refer Figure 21), and an estimated 
population of 5 million people made up from a complex tribal mix. Large parts of 
Darfur are prone to drought, and desertification that intensifies demands on its more 
fertile lands, and water supplies. In recent decades, areas of Darfur have been subject 
to sporadic inter-tribal clashes over the use of such resources. 
 
Figure 21 Map of Darfur region, Sudan (Source: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Darfur_map.png) 
 
From early 2003, fighting intensified in the region following the emergence of two 
armed groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and later the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), and the commencement by them of hostilities against the 
Government. Following a string of SLA victories in the first months of 2003, the 
Government sponsored a militia composed of a loose collection of fighters, apparently 
of Arab background, from the Darfur region. This militia became known as the 
‘Janjaweed’ or ‘men on horseback’, who wore uniforms but no name-tags.  In certain 
areas of Darfur, the Janjaweed have supported the regular armed forces in attacking 
and targeting civilian populations suspected of supporting the rebellion, while in other 
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locations it appears that the Janjaweed have played the primary role in such attacks 
with the military in support. 
  
Figure 22 Conditions in West Darfur camp for IDPs, 2004 
 
The humanitarian fallout of this situation in Darfur (and the border regions of Chad) 
was an estimated one million Internally Displaced Persons/People (IDPs) by May 
2004 (compared with 250,000 in September 2003), with over half of these (some 
570,000) being located in West Darfur (Gharb Darfur) (refer Figure 22). The rest were 
divided between North (Shamal) and South (Janub) Darfur (290,000 and 140,000, 
respectively).  By July 2004, this had increased to 601,096 in camps in West Darfur 
(based on estimates from the UN Agency Organisation for Humanitarian Aid 
(OCHA). IDPs would become ‘refugees’ if they crossed the international border and 
would be covered by international covenants. However, the IDPs are not covered by 
such covenants, and fall outside of the mandate of the United Nations High 
Commission for refugees (UNHCR). In such circumstances the IDPS come under the 
jurisdiction of OCHA. If the IDPs suffer genocide then they fall under International 
Law. Such a large displacement of people also impacts on the ‘host’ community. 
Scarcity of water, firewood and animal feed before the crisis inflamed tensions and 
fighting. Against such a back drop, UN Aid Agencies and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) work to get aid into remote locations. The main aim of the UN 
SHA Project in West Darfur (and of the various agencies), as already noted was ‘to 
make a difference’. Provision of basic shelter and the necessaries of life were at the 
core of the project’s aims.  
In late January 2007, aid groups suspended operations in Darfur, and planned to pull 
out of the province completely, following the first ever sexual and physical attacks on 
western aid workers in Gereida. Seventy aid workers left Darfur as a result, leaving 
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only ten Red Cross workers there. There were 14,000 aid workers in Darfur, most 
were Sudanese and worked for foreign NGOs and UN agencies delivering US$1 
billion of aid per year. It remains today as a complex humanitarian emergency. 
7.3 The Current Management Context in Humanitarian Aid 
Agencies 
7.3.1 The Management Approach 
There appear to be significant gaps in the understanding of disaster management 
within the humanitarian aid community. Fitz-Gerald et al. (2002), reported that  
“The humanitarian aid community is a ‘slow follower’ in the adoption of management 
tools and techniques”. In some ways this can be explained or defended on the basis 
that humanitarian aid is delivered in an environment where no two situations are the 
same. Consequently there is no single model that can be applied, and the absence of 
effective lessons-learned mechanisms that ensure positive and negative experiences 
are addressed throughout all levels of the organisation, and encourages reinvention 
with each deployment. Therefore, humanitarian aid organizations are not only slow 
learners, but also do not have the basis for a learning culture, thus giving credibility to 
the adage that “a humanitarian worker is only as good as their last assignment”. 
In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 1999 
guide lines for example are circumspect and state that ,“There is no single blueprint 
for refugee emergency management; each refugee emergency is unique. However, 
experience shows that emergencies tend to evolve according to certain recognizable 
and documented patterns.” 
Thus, the management process applied to each disaster is different, but disasters 
themselves do have discernable patterns. One would expect there to be a link between 
the management process and the disaster pattern but this and the identity of the 
patterns is not explicitly explained. The Handbook works by setting up desired 
outcomes and then leaves it for the reader to select the management processes 
required to achieve those outcomes. The UNHCR Handbook (2000) does say that, 
While emergency management shares many of the characteristics of good 
management in general, there are a number of distinguishing features: 
? The lives and well-being of people are at stake 
? Reaction time is short 
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? Risk factors are high and consequences of mistakes or delays can be 
disastrous 
? There is great uncertaint, 
? Investment in contingency planning and other preparedness activities is 
crucial 
? Staff and managers may be under particularly high stress because of, for 
example, security problems and harsh living conditions, and 
? There is no single obvious right answer.  
(UNHCR, 2000). 
Thus, the present literature tends to be strong on objectives but weak on how that is 
achieved, and which management processes could be used. Moreover, it suggests that 
each disaster is different, and that perhaps there is no single answer, nor process. 
Hence the initial thoughts that there would be no fit (nor even a minimal fit) between 
the ‘experiences in the field’ and the developed theoretical model. 
7.3.2 The Organisational Context  
The organisation and inter-relation of players within the aid community is complex 
and this is shown in Figure 23 (Willitts-King & Harvey, 2005), which covers the 
general NGO/UN situation, while Figure 24 (Manfield, 2001), covers the operational 
field and sectoral situation. This arrangement is being revised to become a ‘cluster’ 
setup to streamline the flow of aid to beneficiaries and is based on what occurred in 
West Darfur (HRR, 2006). Thus, the complexity of the organizational structure 
through which aid is provided is underlined.  
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Figure 23 The Relief Response 
 
 
Figure 24 Field and Sectoral Organisation 
 
7.3.3 Disaster Phases  
There are distinct phases for a ‘disaster situation’, namely: 
(i) The Emergency Phase (first response being medical treatment of 
survivors) 
(ii) The Recovery Phase (stabilizing the population) 
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(iii) The Rehabilitation phase (return to ‘normality’). 
In a natural disaster, these phases are more evident than in a conflict situation, as 
was(and still is) experienced in West Darfur. The gains from the week before, can be 
easily lost in a conflict situation, if core issues are not resolved. Increasingly, 
humanitarian aid workers are called upon to assist in natural disasters that are also 
conflict situations. For example, Banda Aceh and Sri Lanka, after the tsunami in 
2004, and Kashmir after the earthquake in 2006, are consequently increasing the 
complexity of such situations.The relevance of these phases will be evident in the 
analysis section of this chapter. 
7.3.4 Human Resources and how Staff are Employed on the 
Humanitarian Aid Projects 
The problems associated with high levels of humanitarian aid staff turnover is further 
aggravated at the Emergency Phase, in terms of finding the right people at very short 
notice, and then establishing their availability. These staff arrive from all over the 
world, and are usually referred to as ‘first needs people’ who conduct ‘needs 
analyses’, by establishing the immediate needs for water supplies, food, sanitation, 
shelter and safety. Then they depart the scene. Head Office (the various UN agency 
head offices), often appoints personnel from their own staff, and from within their 
own agencies, to fill the gaps, and to provide essential local knowledge and 
experience within the overall team’s profile. There may be two emergency teams set 
up for any one aid intervention, with a six month maximum time commitment  
required. Hence there is a regular turnover of staff, who frequently have only 24- 48 
hours notice of a ‘call-up’ from the various agencies.  
7.3.5 The Briefing and Training of Humanitarian Aid Staff at the 
Pre-planning Stages of an Aid Project 
Each agency trains their own staff. There are government agencies (UN), such as 
UNHCR and UNICEF, and there are Non-Government agencies (NGOs) for example, 
CARE International, the International Red Cross , MSF (Holland, Belgium et al.), and 
Red-R. The UN generally has a different management and training approach to the 
NGOs, as the UN staff are usually professional career people who are following a 
particular career path and basically have to “play it by the rules”,  and be politically 
correct essentially. The NGOs tend to be a mix of very valuable and/or specialist 
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personnel, who either have no technical skills but understand the complexity and 
realities of humanitarian emergencies, or they do not understand all of the 
complexities associated with these emergencies, but have excellent specialist 
technical skills, and a few have the full range of skills. Normally, all of the 
Emergency Phase ‘needs analysis’ people would be highly trained specialists in their 
field, from around the world, or from the local agencies, with high levels of previous 
humanitarian emergency experience. 
7.4 The Review 
As a basis for interrogating the interview transcripts effectively, a comparison of the 
present management model was undertaken with specific areas of concern raised in a 
documented review for ALNP on Humanitarian Aid Action in the Darfur area in 2004 
Minear (2005). Eight thematic areas of major recurrent concern to the humanitarian 
aid agencies, were reviewed by Minear (2005), of which six were considered relevant 
to the research being conducted (by researcher Kestle) into the operational 
management of the UNSHA at West Darfur project, and the associated personnel. 
Six of the eight thematic areas referred in the report by Minear (2005), were reviewed 
and are discussed here. These were later compared with data collected for this 
research. The selected theme areas are: 
1) Mobilising humanitarian action,  
2) Supporting IDPs and refugees, 
3) Managing the tensions between humanitarian and the political,  
4) Situating humanitarian action in relation to the conflict, 
5) Improving coordination,  
6) Crafting an appropriate and accountable international presence.  
7.4.1 Mobilising humanitarian action  
There is broad agreement that the humanitarian apparatus was very slow in gearing up 
for action, nor was the extent or significance of the emergency fully or accurately 
measured and realised (Minear, 2005).  
“The distinguishing feature of the Darfur crisis has been the lateness and inadequacy 
of the humanitarian response. It has been so serious, that it amounted to ‘systemic 
failure’ (cited in Minear , 2005, p.77). This observation agrees with the findings of 
other Darfur studies, and Minear (2005), notes that the first signs of the imminent 
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conflict in the region were in early 2003, when fighting broke out between the 
Sudanese government and two insurgent groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army 
(SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Significant displacement was 
evident from April 2003, with the numbers reaching over 500,000 by May 2003 in the 
Darfur region. “Estimates of deaths related to the conflict varied from 7000 by the 
Sudanese authorities in 2005, to 300, 000 by a UK parliamentary committee in, to 
180,000 by the UN Secretary-General in March 2005, where highly politicised 
emergencies often involve debates about the numbers of people affected” (Minear, 
2005).  
The need for Aid in the Darfur region pre-dated the humanitarian crisis, as drought 
had undermined food security. At the time when the violence flared up in early 2003, 
there were several agencies engaged on developmental activities in the area, but they 
freely admitted to being slow to ‘read the signs’ of the growing emergency.  
Human Rights NGOs signalled one of the first alarms to the situation in early 2003, 
but there was a significant time-lag before the UN systems swung into a fully 
committed action initiative in mid to late 2004.  
The UN’s ‘Greater Darfur Initiative’ was launched in September 2003, with US$23 
million in requested funding. By April 2004 the funding requested had risen to 
US$115 million and by June it was US$236 million. This was deemed a “runaway 
crisis” by this time.“The MSF-H evaluation found a lack of leadership from the UN, 
which paid little attention to the Darfur crisis, and whose Khartoum presence seemed 
a veritable revolving door of itinerating personnel” (cited in Minear, 2005, p79). 
The MSF-H evaluation concluded that: 
The early UNICEF response, along with that of other UN agencies, NGOs and 
institutional donors was by and large inadequate”... “eighteen months into the 
mobilisation, and despite documented successes in the areas of health, 
education, and potable water, continuing problems raised serious questions 
for the evaluation team about UNICEF’s capacity to deliver and coordinate 
emergency operations (cited in Minear, 2005, p80). 
There were deemed to be four main reasons for the delayed mobilisation: 
1. Agencies had difficulty establishing and monitoring the extent of the need in 
Darfur, as it was a vast region, with difficulties associated with access, and the 
situation fast-moving from both military and political perspectives. 
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2. Governmental and military restrictions on the information (as received by 
Khartoum officials), that could be made available to the various agencies, was a very 
limiting factor for the mobilisation effort. The granting of visas for expatriates and 
import licences for relief material was apparently used as a means of exercising 
political control over emergency activities. 
3. The fear of alienating Khartoum, whose cooperation was essential in achieving 
North-South peace. According to one evaluation, “When the crisis emerged, agencies 
in Sudan were like rabbits caught in the headlights” with their focus being clearly on 
post-peace rehabilitation and development (cited in Minear, 2005, p81). 
4. The effort to mount a major humanitarian aid mobilisation for Darfur was 
hampered by competition from higher-profile emergencies elsewhere for resources for 
example, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The combination of these four factors, delayed the mobilisation of an international 
humanitarian response for twelve months, that is, until around February 2004. 
“If the timeliness of the response to the crisis was the overriding concern of the 
evaluations, its inadequacy was a close second”.  This suggests that international 
assistance was unable to effectively respond to the challenges faced, did not realise 
how best to respond to the challenges for example, siting the camps too close to the 
border, and never quite catching up or taking control of the crisis (Minear, 2005).  
7.4.2 Supporting IDPs and Refugees in Darfur 
Sudan has the largest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) of any country in 
the world, approximately six million in 2004. The numbers resulted from the conflict 
in Darfur, and also from many years of civil strife, particularly between North and 
South. The evaluations urged that the UN agencies not be allowed to repeat the 
mistakes made in relation to the IDP policies in the 1990’s, as refugees tended to be 
treated better than IDPs in terms of their human rights, services and care available to 
them (Minear, 2005). IDPs are people displaced within their own country. This is the 
situation in the Darfur crisis, and despite clarification of the legal position of IDPs in 
the UN Guiding Principles for Internal Displacement in 1999, there is still no 
identifiable institutional patron of the IDPs, nor any lead agency for IDP camp 
management.  
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7.4.3 Managing the tensions between humanitarian aid activities 
and the political context 
“There is almost no action that cannot be interpreted as political,” observed one 
evaluator of humanitarian activities in the Darfur crisis (Minear, 2005). 
Developing a framework for managing the tensions between humanitarian action and 
politics in the Darfur crisis had two main aspects: 
1. Insulating such action from the political context so that humanitarian aid based 
activities could proceed  
2. Finding appropriate political connections that supported the need for aid 
without losing political ‘face’ in the current political context. 
Advocacy was a recurrent theme in the Darfur evaluations. All of the agencies were 
concerned about whether speaking out on the conflict and related political issues may 
have jeopardised their operational presence or their perceived neutrality. 
“The Sudanese government threatened to expel the Save the Children UK and Oxfam 
Great Britain in November 2004, following their statements to the UN Security 
Council on the need for tougher political-military measures” (Minear, 2005).  
7.4.4 Situating Humanitarian Action in Relation to the Conflict 
The relationship between the humanitarian aid activities, and the conflict itself 
preoccupied humanitarian practitioners and their evaluators in Darfur, according to 
Minear’s report (2005). According to aid agency analysts, “ Recent crises have shown 
clearly that emergency aid inevitably affects political and economic processes in war-
torn countries, and in turn aid operations have been profoundly affected by these 
processes” (cited in Minear, 2005, p102). 
The presence of international humanitarian personnel created an embarrassment in a 
country trying to implement and prove itself to be capable of self definition. 
The conflict provided the required rationale for imposing constraints on aid activities, 
as there was a nervousness around the possibility that the inner most workings of the 
country, and any human rights abuses for example, would become public knowledge 
via media attention. Aid organisations responded in different ways to the security-
related restrictions imposed upon them. The NGOs were regarded as being 
resourceful and lateral in their approach, which was quite different to the UN which 
tended to be quite risk-averse, and more willing to take ‘no’ for an answer (Minear, 
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2005). The conflict also politicised aid work by concentrating activities in 
government-controlled areas, “Due to prolonged insecurity, travel restrictions 
prevented UNICEF, and other agencies from distributing emergency supplies to IDPs 
in rebel-held areas” (cited in Minear, 2005, p104 ). However, NGOs, such as the 
MSF and CARE, again demonstrated more flexibility than the UN agencies, as they 
did not have to abide by the UN Security regulations, and therefore managed to 
achieve more extensive aid coverage in the rural areas than UNICEF. 
A third effect of the conflict was the reduction in quality, and increase in the cost of 
aid, with examples cited by CARE of food deliveries being raided by the guards 
responsible for the security of the aid supplies. High value items were also removed 
by the guards, according to the evaluative reports. 
7.4.5 Improving Coordination  
According to Minear (2005), the weaker the government in a crisis, the greater the 
need for an outside coordination role. A strong international connection was not 
present in the Darfur crisis, and an example of this was the lack of an institution 
prepared to specifically focus on the needs of the IDPs, with thirty nine NGOs 
involved in camp coordination. Minear noted that “even in a non-conflict situation 
such a weakness and lack of authority at the centre would create confusion”. 
The UN-centric system of humanitarian coordination resulted in major geographical 
and sectoral gaps (cited in Minear, 2005, p107). 
There appears to be a recurring picture, following a decade of reviewing UN 
humanitarian agencies, of governance structures, funding sources, weak management, 
and institutional cultures being some of the main obstacles to effective coordination 
(cited in Minear, 2005, p109). 
7.4.6 Crafting an Appropriate and Accountable International 
Presence 
The six Darfur evaluations identified the most useful levels and scope of involvement 
by an international presence in terms of humanitarian intervention. The Darfur 
response “suffered from a shortage of field staff with the necessary knowledge and 
experience of starting-up an acute emergency response”  according to the MSF 
evaluation. These comments were also echoed by OCHA’s evaluation, where they 
reported that one of the major weaknesses associated with high levels of expatriate 
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personnel involvement in humanitarian interventions, was the poor understanding of 
local contexts. Although there was an understanding of the complexity around the 
Darfur situation, no agency or organisation undertook a thorough analysis which 
resulted in weaknesses in strategic planning initiatives. 
These are of particular interest as the research aim is to develop the theoretical design 
management model for remote site collaborative international projects and then 
conduct ongoing tests of the model on real-life projects.   
7.5 The UN Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Project in West Darfur 
– the realities of managing the pre-planning and operational 
stages of the project 
There were two parts to the interview questions put to the participants. Part A asked 
questions about the actual project in terms of the participants’ official roles, and Part 
B asked questions about their perceptions of the fit of the conceptual model with the 
realities of managing UNSHA project in West Darfur.  
7.5.1 Interview Questions Part A – the Overall UN Sudanese 
Humanitarian Aid Project in West Darfur 
Part A comprised a three part question that related to the participants’ official 
responsibilities associated with their official roles on the UNSHA Project in West 
Darfur. The question also sought to establish the main issues that arose during the 
project, from the participants’ perspectives, the impacts that the issues may have had 
on the project and their individual roles, and whether there was support or 
disagreement with any or all of the six themes noted in the ‘Lessons Learned’ 
document by  Minear (2005) and referred in section 7.4.  
The questions were: 
 “In reference to the UNSHA Project in West Darfur, 
(i) What were the official responsibilities associated with the key roles played 
by the seventeen selected participants, and did these change during the 
course of the project.  
(ii) What were the main issues that arose during the project, and to what 
extent did they impact on the individual’s particular role, and/or the 
project. 
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(iii) How did the realities of managing the UNSHA project support or   
challenge  the six (out of eight) ‘lessons learned’ themes,”  
 
The data collected in relation to parts (i) and (ii) of the research question were 
reviewed under the following headings: 
? The Management Framework and Approaches 
? Funding/Budgets 
? Pre-planning and the Detailed Planning Stage(s) 
? The Operations Stage 
? Communications 
? Human Resources 
? Suggestions for managing future projects. 
 
The data collected in relation to part (iii) of the research was collected using a voice 
recorder, and captured  the interview participants’ perspectives, in respect of the UN 
SHA Project in West Darfur, for future projects, and was comparatively reviewed 
under the selected headings from the (‘Lessons Learned’) Minear (2005), concerning: 
? Mobilising humanitarian action  
? Supporting IDPs and refugees 
? Managing the tensions between humanitarian aid activities and the political 
context 
? Situating humanitarian action in relation to the conflict 
? Improving coordination  
? Crafting an appropriate and accountable international presence. 
 
The seventeen selected participants represented a cross section of the personnel 
involved on the UNSHA Project in West Darfur, in terms of their official roles on the 
project. All of the participants were approached prior to the interviewing process, to 
establish their willingness to participate in this research and all agreed (in writing) to 
be interviewed using taped verbal responses to the Interview Questions (A and B). 
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7.5.2 Managing the Clients and Stakeholders 
The terms Client and Stakeholder were interpreted differently according to the 
particular participant being interviewed, dependant on whether they were UNHQ or 
UN Agency staff, or NGO staff. 
The Client was generally considered to be the IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons), 
however depending on who was being interviewed, the client was also considered to 
be the UNHQ, particularly if the interviewees were UN agency personnel. 
The Stakeholders were generally considered to be the various government 
authorities, and the local Khartoum politicians, as without their permission the NGOs 
and UN agency personnel were denied access to the overall emergency area, the 
Camps and the IDPs. 
The management of the clients and stakeholders is complex, as already noted in 
section 7.3, and for UN HQ personnel has to follow set guidelines in the UNHCR 
(United Nations High Commission for Refugees) Handbook (1999), in particular. The 
clients in this instance did not fall within the ‘management of refugees’ guidelines as 
they were not refugees, they were IDPs and no one agency has responsibility or takes 
responsibility for them. From the governmental perspective, the legal and political 
status of those to whom aid is directed in conflict situations is critical (compared to 
natural disasters), in the determination of what aid assistance can or cannot be given. 
The IDPs exist because of a lack of security within their particular country. The IDPs 
needed (and still need), shelter, water and food, and to be safe, and then to be able to 
move back to their own areas once the conflicts abate.  
The aim is to not only protect and facilitate the return of the IDPs to their villages, but 
also, “to give them the means to sustain themselves. This is not just a survival 
package, the whole thing is based on sustainability and durability” (Participant 12). 
According to one of the participants, “The IDPs are quick to give feedback, as they 
always make their needs known, and noisily!!”  From the management perspective, 
“The priorities have to be filtered out, from the psycho-social needs. Mostly this is 
about food, water and shelter” (Participant 8) 
One participant suggested that IDPs be used as resources and not just be regarded as 
victims, given that more field staff are needed (Participant 7) 
The management of the clients and the stakeholders whether at the pre-planning or the 
operations stages always came back to who the particular personnel had to report to, 
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whether it was HQ in Khartoum or HQ in Geneva for example, or to the individual 
NGOs. The Sectoral Organisations (refer Figure 24) met regularly and were the 
coordinators and immediate managers of all the field personnel. 
7.5.3 Managing the Camps  
The management of the camps was a major issue in the six evaluations, as noted in 
section 7.4. One of the recurring comments was the fact that up to 39 NGOs believed 
that they were responsible in some way for managing the camps, and the IDPs. In 
terms of who was considered to be officially responsible for managing the Camps and 
IDPs, no particular institution focussed just on the IDPs as already noted, but four 
representatives from the UN agencies of UNHCR (Participants16, and 2) and the IRW 
(Islamic Relief  Worldwide) (Participants 10 and 15), were specifically interviewed in 
terms of this research (Participants 15, 16 and 10).The group of selected interviewees 
who took part responsibility for the management of the camps, were asked their views 
on the management approach taken in terms of their official roles. A selection of their 
quotes as relevant to the management of the camps question follow: 
“Khartoum makes the decisions, hence we are not in control, which hampers the work 
‘in the field’” (Participant 16) 
“You need to know a bit about the culture beforehand”, and “you need to be very 
modest and swallow your pride, and be prepared to do anything that is needed to be 
done”, “how things are done is not so important, it’s just important to get the jobs 
done” (Participant 2). 
Management of the Camps’ Pre-planning Stages 
 Very little was known by the interviewees in terms of what they knew about the 
emergency situation before going to Darfur, other than that there were IDPs there who 
needed care and protection.  
The biggest problem was that the Darfur situation evolved and no-one knew 
what magnitude to plan for, and no-one geared up in time. Had we had 6-8 
months we would have been better organised on the ground, because 
everything would have been there. So we are basically playing ‘catch –up’ 
now (Participant 8). 
One interviewee arrived to Darfur from another agency office, and had no terms of 
reference except “assess and fix it !!”   
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There was no reliable information in terms of how many IDPs there were, nor their 
levels of vulnerability (and therefore their immediate needs were unknown). All the 
interviewees involved with the managing the camps and IDPs knew where Sudan and 
Darfur was, and that there would probably be a severe lack of amenities, but the 
extent of the actual problem was not specifically known. One participant was just told 
that they “were going on a mission to Darfur”, and that was the extent of the 
communiqué. 
Management at the Operations Stage at the Camps 
The operational stage is ongoing, and commenced in 2003/4. The interviews 
referenced and reviewed here, took place in 2004. At the commencement of the 
operations stage, the participants all identified a lack of pre-planning and organisation 
of resources, whether labour or materials or infrastructure/systems/processes. 
This created barriers to achieving any meaningful outcomes initially.  
“There was a complete lack of transportation, telecommunications, office equipment 
(phones, fax machines, email systems, photocopiers, paper et al.) Medivac plan, 
technicians and laboratories when we arrived into Darfur” (Participants15,16 and 
10). 
This project and the roles that the participants’ played were very different to previous 
aid projects, “Darfur was unique” (Participants 15,16). 
Cannot control IDP movements eg 40,000 staying here for say 6 months, and 
put some infrastructure in place. Does not happen like that, as the numbers 
and needs from week to week are always unknown. 20,000 could leave or 
arrive in any one week, so you try to systemise the information received from 
people in the field using simple report sheets that can be quickly upgraded so 
that you can monitor the changes in order to respond (Participant 8). 
The remoteness impacted seriously on the project and the participants’ jobs. 
According to Participant 2,  
 You can shout basically, and no-one will hear you !!, and you will not always 
know what the truth is , for example when the supply plane may be arriving, or 
even leaving”, ….“remoteness was the enemy of the programme. 
The operations stage had several, evolving parts. Once temporary basic shelter had 
been created for the IDPs during the Emergency Phase and Recovery Phases,  
temporary classrooms were built, and continue to be built, to enable the displaced 
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children a chance to continue or commence their education, and to bring some 
‘normality’ to their daily lives.  
Some IDPS, in fact, though they are away from their village, may well achieve 
more by being displaced for example, more girls are going to school, and 
there are social exchanges occurring between people who would not normally 
mix, that is, across fertilisation of ideas and skills is happening and has  
distinct benefits (Participant 8). 
Management of Communications in and around the Camps 
Communications to Khartoum relied on a mail system, referred to as a Pulse system 
by one interviewee. There was a need for more coordination of communications 
according to participants 10, 15, 8 and 16, who suggested running information and 
planning workshops in the future. The lack of telecommunications, phones et al, made 
the job impossible at times according to all 4 of these particular (management) 
participants. West Darfur is considered to be the most remote area of the three Darfur 
states (North, South and West), which contributed significantly to the 
communications challenges noted by these particular participants. 
Management of Human Resources associated with the Camps 
Human Resources and the employment of staff was conducted by the various UN and 
NGO agencies and co-ordinated via the sector groups. 
There was, and continues to be, a lack of people resources, a lack of trained people, a 
lack of institutional knowledge, and an inability to draft up monitoring reports. There 
is no time to train people at HQ (IRW) according to the participants, hence on-the-job 
training occurred instead,“HR and HR training of aid  personnel is fundamental for 
overall improvements in the project/programme, and in terms of impacting positively 
on the programme” (Participant 16). 
Suggestions for managing future projects in terms of management 
of the camps 
? More efficiencies could be realised if the Camps were already in place, even 
partially, before the specialist technical, field operations and relief personnel 
are brought in for the Emergency and Recovery Phases. Suggestions from the 
participants were that a good local field assistant, a couple of local drivers and 
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a local administration person go ahead and do the ground work, including 
setting up camp (Participants 2, 10, 15 and 16).  
? A lack of transportation, telecommunications, Medivac plan, technicians and 
laboratories, were barriers to achieving any meaningful outcomes initially.  
? There should at least be a clear plan of the area and an initial plan of action 
and priorities.  
? There is a need for efficient people and enough people, so that access into all 
of the target areas and the necessary aid can be delivered. 
? Camp management training should be compulsory for everyone involved on 
the project, and  that includes the local camp conditions and local contextual 
information. 
? Training for the ‘longterm’ is needed, and that includes strategic, and 
personnel development, together with future planning initiatives for aid 
personnel and client support mechanisms/processes/systems. 
? There is a need in future, for decentralised decision-making, where delegated  
authority is given to the personnel on-site, as the time-lag associated with 
waiting for decisions from Khartoum is too long and impractical in many 
instances. The current UNHQ situation is too bureaucratic (Participant 15). 
? The developed and the planned future activities need to be recorded and 
available to the subsequent managers and groups of aid personnel, as “ there is 
a lack of institutional memory, people move on, and then the next group tend 
to reinvent the wheel, time after time” (Participant 8). 
7.5.4 Managing the Logistics 
Five logistics-specific participants were interviewed (Participants 1,3,5,6 and 4) 
The key logistical aspects to be coordinated and managed, in their view were: 
? Transportation- (Air freight, trucks), 
? Resources- People, Food , Materials ( for reconstruction/ temporary shelter), 
? Equipment- Pipelines, mainly for pumping water,  
? Creating temporary bridges, 
? Providing logistical information for all of the agencies involved in the project. 
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Management of the Pre-planning and Detailed Planning Stage(s) 
There is no expectation of being pre-briefed in any real detail, according to one 
participant. However, all four participants (3,4,5 and 6) noted that the briefings they 
did receive were very basic, and of little relevance to the reality of the situation. The 
briefings only occurred a few days before they headed for Darfur (Participants 3,4,5 
and 6). Most of the useful information was gleaned from the news on television, 
reading media and UNICEF articles, and from the internet rather than from the 
agencies. 
“Knew little of relevance before getting here. Would have been good to know more of 
the background, context and key constraints before getting here” (Participant 6). 
“Knew about the sensitivity of the situation, but did not give much thought to the 
dangers of coming here, took safety for granted really , as I am with the UN  who will 
protect me (Participant 3). 
Management Framework and Approaches at the Operations Stage  
The remoteness of the site had a significant influence on the level and scope of the  
challenges, for example the climatic conditions, the difficult access(basic tracks at 
best, there are no roads), coordinating the logistics across such a large area, that is 
also fraught  with looters (Participants 11,8,3,4,5 and 6). 
“Would there have been this crisis, if it were not so remote?” (Participant 5).  
Coordination issues were mentioned by four participants (Participants 1,4,5 and 6), in 
terms of what some agencies can and cannot do and when and where. The distance 
between Khartoum and Darfur added to the problems in terms of getting supplies 
through intact, if at all. 
Materials not locally available for example,  takes 5 weeks by road , but there 
are no roads as such, then the materials are looted, or there are floods or 
heavy rains that wash out the roads/tracks,  and/or damage the goods, so you 
may lose the lot en route and have to start all over again (Participant 8). 
 
The coordination of the various groups is a lot about personality, and how 
these organisations operate or react in situations, I have a certain amount of  
credibility which helps enormously. You have to engage everyone (with the 
ideas or plans), without losing sight of the priorities and your time 
management (Participant 5). 
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The remoteness of the site was expected, but the centralisation of decision-making and 
administration, was not expected nor helpful when trying to run an operation that was 
and is changing daily,  on the ground, ‘in the field’ (Participant 4). 
There was another major challenge regarding getting access for the NGO international 
aiders ,“the Sudanese government had signed an agreement at the preplanning stage, 
agreeing to give us free access, but then they required 48 hours notice once at the 
operations stage” (Participant 12). Dealing with the Sudanese government is/was a 
delicate situation according to all of the participants. 
Management of Communications associated with the Logistics 
One of the participants believed there had been given a significant level of autonomy, 
and that with the authority decentralised from Khartoum to Darfur their role was made 
easier (Participant 6). This view was not shared by the majority of the seventeen 
participants, and for example, 
“Communications and feedback from the IDPs was difficult at times in terms of the 
language barrier” (Participant 5).  
“Hard to understand what is happening ‘on the ground’ as stuck in the office, as 
many of the staff are from Khartoum and they are not local staff” (Participant 5).  
“With everything changing on a daily basis you need to have a flexible attitude, and I 
have that” (Participant 6). 
All of the participants commented on the difficulty of getting any information, in or 
out of Darfur, on a regular basis, “You cannot pick up the phone at any time, or send 
an email. This is frustrating as cannot get work reports back to Khartoum or make 
contact with family members” (Participant 8). 
Management of Human Resources associated with Logistics 
The rapid deployment unit apparently did conduct reasonably thorough pre-training 
sessions. One participant believed that training was best conducted ‘on-the-job’, with 
the more important aspect being to first appoint a team of people, who could work 
together (Participant 4). 
There were also several participants who believed that there was a lack of suitably 
experienced and available personnel on a timely basis. 
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“There were, and are, huge gaps in the experience of the personnel as the agencies 
cannot get experienced personnel on the ground when they are needed, and that 
means that mistakes are sometimes repeated” (Participant 5). 
“HR could send us out with the right tools and more information in terms of statistics 
and backgrounding, before arriving here” (Participant 6).  
Suggestions for managing future projects in terms of logistics’ 
management 
? Future project coordination and planning beforehand would mean that supplies 
would already be there, or on their way. 
?  Available upfront funding would permit this forward coordination in most 
cases.  
? “Classrooms built out of local materials is overtaxing the ability of the local 
area to supply local materials, and semi-permanent materials deteriorated 
over time, so instead, we designed the tent structures which are mobile, or 
could be, as needed” (Participant 8). 
? “Make the international community aware of the crisis/emergency so that it 
does not reach the dire level that existed in Darfur when aid finally arrived ” 
(Participant 1). 
? “Being flexible and adaptable on the ground, and maybe a better briefing kit 
and better supplies. Simple operating systems for say computers, to respond 
more effectively to the primitive nature of the area” (Participant 5). 
? “More thought and planning needs to go into things like the worst-case 
scenario situations, before they happen” (Participant 4). 
? “Decentralise operational stage decision-making and decentralise the 
associated administration” (Participant 4). 
7.5.5 Managing the Communications and Suggestions for Future 
Projects 
According to participant 9 located in Khartoum and responsible for enabling 
communications with Darfur et al. 
“The logistics were not planned beforehand, hence the systems were not easy to set up 
quickly, if at all”. 
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“Darfur is a unique place and project, the culture of the people are very different, 
being from so many different tribes and backgrounds”. 
“The camps are inaccessible by vehicles, only planes come in, and they are not 
always available, and there’s no proper airport”. 
Asked the question of whether it (communications) was a problem of Darfur or an IT 
problem , the answer was that it is an IT problem.  
“Without communications nothing can happen”. 
“There is a big plan to deploy high capacity broadband internet access, but the 
country is not currently linked by fibre –optic cables or satellite, can only use phones 
basically, hence the primitive communications modes”. 
“What we need is mobile offices for example a caravan or converted container, which 
are self-contained modules, with UHS radios and email systems all set up in it, to  
speed the communications systems and accessibilities up”. 
7.5.6 The ‘Managed on Being Managed’ - Suggestions for 
Managing Future Projects 
There was concern expressed by 3 of the 5 participants that they had been working 
constantly without a break for weeks and even months, which meant they were not 
particularly rested due to a lack of sleep, and had less patience than at the start of the 
project and felt really stressed. They suggested that wherever possible in the future, 
additional /alternate people be appointed in a staggered fashion to give longstanding 
aid workers on projects, a break every few weeks, 
“Our clients deserve excellence, so we have to ensure that we get good people, and 
look after them in the field. We need to pre-train international staff and the local staff 
before they go out in the field” (Participant 8). 
7.5.7 Analysis of the Key Findings for Research Question Part A (i), 
ii) and iii) as related to the UN SHA Project in West Darfur. 
7.5.7.1 The Key Findings relative to Parts (i) and (ii) of the 
Question: 
The findings were reviewed and analysed under the headings of : 
? The Management Framework and Approaches 
? Funding/Budgets 
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? Pre-planning Stage(s) 
? The Operations Stage 
? Communications 
? Human Resources 
? Suggestions for managing future projects 
The Management Framework and Approaches 
As discussed in 7.3.1, the UNHCR Handbook (2000) sets out desired outcomes and 
then leaves it to the particular manager to select the management processes required to 
achieve the particular outcomes. The management approaches, according to the 
participants, varied according to the particular agency that the participant represented, 
and the goals they needed to achieve set against tight timelines. The unanimous view 
of the participants was that the management approaches were modified to fit with the 
particular disaster project and therefore followed the UNHCR Handbook (2000) 
approach and concurred with Fitz-Gerald et al. (2002) view that, 
The humanitarian aid community is a ‘slow follower’ in the adoption of 
management tools and techniques. In some ways this can be explained or 
defended on the basis that humanitarian aid is delivered in an environment 
where no two situations are the same. Consequently there is no single model 
that can be applied and the absence of effective lessons-learned mechanisms 
that ensure positive and negative experiences are addressed throughout all 
levels of the organisation encourages reinvention with each deployment. 
The lack of one particular coordinating agency dedicated to the needs of the IDPs, and 
a lack of delegated authority (by the agencies in Khartoum) to make decisions ‘in-the-
field’ was identified by several of the participants as a significant barrier to getting the 
necessary work done ‘in-the-field’ in a timely manner. 
The remoteness of the site had a significant influence on the challenges faced by the 
participants in terms of trying to manage the logistics in particular. 
Funding and Budgets 
Eight of the seventeen participants were actively associated with budgeting and were 
responsible for reporting and monitoring their activities relative to their budgets. 
These participants were management personnel, within their particular agencies, 
which in turn were a mix of UN agencies and NGOs.  
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The remaining participants were working within teams, or were supporting other (non 
UN) agencies and had no direct responsibility for specific budgets. 
The participants referred to a range of working arrangements, from having an ‘annual 
budget’ allocated by their agency, to requesting funds on an ongoing basis, to 
forecasting a year in advance. In almost all cases however, the money was not 
available at the start of the West Darfur emergency. The funds came initially from the 
CERF and Humanitarian Aid Fund. The participants spoke of relying heavily on 
donations, and that those donations continued to come in as a result of performing 
well and publicising their achievements. The participants also referred to the fact that 
for some of the agencies, Khartoum budgetted for all of the Darfur states’ needs.  
In a few cases, the participants were required to be a part of a reporting and 
monitoring system, that was linked directly to a monthly Action Plan. 
The Pre-planning Stages  
The unanimous view of the participants was that whilst they knew of the emergency 
situation in West Darfur in the general sense, that there were IDPs needing care and 
protection, they knew very few specifics on the scope or magnitude of the emergency 
before going there. They were basically advised to ‘assess and fix it ’.  
The participants all noted that there was no real expectation of being briefed, but that 
the briefings they did receive were of little relevance to the actual situation. Statistical 
information on IDP numbers, available resources and amenities varied and were 
therefore unreliable. The situation in Darfur basically evolved and personnel were in 
catch-up mode rather than being able to pre-plan months in advance. Curiously, the 
participants noted that the most useful information was gained from watching the 
news on television and from reading media articles, before going to Darfur, rather 
than from the agencies. 
The logistical pre-planning was apparently almost impossible to organise given a 
complete lack of systems being in place, or easy to set up. In addition there was the 
issue of the inaccessibility of the site from political and geographical perspectives. Air 
transport was the only feasible mode of transportation. 
The Operations Stage 
The pre-planning stages and the operational stages on the UNSHA West Darfur 
project tended to become blurred, given the short lead-time, and the unreliability of 
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statistical data. The lack of pre-planning and organisation of resources, whether labour 
or materials or infrastructure/systems/processes, created barriers to achieving any 
meaningful outcomes initially, “There was a complete lack of transportation, 
telecommunications, office equipment (phones, fax machines, email systems, 
photocopiers, paper et al) Medivac plan, technicians and laboratories when we 
arrived into Darfur” (Participants 15,16 and 10). 
There was unanimous agreement amongst the participants that the remoteness of the 
site seriously impacted on the project and their roles. There was a view that 
“remoteness was the enemy of the programme”. The distance between Khartoum and 
Darfur added to the problems in terms of getting supplies through intact, if at all. 
The only realistic and relatively reliable form of transportation involved planes, given 
there were no properly formed roads, only marginally formed airstrips and no formal 
airport facilities. However, according to the participants there was never any real 
certainty as to when the planes may arrive or leave, nor what resources would be on 
board, and materials not locally available would have taken five weeks by road , but 
there were no roads as such.  The materials were frequently looted, or there were 
floods, or heavy rains that washed out the roads/tracks damaging or completely 
destroying the resources.  
Communications 
West Darfur is considered to be the most remote area of the three Darfur states 
(North, South and West) and this contributed significantly to the communications 
challenges noted by all the participants. 
There was consensus amongst the participants that the management of 
communications’ systems and processes were either non-existent initially, or were 
unreliable at best. As already noted air transport was the only feasible means of 
providing resources to the West Darfur site. The camps were inaccessible by vehicles,  
Darfur was not serviced by fibre-optic cable nor satellite technology, so phones were 
the only form of telecommunication, in association with a Pulse mailing system.  
Reporting systems to HQ in Khartoum relied on a mailing system, and given the ever-
changing nature of the emergency, reported information was quickly 
outdated,“20,000 IDPs could leave or arrive in any one week, so you try to systemise 
the information received from people in the field using simple report sheets that can 
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be quickly upgraded so that you can monitor the changes in order to respond” 
(Participant 8). 
Human Resources 
There are government agencies (UN) and there are Non-Government agencies 
(NGOs) such as CARE International, the International Red Cross, MSF (Holland, 
Belgium et al), and Red-R. Each agency appoints, and trains their own staff. In 
addition the UN generally has a different management and training approach to that of 
the NGOs, as the UN staff are usually professional career people who are following a 
particular career path and basically have to “play it by the rules” and be politically 
correct essentially. All of the Emergency Phase ‘needs analysis’ people were highly 
trained specialists in their field, from around the world, or from the local agencies, 
with high levels of previous humanitarian emergency experience. 
There was consensus amongst the participants that there was a lack of trained and 
experienced people resources with institutional knowledge and an ability to draft up 
monitoring reports. On-the job training was regarded by a few of the participants, as 
appropriate, important and unavoidable. The appointment of compatible work 
personnel was actually considered more important than pre-training. 
Summary of the Key Suggestions for Managing Future Projects  
? Need to be able to get experienced personnel on the ground when they are 
needed, to avoid mistakes being repeated,  
“HR could send us out with the right tools and more information in terms of 
statistics and backgrounding, before arriving here” (Participant 6).  
? A plan to install and utilise high capacity broadband internet access needs to 
be developed, and will require that fibre-optic or satellite links are set up, 
ahead of deployments of emergency aid personnel. 
?  Mobile offices are needed, such as converted containers or caravans that are 
self-contained modules with UHS radios and email systems that are already 
operational. 
? More efficiencies could be realised if the camps were already in place, even 
partially, before the specialist technical, field operations and relief personnel 
are brought in for the ‘Emergency’ and ‘Recovery Phases’. 
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? There should be a clear plan of the area and an initial plan of action and 
priorities. There is also a need for efficient people, and enough people, so that 
access into all of the target areas and the necessary aid can be delivered. 
? Camp management training is needed for everyone involved on the project, 
and that includes the local camp conditions and local contextual information. 
? Training for the ‘longterm’ needed, that includes strategic, and personnel 
development, together with future planning initiatives for aid personnel and 
client support mechanisms/processes/systems. 
? There is a need, in future, for decentralised decision-making, where delegated  
authority is given to the personnel on-site, as the time-lag associated with 
waiting for decisions from Khartoum is too long and impractical in many 
instances. The current UNHQ situation is too bureaucratic (Participant 15). 
? The developed and the planned future activities need to be recorded and 
available to the subsequent managers and groups of aid personnel, as there is a 
lack of institutional memory. The resultant is that with people moving on the 
next group tend to re-invent the wheel each time. Future project coordination 
and planning beforehand would mean that supplies would already be there, or 
on their way. 
? Available upfront funding is needed to allow for forward coordination . 
? There is a need to look more closely at the materials needed and where to 
source them from ahead of time as on the UNSHA West Darfur Project 
classrooms built out of local materials tended to overtax the ability of the local 
area to supply local materials, and semi-permanent materials deteriorated over 
time. Tent structures which are mobile could be implemented as needed. 
? The international community needs to be made aware of the crisis/emergency 
as early as possible, so that it does not reach the dire level that existed in 
Darfur when aid finally arrived. 
? There is a need in future for a better briefing-kit and supplies.  
? Simple operating systems for say computers are needed to respond more 
effectively to the primitive nature of the area. 
? More thought and planning needs to go into things like the worst-case scenario 
situations, before they happen. 
? There is a need to decentralise operational stage decision-making and 
decentralise the associated administration.     
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7.5.7.2 The Key Findings Relative to Part (iii) of the Question  
The findings from the participants’ perspectives were compared with those in the 
‘Lessons Learned document’ (Minear, 2005), under the headings of : 
? Mobilising humanitarian action,  
? Supporting IDPs and refugees, 
? Managing the tensions between humanitarian aid activities and the political 
context, 
? Situating humanitarian action in relation to the conflict, 
? Improving coordination,  
? Crafting an appropriate and accountable international presence. 
Mobilising Humanitarian Action 
In section 7.4.1 Minear (2005), the summation of the evaluation reports was that 
international assistance was slow in responding and gearing up for action. In addition, 
the humanitarian response was unable to effectively respond to the challenges faced, 
and did not realise how best to respond to the challenges for example, siting the 
camps too close to the border where military and political tensions were rife, and 
never quite catching up, or taking control of the crisis, as a direct result of the twelve 
month delay to mobilisation. In addition, the agencies did not want to alienate 
Khartoum and the governmental personnel who exercised military and political 
control over all access for personnel and materials. This summation was 
unequivocally supported by all of the ‘management’ participants. 
Supporting IDPs and Refugees 
As noted earlier in section 7.4.2, Sudan has the largest number of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), of any country in the world, reported as being six million in 2004, and 
there is still no lead agency for the IDP camp management, nor identifiable 
institutional patron of the IDPs. The evaluations (Minear, 2005), urged that the UN 
agencies not repeat mistakes made relative to the IDPs’ policies of the 1990’s. 
  
There was consensus amongst the participants that: 
? they were always reflecting on and reviewing how sustainable their 
intervention systems were, in terms of a population in ‘emergency mode’, 
 154
? education would equip the IDPs with a basic set of skills for their future, 
thereby giving them the ability to be self-sustaining.  
According to participant 12, 
The whole thing is based on sustainability and durability. You have to ensure 
the protection of the IDPs and refugees, and that their return (to their 
township and land) is sustainable and not just a survival package. Have to 
give them the means to be self-sustaining”.   
Managing the Tensions between Humanitarian Aid Activities and 
the Political Context 
There was unanimous agreement amongst the participants that advocacy was critical 
in regard to the West Darfur situation. There was a widely shared concern amongst 
the participants, that speaking out about the conflict or any related political issues 
could have materially affected their operational presence. Participant 14 for example, 
stated that “you cannot be directly confrontational in talking with or dealing with the 
governmental agencies, and any dealings with the Sudanese government had to be 
handled very delicately”.  
The participants’ views directly supported the agency evaluations (Minear, 2005), and 
the fact that the Sudanese government threatened to expel Save the Children-UK and 
Oxfam-GB in 2004, following their challenging statements to the UN Security 
Council.  
Situating Humanitarian Action in Relation to Conflict 
There was significant concern amongst the participants regarding the issue of “forced 
return” that is, forcing the return of the IDPs to their homes, whilst the conflict was 
still actively creating more IDPs in Darfur. The participants considered this to be a 
violation of human rights, and a politically motivated strategy by the Sudanese 
government, to try to reduce the international presence. This directly supported the 
evaluations in section 7.4.4 of Minear (2005), which referred to the presence of 
international humanitarian personnel creating embarrassment to a country trying to 
become self determining, and that the conflict provided the government with the 
rationale required to limit the scope, access and location of aid activities, to mainly 
government-controlled areas where they could control what the public witnessed. This 
view was further supported by Participant 14 who stated that, “the government of 
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Sudan signed an agreement saying that they would give us (NGO) access, but instead 
required 48 hours notice”  and “ were the communications systems allowed to remain 
poor once aid arrived, in order to keep the world out ??”. In addition, participant 5 
held the view that as foreigners, the international aid personnel acted as ‘witnesses’ 
and ‘buffers’, and hence offered the IDPs safety from violation of human rights, 
whilst they were there in West Darfur.  
Another effect of the conflict, according to the evaluations, (Minear, 2005) was the 
reported raids on aid supplies, often conducted by the guards. This view was upheld 
by the participants, in as much that they frequently received only a fraction of the 
expected supplies, once they finally arrived. However, the participants did not 
specifically name the guards as the prime suspects, as it could have been the result of 
‘bandits’, or weather, or road or airstrip conditions, as well as looters. 
Improving Coordination 
As already referred in section 7.4.5 Minear (2005), noted that the weaker the 
government in a crisis, the greater the need for an outside coordination role and stated 
that,“ even in a non-conflict situation, such a weakness and lack of authority at the 
centre would create confusion”. A strong international connection was not evident in 
the Darfur crisis. The picture painted by the evaluations in Minear (2005), that after a 
decade of reviews of UN agencies, there are still issues around governance structures, 
funding sources and institutional cultures, sectoral and geographical gaps. All of 
which reduce effective coordination (cited in Minear, 2005, p.107).The fact that the 
individual participants reported back to their specific agencies and sectoral agencies, 
meant that they supported the view that there was a lack of international coordination, 
and often referred to “not knowing what the overall coordination or governance plan 
was”. Yet there were a few participants (all NGOs) who were party to a tiered 
decision-making system and team, where they were specifically consulted given that 
they were working ‘in the field’, or ‘on the spot’, and their contributions were sought-
out and valued. Conversely, other participants saw their roles as “putting plasters on 
the cuts”, and “putting out fires”, mainly because communications with Khartoum 
were considered quite daunting, and nothing could happen without their approval.  
The participants were in agreement that the main issue one to three months into the 
West Darfur Project, was a lack of coordination and “seeing what some agencies can 
do and what others cannot” (Participant 5), as well as the physical distance between 
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Khartoum and Darfur, the basic remoteness of the area and the lack of capacity to 
deliver goods and poor or no logistical support. All of which led to poor coordination 
and outcomes for the clients (IDPs). 
Crafting an Appropriate and Accountable International Presence 
The six Darfur evaluations identified the most useful levels and scope of involvement 
by an international presence in terms of humanitarian intervention, (Minear, 2005), in 
section 7.4.6, and suggested that the Darfur response “ suffered from a shortage of 
field staff with the necessary knowledge and experience of starting- up a large scale 
acute emergency response” (cited in Minear, 2005, p.111),  and that one of the major 
weaknesses associated with high levels of expatriate personnel involvement in 
humanitarian interventions, was the poor understanding of local contexts. There was 
consensus amongst the participants that these views were a true reflection of their own 
experiences on the West Darfur project. In terms of suggestions for managing future 
projects, the lack of pre-training, reference to, or availability of, local expertise, and 
experienced  field staff on the West Darfur project were recurringly strong criticisms 
of the start-up, pre-planning and operations stages amongst the participants. 
7.5.8 Concluding Thoughts on the Findings for Part A of the 
Interview Questions in this Chapter 
From a management perspective the findings suggest a fragmented and highly 
uncertain set of overall outcomes, for the stakeholders and the clients (IDPs). The 
overall management framework would appear to not be working optimally, or even 
adequately according to the findings.  
All the participants, whilst being given some basic terms of reference, on 
appointment, from their particular agency for the SHA project in West Darfur 
appeared to be working in parallel rather than in an integrated manner. There was also 
a mix of personnel amongst the cross-sectional selection of participants, whether 
volunteers and paid personnel from NGOs, and career humanitarian aiders from UN 
government agencies. All have to comply with the overall UN (and hence the USA’s) 
current foreign policies and Handbooks of Management Policies and Procedures. At 
the same time there are policies and procedures for each of the agencies whether 
NGOs or governmental, and each emergency is different to the previous one. 
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Not only are the foreign policies and priorities in terms of who and where aid will be 
focussed, politically driven, so too are the individual government’s policies and 
procedures and desired outcomes. In the case of the Sudanese government, the 
findings and the UN agency evaluations, suggest that there appeared to be an 
unwillingness on the part of the government to acknowledge the numbers and actual  
plight of the IDPs, in that they tried to downplay the problem in part, by making the 
access process difficult for humanitarian aid personnel.  
The ‘Lessons Learned at Darfur review’ commissioned by ALNAP 2004 (Minear, 
2005) and subsequently read by their staff, identified the need for a thorough analysis 
to be conducted of the Darfur situation, as the review in their words “relies on a fairly 
narrow set of data set of six evaluations of work in Darfur”. The lack of an overall 
and thorough review has to date resulted in ongoing weaknesses in strategic planning 
initiatives for UN Humanitarian Aid Projects (Minear, 2005).  
This view was strongly supported by the findings from the collected data for the 
Interview Questions of Part A. 
7.6 The UN Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Project in West Darfur 
– the fit of the conceptual management model with the 
realities of managing the pre-planning and operational stages 
of the project  
7.6.1 Interview Questions Part B   
Part B of the interview questioning was aimed at testing the fit of the conceptual 
model’s four key factors and potential drivers with the management realities of the 
UN Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Project in West Darfur. The question actually posed 
to the eight senior and middle operational managers (from NGOs and UN Agencies) 
was, 
“How well does the conceptual design management model for remote sites represent 
the realities of your management experiences on UN Humanitarian Aid Projects and 
in particular, the West Darfur Humanitarian Aid Project in Sudan?”. 
7.6.2 Data Collection  
The interviews that were conducted, explored the project in its entirety with the 
seventeen selected key personnel, in terms of their official roles. However, the 
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selection of only eight of the seventeen interviewees’ transcripts, for this part of the 
research question, was made on the basis that these people were the managers from 
each of the agencies, and therefore knew the big picture objectives, the strategies 
being applied, and the desired outcomes. 
The remaining data collected related to the participants’ particular roles on the project 
and the impacts on their roles of the main issues, during the course of the project, and 
is written up in sections 7.5.1 to 7.5.9.  
A refereed and published paper by Kestle and Potangaroa, (2006), focussed 
specifically on a selection of the collected data gathered from the eight interviewees, 
when testing the conceptual design management model for remote site projects 
against the UNSHA Project in West Darfur.Testing was directly related to the four 
key factors of the conceptual design management model for remote sites.  
These factors were: 
1. Value Generation;  
2. Knowledge Integration;  
3. Process Integration;  
4. Timely Decision-Making, 
The aim was to establish how well the gathered data supported or added to the four 
key factors of the conceptual design management model. The data were transcribed, 
collated and analysed in terms of the interview questions and the overall research 
question. 
7.6.3 Analysis and Discussion of the ‘Key Factor’ Findings 
As already described in section 7.1 and 7.2, the selection of the case study at West 
Darfur in Sudan, was made on its ability to represent the phenomenon of remote site 
design and project management. The UNSHA Project in West Darfur, being an 
international collaborative, involved aid representatives from several international 
countries (such as the UN HQs in Geneva and Khartoum, the USA, UK, European 
Union, New Zealand, and Australia). Each country contributed to the management 
and/or operational aspects of the project. This collaborative approach created a 
complex regime of project personnel and tasks that needed to be sensitively 
integrated, coordinated and managed. The overall aim of the UNSHA Project in West 
Darfur, (and therefore the various agencies), as previously noted, was ‘to make a 
difference’ to the lives of the beneficiaries of the aid, the Internally Displaced Persons 
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(IDPs). Provision of basic shelter and the necessaries of life, were at the core of the 
project’s aims. Measuring the ‘differences’ made was problematic, as it involved 
levels of quantitative assessment, clinical monitoring, and also a range of qualitative, 
cultural, and psycho-social observations and measurements, by the operational 
personnel.  
The complexity of the UNSHA Project in West Darfur, and the associated 
management of this internationally collaborative project, was strongly evident to the 
planning committee, subsequent management personnel, and the field personnel from 
the commencement of their engagement on the project, according to virtually all of 
the participants. This stemmed in part from the fact that there were several agencies 
and several countries’ representatives involved, with all of their associated 
stakeholders and their expectations, and a non-negotiable timeline to achieve the 
desired outcomes.  
Testing the collected data against the conceptual model under the four factors and 
potential drivers of value generation; knowledge integration; process integration and 
timely decision making, involved reviewing the responses specific to the West Darfur 
Humanitarian Project in Sudan. The results were generally consistent across all of the 
selected interviewees, though some of the respondents appeared to have more 
autonomy than others in terms of playing a real part in the decision-making processes.  
The personnel interviewed supported the four key factors of the design management 
model, as being valid for humanitarian aid project sites generally, and as being 
representative of their experiences, or those that were needed, on projects such as the 
West Darfur Humanitarian Aid Project in Sudan.  
The key points shown in Table 5 were drawn from the collected data under the 
‘factor’ headings. 
Table 5 Key points from the UNSHA West Darfur data in reference to the 4 key Conceptual Design 
Management factors 
The Four CDM Key Factors for 
Remote Sites  
Value generation as perceived or needing to be realized on 
the West Darfur Humanitarian Aid Project in Sudan and as 
per the collected data was: 
Value Generation  The effectiveness, and therefore the value was measured on the 
project, by what was achieved, how many people (IDP’s) have 
been saved and fed; what the mortality rate was. Value was 
measured quantitatively. 
About keeping a reliable, continuous supply line of food to the 
displaced people, from a distant donor to the NGO’s in the field. 
About making a difference to the living conditions, in terms of 
emergency water and sanitary assessments in the ‘Field’, acting 
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on the recommendations, and their timely implementation. 
Measured in how many built outputs will be achieved, and then 
seeing the re-collection of people; putting the ‘village’ back 
together again. 
Knowledge Integration  That there are definite gaps in the knowledge integration 
process. No-one wants to trespass on others’ areas, and 
therefore perceived as a possible hindrance to finding the best 
solution(s). 
That there’s a problem with the planning and the reality. Very 
specialised personnel who come in, cannot do what they are 
best at, as have to follow a particular plan, and therefore not 
necessarily seeing the desired/potential ‘results on the ground’. 
That there are consultants, who are not in the UN system, who 
need to be advised of the potential pitfalls, when involved on 
these types of projects. 
That there are basically, informal and formal systems of 
knowledge integration. 
The gaps in specialist knowledge, in terms of the experiences of 
the people in the field, versus those in the office - they were not 
always in-line at times. 
That sometimes there is too much specialised knowledge on a 
project, and what is needed is a more holistic approach. 
A good knowledge of the IDPs cultural and value systems is 
needed, before commencing the on-site work. 
The high turnover rate of people in these roles, so things were 
not recorded as much as they could have been. Important 
though, to understand the context of the project. 
Process Integration To try and understand how the IDPs think, and will act/respond, 
and then to try and set up the best processes and systems. 
In trying to achieve co-ordination at the camp level, and engage 
in meaningful and useful relationship-building with the 
International, and IDP Communities. Knowing the other 
agencies’ plans, means better facilitation. 
That little could have been achieved without the Sudanese 
people and their expertise. They had valuable connections and 
networks within the community. 
About co-ordination of the various groups, on this project, and 
helping working groups focus on the task in hand. 
To make sure that assessments are correct. That a thorough, 
logical and sensible solution to the assessment findings is made. 
Then prepare a plan to address the challenges within the 
timeframe and the budget.  
Timely Decision-making  That decision-making on this project was quite reactive and 
prescriptive. The detailed, and bigger picture decisions were fed 
from the ‘Field’ back to central, where the tailoring occurred, 
and the decisions, and plans, were fine tuned.  
A tiered system of decision-making. Consultative decisions 
were made. The people with the on-the-ground, or with the 
bigger picture knowledge, worked together to work out the best 
answers, and decide what was feasible. 
That decision-making involved a group of managers, one 
manager for each of the programmes, and it was essentially de-
centralised. 
That at the organisational level, the decision-making was de-
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centralised. There were considerable levels of co-ordination 
between West Darfur, Khartoum and the agency’s head office. 
The staff were given almost total autonomy in the ‘Field’, and 
dedicated organisational finance personnel to work with. 
 
The main challenge for all of the aid agencies was establishing a means of quantifying 
acceptable ‘differences’ in their clients’ lives, and whether the ‘plan’ had been 
achieved once implemented, and that the expected ‘value’ had been generated. 
Measuring the ‘differences’ achieved was problematic, as it involved both a level of 
quantitative, clinical monitoring, and also a range of qualitative, cultural, and psycho-
social observations and measurements. 
One of the notable outcomes, from the collected data, was the diversity of views held 
by the respondents as to who they considered to be the stakeholders of the project, and 
what contributed to value generation on this project. A range of views also emerged in 
terms of the preferred and actual process integration in practice on the project, and 
whether the respondents had to slavishly follow the plan from ‘central’ or that local 
decision-making opportunities existed on the project.  
There was recurring criticism of the centralised decision-making process of some of 
the agencies, and how this hindered progress, timely communications, and the 
potential for on-the-ground, and informed and improved/relevant local decisions 
being able to be made. Others believed, that they had some autonomy in terms of the 
decision-making, having had the authority delegated to them by their agency(ies).  
This lack of consistency of decision-making and delegated authority, across the range 
of agencies, and the ever-changing personnel in-the-field and offices, was 
challenging, frustrating and disorientating for a number of the respondents. 
The respondents, almost unanimously (7/8), noted that there were significant gaps in 
terms of specialist knowledge and knowledge integration on the West Darfur 
Humanitarian Aid project.  
This resulted from a range of contributing factors, in their view, being: 
1. Mismatches between the knowledge and experience of personnel in the 
agency offices, and that of the personnel specifically brought in for the 
on-the-ground work associated with the project. 
2. No-one wanted to trespass on (or offend) other agencies’ areas of 
responsibility, which in reality probably puts limits on achieving the 
much needed knowledge integration, on these projects. 
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3. Too little time being spent on the pre-planning stage(s). Realistic 
strategies and implementation plans and processes are regarded as 
essential, even though these are emergency projects. 
4.  Continually changing staff, in all areas, means that record keeping, as 
well as status and improvement report writing (by the specialist 
consultants in particular), should be an essential part of the central and 
local portfolio resource pool and the pre-briefing/training of affected 
personnel. 
A commonly, and strongly held view was that there was insufficient pre-briefing and 
associated training, before going into the field. There was consensus amongst the 
respondents, that there was a significant lack of effective and timely communication 
equipment, and systems available for project staff, in the Field and in the offices at the 
start of the ‘in-the-field’ project work. 
Reliable and timely communications are considered to be critical on these remote 
sites, yet miscommunications do occur at times, between the various stakeholders, on 
and off site, caused perhaps by different interpretations of the issues, or decisions 
being made remotely from the site itself, and from each other (Kestle & Storey, 2005). 
Concluding Statements 
The overall research question was aimed at investigating whether a project framework 
based on relatively conventional issues of remoteness and sustainability could be 
applied to a humanitarian aid context, where the human costs involved are often 
significant. However, if such research could be used and extended into what must be 
considered an ‘extreme’ context, then there would be the potential to provide aid 
workers with guidance in a situation of apparent ‘chaos’.  
The in-depth detail of how well the conceptual management model represents the 
realities (or needs) of managing humanitarian aid projects, such as the one in West 
Darfur is found in the analysis and discussion of the findings in this chapter and in 
Chapter 8. The eight selected interviewees were very clear though that the model 
works, and unequivocally supported the four key factors of the design management 
model, as accurately representing their experiences, or those that were in fact needed 
on projects such as the UN SHA West Darfur Project. The analysis of the semi-
structured interviews, suggested that the conceptual design management model for 
remote sites (Kestle & London, 2002), is relevant in a non-profit and/or humanitarian 
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aid context. In addition, the model allows for a blending of traditional and modern 
management methods.  
This support by the participants of the conceptual design management model for 
remote sites, lends significant support to the model and to the associated typology for 
remote sites, and is especially pertinent given that Humanitarian Aid projects are 
probably one of the worst situations that one could select to test, also being very 
different in many ways to the Antarctic Science project(s). Yet the model works for 
both contexts. This then gave weight to the notion/idea of ‘model portability’ which is 
discussed elsewhere in the thesis and specifically in Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 8. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
8.1 Introduction 
The detailed findings and analysis for each of the two main case-studies in Antarctica 
and Sudan can be found in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively. The discussion and 
analysis within this chapter is in relation to the comparative similarities and 
differences between the findings of the Antarctic and Sudanese case-studies, and how 
that provided the potential to influence, modify and /or validate the conceptual 
management model. The two main case studies referred in Chapter 8.2 and 8.3 are the 
Cape Roberts Drilling Project (CRP) in Antarctica, and the United Nations Sudanese 
Humanitarian Aid Project (UNSHA) in West Darfur. The Antarctic science project 
was a retrospective historical case-study conducted with a representative cross-section 
of the personnel previously involved, whereas the UN Aid project was an ‘as it was 
happening’ live and current case-study, conducted with a range of aid agency 
managers and other in-the-field personnel. 
8.2 The similarities and differences between the findings and 
analyses of the two main case-studies. 
8.2.1. The Similarities between the Findings 
? There was a consistent call from both groups of participants for better pre-
planning and operational plans that reflect the actual realities of in-the-field 
staff needs and experiences. (UNSHA and CRP office and field staff had very 
different experiences and ideas respectively, on how to identify, manage and 
conduct the necessary tasks). 
? That relevant and timely delegated authority was needed to better respond to 
the ‘in-the-field’ situations, resulting in better outcomes for everyone 
involved. 
? There is a need for project managers to be brought in before the start of a 
project to better manage, inform and motivate staff to do the best job. 
? That funding of these international collaborative projects is an issue at the pre-
planning and operational stages, mainly because there are multiple 
stakeholders and sponsors and each have their own timelines for expenditure 
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and reporting. These expectations are rarely in sync with each other. In 
addition the international stakeholders either put up money or ‘in kind’ 
payments/contributions. The in-kind contributions are hard to quantify or 
compare across different countries as they usually involve logistical support, 
equipment, across laboratory access, labour or research resources, for 
example. 
? That both groups of participants called for improved coordination of efforts at 
the pre-planning and operational stages by the various agencies in the future, 
whether Antarctic science or humanitarian aid projects, citing problematic 
communications and gaps in or duplication of effort on occasion.  
? That the management of communications and information on these 
international collaborative projects conducted on remote sites, challenged even 
the best of the experienced staff’s efforts and intentions. This was mainly 
because these sites were not well serviced with phones, fax, email or internet 
even before the expert personnel arrived, therefore hindering progress for 
some days and weeks, creating significant frustration and lost opportunities. In 
addition to the geographical remoteness, there were often local weather 
conditions that prevented optimal, and at times even fundamental, 
communication systems being installed.  
? That issues around the fragmented location of site and/or office personnel 
created real and potential misinterpretations and miscommunications of issues, 
reporting of results or needs, and therefore affected outcomes and critical 
progress on the projects. 
? That politicization of these international projects, whether resulting from 
cultural or local political conflicts, or governmental strategising by the various 
stakeholder countries, became quite a hindrance on the projects. This impacted 
to varying degrees on the two projects, in terms of planning, meeting 
operational objectives, funding, timely decision-making and trying to achieve 
integration of effort(s) whilst trying to work with tight timelines. 
? That there were, and never are, enough personnel with the necessary specific 
remote site project experience, particularly on the Humanitarian Aid projects, 
to provide continuity between projects or provide for a satisfactory and 
plausible successional planning.  
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8.2.2 The Differences between the Findings  
? The Cape Roberts Drilling Project, and Antarctic projects generally, are pre-
planned well in advance in terms of funding, environmental impact reports, 
logistical needs and special area access requirements, often up to twelve, 
twenty four months or more, before the projects commence on site. This is 
because the scientists can only conduct their Antarctic research during the 
months of late September to February in any one year, as the first sunrise is 
around 20 September each year, and the last sunset is on or around late March. 
Therefore the logistical support crew prepare for the scientific research 
requirements during the winter months of total darkness, in readiness for the 
New Zealand scientists’ projects. However, on the collaborative projects such 
as CRP there was the additional complexity of trying to coordinate 
management and logistical issues across seven different countries, and the 
changing needs and expected outcomes of their project specific personnel. In 
addition, what also sets the Antarctic project apart from the UNSHA project is 
what is referred to by the participants as the ‘Antarctic Factor’, meaning that 
the Antarctic weather and the environment control everything, and can destroy 
the best made plans. Flying resources and personnel into Antarctic sites can be 
delayed by weather conditions up to a week or more at times, meaning that 
worst case scenario is that the scientists cannot conduct their research in the 
specifically funded year. On the CRP project there was also a problem with 
the sea ice and the sea currents beneath it moving at speeds faster and more 
erratically than expected, thereby compromising the drilling equipment and 
the project for that first season of the 5 year project. 
? That conversely, on the UNSHA project in West Darfur, the work on-site 
started as an International Emergency Response, meaning that fully trained 
and experienced Aid personnel were contacted only 24-48 hours before they 
were required thousands of kilometres away in the middle of a desert, with no 
formed roads, or communications systems in place, and with only minimal 
information or pre-planning available. Experienced personnel would however 
have been familiar with the UN Humanitarian Aid Handbook (2000), and have 
worked on previous, though not similar projects necessarily. Several of the 
participants interviewed commented that they learned more about the disaster 
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and where they were going from international news desk reports. The actual 
scope and scale of the humanitarian aid issue in West Darfur was largely 
unknown prior to the aid personnel arriving, as their objective at the 
Emergency Response stage was to in fact conduct the needs assessment and 
analysis in-the-field, from which the resourcing and implementation plan for 
the ‘Recovery Stage’ could be drawn up.  
? That logistically, the CRP Antarctic Science projects needs were prepared 
during the winter months in micro detail before most of the scientists arrived 
in Antarctica, because of the limited access times, the limited supplies of 
specialist support equipment. Replacements that might be required through 
damage or loss, were also sourced beforehand. However, being a collaborative  
comprising personnel from seven countries, the coordination of actual on-site 
needs and objectives were often unable to be addressed fully until personnel 
arrived in Antarctica. The UNSHA project in West Darfur was a major 
challenge to the aid agency representatives and the international experts 
brought in, given there were no formed roads, airstrips and the area was prone 
to the extremes of drought or flooding, and looters. Up to 60% of donated aid 
and critically needed basic resources were prevented from arriving to the 
project camp sites, by looters or extortionists, or damaged by flooding.  
8.2.3 How the Findings Compared Overall 
Despite the fact that the two key case study projects were operating within quite 
different disciplines and with very different goals, there were significant similarities 
between the findings, even though they were very different projects, with uniquely 
specific objectives, stakeholder expectations and management approaches. This was 
not really expected at the outset, but added weight to the value, usefulness and 
portability of the management model across disciplines, and was very encouraging in 
terms of how well the model stood up to the in-field testing with the selected 
participants. 
8.3 Why the Model was Specifically Supported by Participants 
on the two main Case Study Projects 
When writing up the data analysis from the findings for both of the main case-studies, 
all of the participants agreed that the four key factors of the management model 
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represented their experiences on the project that they had been involved on, and had 
been interviewed about for this research. The model was supported by the two main 
case-study projects’ findings. Evidence of this was found by looking in more detail at 
situations identified by the participants, which were linked to statements where they 
refer to ‘the factors in the model being representative of the project’s management, 
and their own experiences’. Specific examples are drawn from each of the Antarctic 
and Sudanese case studies, and written up under the four key factors of the model, to 
show how they were severally and collectively supported. 
8.3.1. Antarctica - Cape Roberts Drilling Retrospective Case-study 
Findings Pertinent to the Support of the Model’s Four Key Factors 
for this Particular Project 
Value generation was acknowledged as a key factor particularly as it related to the 
key aims and the value sought in terms of the Antarctic rock core drilling projects. 
The main aim had been to recover high quality sedimentary strata core to provide 
internationally significant scientific outcomes related to determining the core’s 
composition (geologically and climatologically). In addition, the analysed data from 
the case-study supported the notion that strategic decisions made at the design and 
pre-planning stages significantly impacted the value generated for the client and 
stakeholders in terms of the outcomes. 
Knowledge integration was acknowledged as a key factor too, being realized in the 
lack of, and need for successional planning on these specialised projects. However, 
intellectual property (patch protection) issues were identified as an inhibiting factor 
for knowledge integration to occur as intended under the Antarctic Treaty. There was 
strong support for clear, effective and regular communications, on these remote 
Antarctic sites in future. In addition there was a call for centralized storage and 
management of operational and archival data on future projects, in order to enable 
reliable and efficient processes, innovative responses, and accurate, timely outputs. 
The creation of a common website accessible to all of the international collaborators 
and involved personnel, whether logistic, design, scientific or administrative was 
another recommendation from the participants.  
Process integration was acknowledged as a key factor by the project participants. 
They noted that there had been a lack of certainty and/or clarity around process 
integration, as it involved the various stakeholders, offsite and on-site personnel. The 
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associated planning, logistics and procurement strategies had resulted in dissatisfied 
staff, staff burn out, budget blowouts and incompleted projects.  
Timely decision-making was acknowledged as a key factor given the potential of 
time delays associated with decision-making about design or financial issues causing 
flow-on effects across all disciplines and tasks.  
Misinterpretations of issues and a lack of delegated authority were cited as having 
occurred  between stakeholders on and off-site, due mainly to their working remotely 
from each other, and in several instances, remotely from the site itself, causing delays 
of up to twelve months on the project until the site became accessible again.  
However, it is also well known in the Antarctic fraternity that personnel/stakeholders 
have no real control, as the weather and the environment control everything, often 
being referred to as the ‘Antarctic Factor’. 
8.3.2 West Darfur Sudanese HA Case-Study Findings Pertinent to 
the Support of the Model’s Four Key Factors  
Value generation was acknowledged as a key factor on this Humanitarian Aid (HA) 
project, and was measured quantitatively in terms of how many lives were saved and 
fed, and the number of built outputs achieved in rebuilding the villages, and 
establishing a reliable and continual supply line of food and water. 
Knowledge Integration was strongly acknowledged as a key factor on Humanitarian 
Aid projects. The participants identified a number of gaps in knowledge integration. 
Examples included situations where very specialised personnel were brought in to the 
sites, but they could not do what they were best at due to a lack of a reality check at 
the preplanning stage between the plan set by office staff remote from the site, and the 
actual in-the-field needs. In addition no-one wanted to trespass on another’s area of 
perceived expertise, so the best solutions were potentially missed, and sometimes 
there was too much specialised knowledge on a project. What was needed was a more 
holistic approach. 
Process Integration was acknowledged as a key factor too, being realized for 
example, when trying to achieve coordination amongst the various aid agencies and 
their specifically targeted plans. Also when trying to build workable relationships 
between the IDPs and international aid communities at the ‘camp’ level, whilst 
keeping to a tight budget and timeframe. 
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Timely decision-making was strongly acknowledged as a key factor on this and other 
HA projects, and that the timing and reality of decisions made were pivotal to the 
success or potential failure of this and other humanitarian aid projects. Examples 
being the recurring criticism (by interviewed participants) of how the centralised 
decision-making process of some aid agencies, and a lack of delegated authority to 
field personnel often hindered progress and communications at the critical emergency 
response and recovery stages.   
8.4 The Usefulness of the Model and the Changes over Time 
The analysis of the data findings from the interviews conducted on the Sudanese 
Humanitarian Aid project, suggest that the conceptual design management model 
for remote sites by Kestle and London, (2002), is relevant in a non-profit and/ or 
humanitarian aid context, because the conceptual model essentially allows for a 
blending of traditional and modern management methods which apply on these 
projects. The analysis of the data findings from the interviews conducted on the Cape 
Roberts Drilling project, suggest that the conceptual design management model for 
remote sites by Kestle and London, (2002), is relevant for these commercial scientific 
projects as it recognises the realities and the politicization that occurs on international 
collaborative projects such as the Cape Roberts Antarctic Drilling project.  
The issue and impacts of politicization on these international projects added to the 
management challenges across all aspects, and all stages of the projects, and included 
the impacts on the stakeholders, clients, logistics, finances, site and office personnel, 
the processes, and the final outcomes for these international collaborative projects.  
Differing languages, differing cultural, work and organisational structures at the 
planning and operational stages, have to be acknowledged and addressed on future 
projects in the process documents when delegating effective decision-making 
authority, and when planning to manage personnel in-the-field’, or ‘on-site’. 
On reviewing the findings and analyses from Chapters 6 and 7, the usefulness and an 
unexpected portability of the conceptual model has emerged, as a result of  testing it 
across the very different disciplines of Antarctic Science and Humanitarian Aid post- 
disaster projects on remote and frequently environmentally sensitive sites.  
The initial intent and objective around the development of the conceptual 
management model for remote sites have evolved over time, and the model has started 
to take on a few new dimensions and uses. One use for the model was as a  
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‘management tool’ where it was found to be effective in understanding the issues 
related to the provision of Humanitarian Aid, and for modelling and analyzing 
situations, as attested on the Humanitarian Aid Project in West Darfur (Kestle & 
Potangaroa, 2006). Another use for the model, on both of the main case-study projects 
was as a management framework for comparing what was seen and experienced in-
the-field with what was originally planned by in-the-office management personnel 
often distantly located from the sites and with little or no in-the-field experience. The 
extent and potential for the management framework’s portability, could be developed 
further by documenting applications of the model by future practitioners in the 
Antarctic science, humanitarian aid and post-disaster reconstruction fields.  
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this research was to develop and validate a conceptual design 
management model for remote sites, in order to answer the research question: 
“What are the key factors and drivers that constitute a plausible theoretical conceptual 
design management model for remote sites?”  
The approach taken involved several stages of research investigation, commencing 
with a review of lean and design management literature and investigating, in part, 
three previously completed world heritage site projects across a range of 
geographically remote locations, in order to develop a typology and an exploratory 
conceptual design management model for remote sites. The model emerged from a 
synthesis of production and sociologically-oriented world views associated with the 
reviewed lean design and design management theoretical and applied research 
literature, in the Architecture, Engineering, Construction, Conservation and 
International Science disciplines. The conceptual model identified the perceived 
importance of an integrated approach to the management of these remote site 
international collaborative projects.  
The next stage involved testing the newly developed model by conducting a 
retrospective case-study of the Cape Roberts Antarctic Drilling Project (1995-2001), 
in 2003-2005, and a case-study of the UN Humanitarian Aid Project in West Darfur, 
Sudan in 2004, using face-to-face interviews with selected participants. The Antarctic 
community were keen to have an ‘outsider’ actively review the project from a 
management perspective, as were the Humanitarian Aid community.  
The findings (refer Chapter 8) lent significant support to the model and to the 
associated typology for remote sites. This was especially pertinent given that 
Humanitarian Aid projects are probably amongst the worst situations that one could 
select to test, given the random nature of emergencies needing to be managed, the 
lack of forewarning for the specialist personnel, the wide range of agencies and their 
expectations, and management approaches. They are also different in many ways to 
the Antarctic Science project(s), in terms of there being an opportunity to pre-plan the 
Antarctic Projects, but the challenge there is always the Antarctic Factor. 
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The comparative findings were discussed in some detail in Chapters, 6, 7 and 8, and 
the key points are summarised as follows: 
1. The conceptual design management model can be applied to: 
? international science projects 
? humanitarian aid projects 
? eco-resort projects with an environmental education focus 
? national park conservation site projects.  
2. The conceptual design management model: 
? is relevant in non-profit and/or humanitarian aid contexts 
? allows for a blend of traditional and modern management methods 
on humanitarian aid projects in particular 
? recognises the realities of politicization and differing organisations 
on international collaborative remote site projects. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, there were a significant number of similarities between the 
findings on the Antarctic and Sudanese Humanitarian Aid projects, regarding the 
validity of the remote site management model, despite their very different disciplines, 
stakeholder goals/expectations, and approaches to managing the projects. The findings 
regarding the usefulness and fit of the conceptual design management model with the 
realities of managing the two main case-study projects selected were very 
encouraging, and at times surprising, in terms of how well the model stood up to the 
in-field testing with the selected participants. The model works for both contexts. 
This was certainly not expected at the outset of the research, but added weight to the 
value, usefulness and portability of the model across a range of very different 
disciplines. This gave weight to the notion/idea of ‘model portability’ as discussed in 
Chapter 8, and leads to the discussion on the potential directions that future research 
may take, in Chapter 10. 
 
 
 174
CHAPTER 10. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Subsequent research work has already commenced. Further testing of the conceptual 
model by in-the-field practitioners and researchers has been undertaken from 2004-
2008 on the post-disaster reconstruction tsunami relief project in Banda Aceh, 
Indonesia (Potangaroa & Kestle, 2008). The objective of the research on this project 
was to establish where perceived and actual value was added to the beneficiaries, by 
the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) as a part of their Tsunami Relief Programme.  
Following further with the Humanitarian Aid theme and the notion of ‘model 
portability’, given the findings as discussed in Chapters 6,7 and 8 in particular,  there 
is the prospect for: 
? The development of a project planning framework specifically for 
Humanitarian Aid projects built from the conceptual design management 
model for remote sites, which ensures that the significant ‘gaps’, identified by 
the respondents and interpreted from the data collected from the West Darfur 
Humanitarian Aid Project in Sudan, are addressed.  
? The documentation of further applications of the conceptual design 
management model by future practitioners in the Antarctic Science, 
Humanitarian Aid and post-disaster reconstruction fields. 
In addition, there are several other potential research developments and investigations 
that could be undertaken that build from and align with this doctoral research, 
particularly when reflecting on the work by Winter et al. (2006). Those research 
findings supported ‘theoretical models for practice’, (such as the conceptual design 
management model for remote sites in this thesis). In their research work Winter et 
al.,(2006) called for “new models and theories which recognise and illuminate the 
complexity of projects and their management at all levels”, “concepts that focus on 
the interaction amongst people and the framing of projects within an array of social 
agendas, practices, stakeholder relations, politics and power,” and “concepts and 
frameworks which focus on value creation as the prime focus of projects.” They 
asserted that “theories about practice can also be used as theories for practice.” The 
network project data analysis also established that future research needs to specifically 
focus on creating theories and concepts which are closely aligned with in-the-field 
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realities, and which provide project practitioners with realistic and contemporary 
management frameworks.  
The data collected from the practitioners by the research network referred to the 
complexity of projects, created in the main by ‘the multiplicity of stakeholders and 
their differing agendas’, and ‘theories, practices and communications operating within 
the different interest groups’. They suggested that concepts and frameworks which 
would help them deal with the project complexity issues ‘in the midst of practice’ 
would be useful. Such concepts and frameworks need to recognise interdisciplinary 
approaches, social processes, project conceptualisation, value creation and value 
management. This presents one of the key challenges for future research that leads 
directly from this work. 
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